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Response to On-Site Due Diligence Questionnaire

Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System

May 26, 2023

Presented by:

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For

RVK – General Consultant

Timeline

Date of Inquiry issuance	March 22, 2023
Deadline for submission of response	5:00 pm PST, May 26, 2023
Interview dates	June 1 – June 2, 2023
Tentative final presentation to Board	June 28, 2023

Delivery of Response to Questionnaire

Proposals are to be delivered as follows:

One (1) electronic version to be delivered to:

Investments Team
Investments@sbcers.org

A. Professional Staff

1. **Please list all members of the firm who would have direct responsibility for SBCERS' Private Credit portfolio or who would otherwise be key or regular contacts for SBCERS' account. (add rows as necessary).**

Name and Title	Job Function	Primary Office location	Years with Firm	Total years of Private Credit Consulting
Marcia Beard Senior Consultant, Principal	Investment Consulting	Portland, OR	27	10*
Matthias Bauer, CFA Senior Consultant, Principal	Investment Consulting	Portland, OR	16	7*
Paige Blaser Associate Consultant	Investment Consulting	Boise, ID	9	7*
Jordan Masukawa Investment Associate	Investment Consulting	Portland, OR	4	0
Joe Ledgerwood, CFA Director of Investment Manager Research, Principal	Manager Research	Portland, OR	13	N/A
Steve Hahn, CFA Director of Alternative Markets Team, Principal	Manager Research	Portland, OR	16	20
Reed Harmon, CFA Manager Research Consultant, Principal	Manager Research	Portland, OR	9	1
Tricia Lynn, CFA, CAIA Manager Research Consultant	Manager Research	New York, NY	2	7
Todd Simones Senior Manager Research Analyst	Manager Research	Portland, OR	1	6
Layne Johnson Manager Research Analyst	Manager Research	Portland, OR	2	1

*As general consultants, Marcia, Matthias and Paige have experience including Private Credit in asset allocation studies, asset class structures, and manager search and selection.

2. **For Private Credit specifically list primary director(s)/analyst(s), backup director(s)/analyst(s), and support personnel complete the following information in the format below:**

Investment Professional Information
Name: **Joe Ledgerwood, CFA**
Title: **Director of Investment Manager Research, Principal**
Role and/or Function: **Primary Director**
Primary Office Location: **Portland, OR**
Number of years of experience in institutional investments: **21**
Number of years of experience in investment consulting: **21**
Number of years with the firm: **13**
Educational degrees: **BBA**
Professional designations: **CFA**
Number of clients as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Number of clients as Secondary Consultant: **N/A**
Names of clients for whom Consultant serves as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Equity ownership in the firm (%): **1.48%**

Investment Professional Information
Name: **Steve Hahn, CFA**
Title: **Director of Alternative Markets Team, Principal**
Role and/or Function: **Primary Director**
Primary Office Location: **Portland, OR**
Number of years of experience in institutional investments: **27**
Number of years of experience in investment consulting: **27**
Number of years with the firm: **16**
Educational degrees: **BS**
Professional designations: **CFA**
Number of clients as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Number of clients as Secondary Consultant: **N/A**
Names of clients for whom Consultant serves as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Equity ownership in the firm (%): **0.81%**

Investment Professional Information
Name: **Reed Harmon, CFA**
Title: **Manager Research Consultant, Principal**
Role and/or Function: **Conducts research within multi-asset strategies**
Primary Office Location: **Portland, OR**
Number of years of experience in institutional investments: **14**
Number of years of experience in investment consulting: **14**
Number of years with the firm: **9**
Educational degrees: **BBA, BA, and MS**
Professional designations: **CFA**
Number of clients as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Number of clients as Secondary Consultant: **N/A**
Names of clients for whom Consultant serves as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Equity ownership in the firm (%): **0.48%**

Investment Professional Information
Name: **Tricia Lynn, CFA, CAIA**
Title: **Manager Research Consultant**
Role and/or Function: **Conducts research within Private Credit**
Primary Office Location: **New York, NY**
Number of years of experience in institutional investments: **18**
Number of years of experience in investment consulting: **18**
Number of years with the firm: **2**
Educational degrees: **MBA, BA**
Professional designations: **CFA, CAIA**
Number of clients as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Number of clients as Secondary Consultant: **N/A**
Names of clients for whom Consultant serves as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Equity ownership in the firm (%): **N/A**

Investment Professional Information
Name: **Todd Simones**
Title: **Senior Manager Research Analyst**
Role and/or Function: **Assists RVK's Private Credit Director in conducting research and due diligence**
Primary Office Location: **Portland, OR**
Number of years of experience in institutional investments: **13**
Number of years of experience in investment consulting: **13**
Number of years with the firm: **1**
Educational degrees: **BA**
Professional designations: **N/A**
Number of clients as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Number of clients as Secondary Consultant: **N/A**
Names of clients for whom Consultant serves as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Equity ownership in the firm (%): **N/A**

Investment Professional Information
Name: **Layne Johnson**
Title: **Manager Research Analyst**
Role and/or Function: **Assists RVK's Private Credit Director in conducting research and due diligence**
Primary Office Location: **Portland, OR**
Number of years of experience in institutional investments: **2**
Number of years of experience in investment consulting: **2**
Number of years with the firm: **2**
Educational degrees: **BS**
Professional designations: **N/A**
Number of clients as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Number of clients as Secondary Consultant: **N/A**
Names of clients for whom Consultant serves as Lead Consultant: **N/A**
Equity ownership in the firm (%): **N/A**

3. Identify and explain the role of backup director(s)/analyst(s), and other contingency plans in the case of key professionals and/or primary personnel leaving.

RVK and its investment professionals operate in a team setting, providing several benefits for our clients, including continuity of service. In the unlikely event that a member of your assigned team leaves the firm or is unavailable, our senior management will propose an experienced professional within the firm to replace the individual, for pre-approval by SBCERS.

A key benefit of our team-based consulting model is institutional knowledge of our clients is not lost if a team member leaves the firm; rather, it is maintained via "Master Files," which contain a historical narrative of information about each client. These files include meeting summaries, asset allocation decisions, and all relevant action items executed by RVK since the inception of each client relationship. Further, other members of the team will continue to be available via a dedicated client service team email. While members of our Private Credit research team will underwrite the deals, RVK's Lead Consultants are familiar with the deals and will verify their suitability for the overall SBCERS program.

It is important to note that three of our four proposed consultants are shareholders of the firm, providing SBCERS with team stability and continuity of service.

4. How does your firm determine which primary director(s)/analyst(s), backup director(s)/analyst(s), and support personnel will be assigned to a particular account?

We believe it is important to assign clients a service team that specializes in their respective plan type, as there are substantial differences between public plans, corporate plans, endowments and foundations, defined contribution plans, and so forth. Therefore, when responding to a Request for Proposal for a prospective account, we design a service team comprised of professionals who have direct experience with a prospect's plan type(s) and the required scope of services, as well as sufficient capacity to service the prospect.

Collectively, the team members outlined in this response meet this criteria, including extensive experience working with public fund clients and underwriting deals of this size and complexity.

5. For the proposed primary and all backup director(s)/analyst(s), assigned to the SBCERS account, using the format below, provide the client's name, plan type (i.e. public, corporate, endowment/foundation, etc.), the role of the consultant(s), length of relationship with the stated client, client's total plan size and client's Private Credit program size (based on total commitments as of December 31, 2022). (add rows as necessary)

The professional staff listed in the table in Question A.1 primarily represents RVK's Investment Manager Research Team, a dedicated resource for all clients. Considering the spirit of this question, we do not feel it appropriate to list our general consulting team's clients and their private credit programs, but rather, to provide the following list of clients for whom RVK has assisted with private credit allocations. Data is as of 12/31/22.

Client Name	Assets Placed in PC ($MM)
AAA Club Alliance, Inc.	$21
AAA Washington Corporate Assets	$10
Albuquerque Community Foundation	$2
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota	$465
Blue Cross of Idaho Health Service	$107
California Field Ironworkers Pension Trust	$205
California Teachers Association Employees Retirement Benefit Trust	$55
City of Jacksonville Police and Fire	$160
City of Lincoln Police and Fire	$12
Confidential College Client	$9
Confidential Corporate Pension Plan	$118
Edison Pension Trust	$68
Electrical Insurance Trustees	$120
Fuller Foundation	$7
Kansas City, Missouri Employees' Retirement System	$31
Kansas City Police Employees' Retirement Systems	$52
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power	$375
Montage Health & Related Corporations	$10
Municipality of Anchorage	$20
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association	$270
New York State Common Retirement Fund	N/A*
North Dakota Board of University and School Lands	$900
Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation	$100
Pinnacol Assurance	$305
Portland Art Museum Endowment Fund	$1
San Francisco Opera Association	$7
Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System	**$185**
Santa Fe Opera	$5
Shimon Ben Joseph Foundation	$115
St. Luke's Health Foundation	$3
St. Luke's Health System	$88
State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Funds Office	$267
Southern California Local 83 Employer Pension Trust	$48
Teachers' Retirement System of Illinois	N/A*
Vermont Pension Investment Committee	$664

*Represents clients with specialty consultants for whom RVK assisted with PC-specific projects.

6. What policies are in place to control the workload and the number of clients serviced by each director(s)/analyst(s),? Is there a limit on the number of accounts that a consultant may handle?

All members of RVK's 24-member Investment Manager Research Team—including our Private Credit specialists outlined in A.1—serve as a dedicated resource to all RVK clients. As such, they do not typically maintain a bona fide list of accounts.

As it relates to our general consulting staff, there is no specific limit on the number of assets or clients we will accept over time. The number of client teams, however, that a consultant may serve on depends on numerous factors, including complexity of a client's portfolio, meeting frequency, a client's scope of work, location and travel requirements, and the specific role the consultant is required to play on the client team. RVK's CEO and President regularly review client loads for each professional to facilitate optimal capacity utilization and delivery of client-focused consulting service.

7. Explain how junior level staff are trained and developed to assume more senior level positions and cite the criteria used to promote them.

RVK's goal has been, and continues to be, expansion of our hiring net to attract and retain highly qualified investment professionals and corporate talent across the country. We seek to hire primarily at entry-level positions and promote from within—as evidenced by 22 promotions of junior staff to more senior positions within the Investment Manager Research Team during the last three years.

RVK's professional staff are evaluated and rewarded based upon the following criteria:

- Creative, effective consulting services
- Highly responsive client service
- Thought leadership contributions
- Close collaboration within our team-focused consulting model

We also encourage and support our junior level staff in pursuing professional development courses, such as the CFA, CAIA, FRM, and/or MBA programs, with financial assistance from the firm. RVK recognizes that its number one asset is the people who work for the firm. Accordingly, we invest time and money to facilitate the hiring, training, and retention of the best professionals possible.

8. Which of the following types of incentive compensation are provided to staff? Please indicate whether the compensation applies to all staff, senior staff, key employees, or principals only. How does the firm tie client performance and satisfaction to a consultant's performance?

Type of Compensation	Yes/No	All	Senior/Key	Principals
Bonus		Yes	Yes	Yes
Profit Sharing		Yes	Yes	Yes
Stock Ownership		No	Yes	Yes
Stock Options		No	No	No
Other Equity Participation		No	No	No
401(k) or Other Deferred		Yes	Yes	Yes
Other (Please specify):		N/A	N/A	N/A

RVK ties client performance and satisfaction to consultant performance by evaluating how well our clients' investment results compare to similar funds with comparable risk. Our goal is for clients to perform significantly above median over the long term. RVK has quality control procedures in place to facilitate a high quality and consistent approach to providing investment consulting for clients, including a team approach and peer reviews. We also solicit feedback as we want to know how clients perceive our services and consultant performance.

9. Does the lead director(s)/analyst(s), who would be assigned to SBCERS' account have a minimum of ten (10) years of experience (as of December 31, 2022) in Private Credit investments or Private Credit consulting to institutional fund clients including public and/or private pension plans? (Indicate "Yes" or "No").

No. Although an RVK client made their first allocation to Private Credit in 2013, we did not start making a meaningful number of recommendations until 2016. Steve Hahn, RVK's Director of Alternatives Market Research, has over 20 years of private markets manager research experience, which includes experience researching mezzanine debt, venture debt, and distressed debt strategies. Those strategy types, generally considered private credit strategies today, were considered private equity strategies previously.

As shown in the chart on the next page, private credit was very much a niche investment strategy as recently as 2014, with less than $75 billion of capital raised. Although that number has tripled, it still pales in comparison to private equity. For example, in 2014 total capital raised in private equity was over $430 billion and nearly doubled by the end of 2022.



10. Has the lead director(s)/analyst(s), been with the firm for at least five (5) years? (Indicate "Yes" or "No").

Yes.

11. In column 2 below, indicate the number of total professional staff the firm currently employs in each of the categories listed in column 1. (Each person should be assigned to only one category).

(1) Category of Staff	(2) Number of Staff
Senior Investment Professionals (Consultants and/or Portfolio Managers)	53
Junior Investment Professionals (Investment Analysts)	58
Dedicated Executive Management Staff	3
Other Non-Investment Professionals	0
Technical/IT staff	4
Administrative staff	18
Total Staff	**136**

12. Provide the average number of clients assigned to Private Credit director(s)/analyst(s), in the firm, in both lead and support roles. Indicate the maximum limit, if any, on the number of clients assigned per consultant.

Role as Consultant	Average No. of Clients	Maximum Limit per Consultant if applicable
Lead Consultant	N/A	N/A
Support Consultant	N/A	N/A

13. Of the director(s)/analyst(s), listed above, how many are fully dedicated to Private Credit consulting? Do consultants work on other asset classes?

Tricia Lynn, Todd Simones, and Layne Johnson are fully dedicated to conducting Private Credit research while Reed Harmon spends approximately 75% of his time in the space, with his remaining time focused on GTAA and other multi-asset strategies. As noted previously, Steve Hahn spends 100% of his time leading the Alternatives Markets Research Team, while Joe Ledgerwood spends 100% of his time overseeing RVK's entire Investment Manager Research Team.

14. How many staff have acquired professional designations such as the CFA, CAIA, FSA, etc.? How many are currently enrolled in these programs?

The chart below represents the number of professional designations, and those currently enrolled in the applicable programs, across our entire firm.

Professional Designation	Acquired	Enrolled
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA)	20	1
Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA)	7	1
Fellow of the Society of Actuaries (FSA) or Member of the American Academy of Actuaries	1	0
Other (specify): Juris Doctor (JD), Master of Business Administration (MBA), Master of Public Administration (MPA), Master of Finance (MFIN), Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Financial Risk Manager (FRM)	17	0

15. Using the following table, indicate the number of discretionary Private Credit consulting clients that the firm and lead consultant currently has by length of service with the firm, as of December 31, 2022.

Length of Service	Number of Clients (Firm)	Number of Clients (Lead Consultant)
Less than 1 year	Not applicable	Not applicable
1-4 years		
5-10 years		
Over 10 years		

16. Using the following table, indicate the number of advisory Private Credit consulting clients that the firm and lead consultant currently has by length of service with the firm, as of December 31, 2022.

Length of Service	Number of Clients (Firm)	Number of Clients (Lead Consultant)
Less than 1 year	0	Not applicable
1-4 years	6	
5-10 years	13	
Over 10 years	16	

As previously mentioned, RVK did not start meaningfully researching Private Credit for clients until 2016. As such, the data above represents the total number of years our current Private Credit clients have been with RVK.

17. Using the following table, please indicate staff turnover, specific to Investment Manager Research Resources team, over the past five calendar years (2018-2022), place an (*) by the name if the person was considered to be Key Personnel by the firm:

RVK's Investment Manager Research staff is stable and has remained so during the past five years. As detailed on the next page, 16 professionals departed the research team during this period while RVK hired or promoted 16 professionals. Of those that departed during this time period, three (3) were considered key personnel members and three (3) highly qualified professionals were promoted to replace them. It is RVK company policy to not disclose names of employees without their express permission; therefore, they are redacted in the following table.

Position	Years with the Firm	Date of Departure	Reason for Leaving
Director of Investment Manager Research, Principal*	24	1/2/2019	Desired to Move Back to Hometown; Joined Local RIA
Manager Research Analyst	4	1/25/2019	Personal Reasons
Senior Manager Research Analyst	7	2/15/2019	Personal Reasons
Senior Manager Research Analyst	6	5/10/2019	Joined a Competitor
Manager Research Analyst	2	5/29/2019	Joined Other Industry
Manager Research Analyst	6	12/31/2019	Joined Other Industry
Manager Research Analyst	2	10/15/2020	Joined Other Industry
Director, Traditional and Alternative Credit, Principal*	11	1/8/2021	Joined a Competitor
Manager Research Analyst	4	4/21/2021	Joined Asset Management Firm
Senior Manager Research Analyst	6	8/23/2021	Joined Other Industry
Senior Manager Research Analyst	3	11/30/2021	Joined a Competitor
ODD Manager Research Consultant	3	2/25/2022	Joined Other Industry
Manager Research Consultant	7	6/6/2022	Joined a Competitor
Manager Research Consultant	5	6/9/2022	Personal Reasons
Manager Research Analyst	2	11/3/2022	Joined Financial Advisor/Broker-Dealer
Manager Research Consultant, Principal*	11	11/11/2022	Joined Asset Management Firm

18. What is total staff turnover (in percentage) over the past five calendar years (2018-2022)?

Details of professional departures are provided below, by Consultants, Research, and Technical personnel.

Personnel Group	Turnover Rate (Excludes Promotions)
Consultants	9%
Research	15%
Technical	25%*

*This rate includes Investment Analysts in our Performance Measurement & Analytics Team and our administrative staff, which tend to experience a higher turnover rate, relative to other professional staff. The average tenure for these younger professionals is approximately two years. These departures represent normal turnover as they are entry-level positions; many of these employees are promoted to other departments within the firm, providing excellent opportunities for growth and advancement. Our Performance Measurement & Analytics Team and administrative staff remain at full strength, the former of which is RVK's largest and most robust department, providing critical performance reporting and analytics for our nearly 200 clients.

19. How does the firm manage the risk that key professionals leave the firm either as a group or individually?

RVK has a succession plan for every client service team whereby we have multiple consultant leaders serving on a client team, facilitating continuity of service. We also create a team email that includes every member of the RVK team to facilitate continuity of service when individuals are busy or out of the office.

We encourage all clients to use their team email address as an effective way to correspond with all members of their service team.

On a broader scale, RVK's succession plan rests on the following three key points:

1. Continue building a strong internal management team. In our seven-person Board of Directors (and our department/office managers), we have built and continue to develop a strong candidate pool.

2. Confirm that multiple demographics within the firm are represented within this candidate pool. The current ages of our managers and internal directors range from approximately 40 to 70, with the median age under 55.

3. Continue executing our equity ownership process that results in a broad number of RVK professionals serving as equity owners. We have such a process, which has led thus far to 34 professionals owning equity in RVK and participating in setting its direction.

There are no current plans for senior members of the firm to retire. For RVK's CEO and President specifically, Becky Gratsinger is at least ten years from typical retirement age while Jim Voytko (though in his 43rd year of institutional investing), has no interest in retiring. He continues to relish the challenges of institutional investing and exploring the many mysteries of the capital markets and investor behavior. Both Becky and Jim are in excellent health and have no other career interests beyond RVK.

Philosophy and Approach

20. Describe the firm's philosophy and approach with respect to Private Credit consulting for a defined benefit U.S. public pension plan. Would this philosophy and approach change with significant market disruptions or changing economic conditions? (maximum 1 page).

Consistent with our firm's general investment philosophy, RVK takes a customized approach with every client based upon their specific plan investment objectives, cash flow pattern, liquidity needs, and risk tolerance. We then work collaboratively to develop a portfolio structure, post asset allocation study, that best obtains the desired exposures in a cost-effective and return-optimizing manner. Managing diversification (and conversely concentration) in the implementation of investment mandates is critical to ensuring stability and efficiency in a portfolio.

Private credit traditionally compensated investors who were willing to tolerate less transparency and lower liquidity with an incremental return relative to comparable investments in public high yield fixed income securities. However, that is no longer the case across the entire private credit landscape. At this time, certain parts of the private credit space are being affected by many of the factors that have compressed expected forward returns in the public markets; therefore, these areas may offer only limited compensation for locking up investor capital for extended periods. As such, our recommendation for most private credit investors is to consider less crowded areas within private credit, and look for strategies that invest in niche markets that benefit from higher barriers to entry, which are also often less correlated with the broader market.

For investors that can tolerate a longer time horizon and possess a greater risk appetite, we may also recommend they consider a select series of co-investment opportunities.

The initial stage in any private credit program is developing the strategic plan for the private credit program. In this stage, the client's private credit program goals and objectives are established. Additionally, investment guidelines are created, which outline the statement of purpose, strategy and performance objective, private credit benchmark and volatility target, and investment parameters/limitations.

Once the private credit program direction has been established, the next step is portfolio construction. When constructing a private credit portfolio, it is essential to consider the program size and return target, the diversification and risk expectations, and the program pacing, liquidity, and structure. RVK's proposed private credit team believes a degree of diversification is typically necessary for most long-term private credit allocations in order to limit potential downside, to smooth the distribution of cash flows, and to optimize risk-adjusted returns. However, we also believe the level of diversification each client requires is directly linked to the client's goals, the size of their private credit allocation, the timing of their cash needs, and their overall risk tolerance. As such, the number of private credit funds and the fund-level allocation size in a private credit program should be unique to each client.

It should be noted that while we believe a minimum level of diversification is required for a private credit program to be effective, many institutional private credit programs may be over-diversified, leading to the inclusion of less compelling strategies and a potential dilution of returns. Specifically, one worrisome trend we have recently encountered is a "check the box" approach to private credit investing, where clients are pressured to maintain exposure to each subset of the private credit opportunity set in spite of overcrowding or a general lack of compelling opportunities in some areas. While we believe diversification has an important place in portfolio construction, we also acknowledge that maintaining permanent exposures to every type of private credit across every vintage year, regardless of opportunity set, is likely to be detrimental to long-term returns.

Lastly, RVK provides a customized performance report to clients that elect to receive full performance and risk reporting services. Many private credit investors rely on custodian banks or individual managers to provide performance updates, which in our experience, have been unreliable in reporting accurate and timely data. Additionally, without the benefit of a customized performance report that compiles data from underlying managers into the composite level, it is difficult to view a client's portfolio holistically on the composite level.

21. Does your firm favor or specialize in any particular strategy (core, value-add, and opportunistic) of the Private Credit market? Please elaborate on the pros and cons of the various strategies and how you might position SBCERS' Private Credit portfolio to gain diversification and achieve high levels of risk-adjusted returns (maximum 1 page).

The following is a representative list of the primary private credit strategies we cover:

- Asset-Backed Debt
- Direct Lending
- Distressed Debt
- Mezzanine
- Multi-Strategy
- Real Estate Debt
- Special Situations
- Specialty Finance

We do not favor a particular strategy but rather look at all strategies as tools to build an efficient private credit portfolio—defined as having the highest probability of producing the highest long-term returns for a given level of risk. We recognize that different portfolios have different needs, and that a "one size fits all" strategy is not appropriate; therefore, our approach to investment structure is agnostic as we seek to suit the needs of each client.

RVK's thorough review of private credit investment firms and strategies provides clients with assurance that recommendations come with an in-depth understanding of the quality of the organization and how the strategy would fit into their current portfolio.

22. Describe any quantitative factors used and their application at asset class level and/or investment level.

Stage 2 of our due diligence process entails quantitative information from various sources and people with the goal of identifying a manager's strengths and weaknesses. Below are the steps we typically employ:

- **Data request and review:** RVK requests that each GP complete our quantitative template and provide us with access to their dataroom. We then review the available materials, including Private Placement Memorandums (PPMs), Limited Partnership Agreements (LPAs), presentations, executive summaries, and biographies of key personnel.

- **In-depth investment walkthroughs:** This step typically represents a significantly more granular review of several past investment examples. RVK typically requests that a manager cover at least two investments from the past 12 months, and at least one investment that resulted in a loss on exit. Our line of questioning during these in-depth walkthroughs typically emphasizes sourcing, the presence of any barriers to the entry of other lenders, asset management, loan structure, and choice/implementation of covenants. If, following the in-depth investment walkthroughs, RVK determines the strategy to be a potential best-in-class offering, we request that the manager complete our quantitative template.

- **Quantitative track record analysis:** RVK's quantitative template requires a position-level look-through into the performance and structure of every past loan made by a strategy or core team. The track records we analyze typically include over 100 past loans, with a wide range of loan-level metrics such as attachment and detachment point loan-to-value, borrower debt/EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization), loan level yield, and loan size required for each position. Performance metrics center on the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Multiple On Invested Capital (MOIC) that each loan achieved upon exit. If, based on our track record analysis, the strategy continues to represent a potential best-in-class offering, RVK moves on to an in-depth analysis of the manager's chosen opportunity set. A sample of our quantitative template is available upon request.

- **Quantitative analysis of opportunity set:** The metrics used in this stage of due diligence can vary widely, due to differences in data available across different regions, sub asset classes, and peer groups. Typically, our evaluation of a manager's chosen opportunity set is intended to gauge the level of the opportunity set's inefficiency, its expected yield vs. other potential investment spaces, and the risk it represents compared to other parts of the private credit market. Our goal in evaluating the opportunity set is to determine, absent specific manager skill, whether the opportunity set represents an especially fertile area in which private credit capital may be prudently deployed.

Although RVK is willing to underwrite a strategy whose opportunity set is experiencing strong "headwinds" in cases where managers represent exceptional proprietary deal flow or investment skill, we typically focus most recommendations on less efficient parts of the private credit landscape with strong secular demand for private capital and high barrier to the entry of new lenders.

23. Describe any qualitative factors used and their application at asset class level and/or investment level.

Stage 1 of our due diligence/sourcing process entails the following qualitative factors:

- **Initial document and track record review:** When an opportunity is received, RVK's private credit team evaluates the manager's basic information, including marketing materials, the manager's investment track record, the manager's past performance compared to peer strategies with a similar vintage year, focus and targeted capital structure positioning, and the size and backgrounds of the investment team. If, based on this information, the strategy appears to be of institutional quality and does not intend to target a blacklisted opportunity set, RVK typically moves to the next stage of the due diligence process.

- **Introductory call/meeting:** An initial call is held, typically with one or more key investment professionals, to review the strategy's goals, basic risk-return profile, typical loan structure, key points of differentiation, and approach to the current private credit market environment. Details from the call/meeting are captured in a note that is posted in our research database.

- **In-depth call/meeting:** If the team deems that a manager merits further consideration, follow-up meetings and/or conference calls will be arranged to further explore the investment process, pipeline transactions, risk management philosophy, and more. The decision to conduct full underwriting is usually the result of reviewing a particular opportunity against a pipeline of prioritized potential investments. Our decision is based on the following criteria:
  - Unique and well-defined strategies that are core to the GP's expertise;
  - Investment teams that have a certain degree of proven investment capabilities and have worked together for at least a market cycle;
  - Successful historical investment track record;
  - Niche opportunity where there are high barriers of entry; and
  - Client interest in the fund.

  - **Reference calls:** These typically include several past investors with at least one past investor that chose not to continue investing with the strategy's fund series, at least one prior borrower, colleagues that worked with key investment staff in prior roles and, where possible, past employees that chose to leave the firm, and at least one lender with a history of bidding against the strategy in question.

  - **Terms/documentation review:** This includes a complete review of core documentation, including a strategy's Limited Partnership Agreement, a recommendation for corrections or improvements to be made via either side letter or fund-level document revision, and any remaining areas of concern. Fee negotiations are expected to be finalized either at or before this stage of the process.

No underwriting is complete without visiting a manager at their respective office(s). This relatively late stage of RVK's due diligence process is typically focused on navigating a strategy's systems, meeting with investment team members whom RVK has not yet had dialogue, and completing several more deal-level walkthroughs with the benefit of in-house systems, documentation, and staff. RVK also attempts to fill in any blanks left by other phases of the process, which vary widely for each due diligence process.

24. Briefly describe the firm's market outlook for the Private Credit investment markets.

The global macro-economic outlook greatly influences how we approach and focus our research not just in the private credit asset class, but in all asset classes. Current thoughts on the prevailing landscape include:

- The size of the private credit asset class has enjoyed consistent growth in recent years as a greater number of investors seek the benefits found in private credit, such as high risk-adjusted yield, low market sensitivity, and meaningful portfolio diversification.
- Since the Global Financial Crisis, fundraising has been robust, leading to overcrowding, compressed yields, and lower investor protections within many private credit strategies.

- Direct Lending continues to be the dominant strategy within Private Credit, as approximately half of the capital raised since 2017 has been committed to Direct Lending managers.
- RVK focuses on direct lending managers which benefit from substantial experience within their market segment, target low levels of borrower and fund-level leverage, and demonstrate a defensive strategy posture by emphasizing senior debt and strong covenants.
- Private credit median performance has been approximately 8% to 10% net IRR since 2007.
- Manager selection within private credit is essential, as the spread between the top and bottom performing private credit funds is significant, with an average differential of approximately 7.1% since 2007.
- Investors in private credit can generally expect an increased yield compared to their public fixed income portfolios, as private middle-market loans often provide a yield premium of 1% to 3% over securities of comparable credit quality in public fixed income markets.
- Senior loans in the direct lending market have historically offered lenders consistent all-in yields of between 6% and 8%, with an average yield of 6.7% from 2013 through 3/31/2022.
- Base rate floors, spreads and all-in yields have increased to historic highs, reaching an approximate 11% as of year end 2022.

How that may impact our thinking on some of the sub-strategies within private credit include:

A. Direct Lending:

- We are once again experiencing overcrowding as more competition floods the market. Many middle and upper-middle market lenders have essentially become "price takers," willing to accept increased leverage and weaker lender documents.
- We believe a risk-adjusted premium still exists in the lower-middle market, characterized by reduced competition leading to increased lender protections and yield.
- Strong lower-middle market lenders are gaining market share over their weaker competitors due to their performance in protecting investor capital during the pandemic. We expect this dynamic to continue over the course of the year.

B. Distressed Debt:

- A significant amount of capital entering the distressed debt space paired with low levels of defaults across below investment grade bonds and loans has led to a lack of compelling opportunities in traditional large-cap corporate distress.
- Our focus is on distressed managers with significant experience, compelling track records, the ability to invest in more niche opportunities outside of large-cap distress, and the capability to add value to companies at the operational level.

C. Asset-Backed Specialty Finance:

- Banks continue to exit the asset-backed specialty finance lending market, opening the door for private lenders.
- We believe the risk-adjusted relative value of private asset-backed specialty finance strategies remains compelling relative to more traditional and well-trafficked private lending opportunity sets, such as middle market direct lending.
- Top-tier strategies in this space can offer unlevered senior debt returns of 8-10% with strong structural protections and high levels of overcollateralization.

D. Opportunistic Lending and Special Situations:

- With the overcrowding of more commoditized private credit sub-strategies such as direct lending and distressed debt, RVK has shifted its focus to investment managers that lend to borrowers in niche opportunity sets or some form of complicated transition.
- RVK is seeking opportunistic lending and special situations managers with significant experience in their unique target markets, robust track records, and the ability to navigate complex events to generate expected returns of 10-15%.

25. Would the firm describe itself as more "bottom-up" or "top-down" in portfolio construction?

As previously mentioned, when constructing a private credit portfolio, we consider the program size and return target, the diversification and risk expectations, and the program pacing, liquidity, and structure.

We focus on three components during portfolio construction

1. Program Size and Return Target	Typical RVK Client Solution
Investor's Objective and Return Target	Augment the long term returns of the Fixed Income or Alt portfolio while providing risk control, diversification, and an attractive risk-adjusted return for the Total Fund
Source of Capital	Fixed Income, Hedge Funds, or Equities, among others
Target Allocation Size	2-10% Target Allocation

2. Diversification and Risk	Typical RVK Client Solution
Geographic Diversification	We believe that most investors should allocate opportunistically and globally based on the greatest relative value, as opposed to "set" percentage allocations
Appropriate Strategy Mix	Allocate opportunistically among private credit sub-strategies depending upon market cycle placement and relative value
Target Fund Size	Institutional quality size, typically $500 million or above
Tolerance for Fund-Level Leverage	RVK will typically avoid recommending funds with high levels of fund-level leverage

3. Pacing, Liquidity, and Structure	Typical RVK Client Solution
Number of Underlying Investments	8-10 fund series over the next 5-8 years
Investment Size	$25 - $200 million
Vintage Year Diversification	2 – 3 funds each year
Investment Time Horizon Restrictions	Varies by client
Structural Considerations	Varies by client

At the policy level, RVK's risk control strategies begin with a "top down" approach focusing on risk preference setting for the entire portfolio in the context of its investment purpose. Using various tools such as asset allocation optimization, Monte Carlo analyses, and risk budgeting via Mean Benchmark Optimization, we review the risk associated with various portfolio structures and assist clients in matching risk to investment objectives, taking into consideration the risk preferences of the fiduciaries.

26. How does the firm measure and compare relative differences of risk and return among strategies (core, value-add and opportunistic)? Please include as Exhibit #1.

RVK's performance reports include analysis of performance data and characteristics from the ground up, including individual positions, each fund, and a client's private credit composite. We regularly monitor client concentration in (and exposure to) each of the major risk dimensions within private credit, including:

- Strategy Type
- Vintage Year
- Firm/Fund
- Current Borrower Stability/Solvency
- Borrower Industry
- Borrower Geography
- Borrower Size
- Borrower Leverage (one proxy for Future Borrower Stability/Solvency)
- Capital Structure Focus
- Fund Leverage

Although each client's desired level of diversification is unique across each of these major risk dimensions, RVK strives to keep these within reasonable bounds for steady-state private credit programs. Because diversification is necessarily more limited in the early stages of the build-out of a private credit program, some clients also prefer to establish a foundation of several large, highly diversified strategies before branching out into more niche offerings.

If a client's portfolio-level exposures are found to fall meaningfully outside of the client's desired ranges or reasonable bounds, RVK will typically recommend that the client seek to bring the portfolio into balance through future capital commitments. For example, RVK may recommend that a portfolio with a substantial overweight to real estate debt "pause" the commitment of new capital to real estate debt heavy strategies for a period of time.

Similarly, if a new RVK client is found to have a portfolio consisting exclusively of cash flow backed corporate lending strategies (a relatively common occurrence), RVK may recommend that the client consider branching out into other parts of the private credit landscape, such as specialty finance or asset-backed debt, which are often less likely to correlate with the broad market cycle.

In extreme cases where there is an urgent need to immediately control portfolio-level risk, RVK may aid a client in the secondary sale of private credit assets. However, this is not a step that we typically recommend, as the discount at which private credit assets are sold in secondary markets is typically greater than the size of any loss those assets are likely to suffer if held to maturity.

Even in cases where clients are exposed to the potential mismanagement of private credit assets, RVK would typically recommend removal of the troubled manager and the installation of a more capable "transition manager," as opposed to a secondary sale. If an unacceptable level of risk is unexpectedly presented by a substantial portfolio-level overweight or underweight, RVK will typically take steps to evaluate whether the risk presented by this weighting might be most quickly and easily controlled through the application of a customized, derivatives-based hedge.

At the strategy level, risk is closely monitored through deal-by-deal transparency and reporting, which RVK requires of all strategies at the time of underwriting. This enables us to gauge the risk profile of each strategy across a wide range of different dimensions through the aggregation of each strategy's positions and their combined evaluation with our quantitative screening and risk measurement tools. RVK will be pleased to provide a sample quantitative screening report upon request.

In addition to our quantitative monitoring processes, RVK maintains ongoing, detailed dialogue with the management teams of all strategies to which our clients have meaningful exposure. This helps to verify that the risk and exposure characteristics represented by each strategy's investment pipeline are consistent with the client's expectations and the strategy's originally stated intentions.

Lastly, it is important to note that the degree of risk represented by any given strategy or portfolio-level overweight/underweight shifts over time, typically alongside changes in the broad market cycle. As such, while a given portfolio may represent an appropriate level of risk for some market environments, it may be prohibitively risky in others. RVK's recommended investments are, therefore, always made in the context of the range of market environments we believe each strategy could face over the full course of its life. We place particular emphasis on the bespoke, market-based stress testing we typically perform as part of our due diligence process.

From the perspective of operations, RVK conducts strategy-level operational due diligence independently from investment due diligence, with the goal of identifying the various aspects of operational risk that relate to private credit investing. At a high level, the operational risks we look to identify focus on several key areas, including:

- Evaluating the independence and competency of operations and trading personnel;
- Determining if the fund manager and third-party administrator have adequate controls in place to prevent fraudulent activity;
- Identifying and assessing the manager's procedures to control business risk including whether the fund has adequate systems in place for the strategy, procedures regarding segregation of duties, adequate compliance procedures, etc.;
- Evaluate co-investment and allocation procedures; and
- Identifying and assessing ethical concerns or conflicts of interests within the fund or manager.

Please reference Exhibit #1 for the 2023Q1 SBCERS quarterly performance report.

27. **Please provide samples of no more than three pages or short research communications on Private Credit provided to your clients. Attached as Exhibit #2.**

    Please reference Exhibit #2 for a Tear Sheet of the Angelo Gordon Evergreen Fund.

B. Asset Allocation

1. **Explain how the firm determines its Private Credit strategic allocation policy (i.e., the allocation between core, value-add, and opportunistic)? Please explain briefly.**

   Typically, most private credit programs comprise 5%-20% of a client's total portfolio allocation and between 10%-50% of their private markets allocation. The allocation size is determined by the profile and purpose of a client's private credit program and its suitability to portfolio-level goals. Depending on the size of a portfolio, this typically equates to between one and ten fund-level commitments per year, with a typical minimum of at least six active funds in each private credit program, and at least three to four different fund series. Commitment sizes typically range between $20 million and $150 million per fund, depending on a client's size and desired level of diversification.

2. **How does your global outlook influence your views on Private Credit programs and policy?**

   As mentioned previously, the global macro-economic outlook greatly influences how we approach and focus our research not just in the private credit asset class, but in all asset classes. Current thoughts on the prevailing landscape include:

   - The size of the private credit asset class has enjoyed consistent growth in recent years as a greater number of investors seek the benefits found in private credit, such as high risk-adjusted yield, low market sensitivity, and meaningful portfolio diversification.
   - Since the Global Financial Crisis, fundraising has been robust, leading to overcrowding, compressed yields, and lower investor protections within many private credit strategies.
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3. Describe the firm's coverage of U.S. vs Non-U.S. Private Credit markets. What resources does the firm utilize in sourcing and monitoring investments outside the U.S.?

RVK maintains a private credit deal log which keeps track of firms coming to market with new offerings in the foreseeable future. The log tracks the firm name, fund name, strategy type, primary geographic focus, target fund raising size, target return, expected close, and primary contact. This information is sourced through Preqin in addition to our regular interaction with managers. In most cases, managers for which RVK reviews and offer non-US strategies have a major US presence.

4. What is your internal policy for allocating Private Credit investment opportunities across clients? How do you allocate over-subscribed investment opportunities across clients? (If you have a written policy please attach as Exhibit #3)

As a non-discretionary advisor, RVK does not have discretionary or asset management lines of business to compete for resources or capacity-constrained investment allocations. RVK's Investment Manager Research Team has successfully, on many occasions, secured capacity in top-tier private markets strategies for client investment. RVK collaborates with clients to create bespoke portfolios, with a variety of asset allocation and manager strategies employed, and has not faced challenges with access or capacity for clients with interest in specific strategies.

In our advisory model, we provide client names and desired allocation amounts to a manager directly after the client has expressed interest or given approval, removing any internal allocation issues. As a result, we are not given a capacity amount and charged with allocating that amount equitably across our client base, as the manager/investor relationship lies with the client. If a situation arose where client interest exceeded available capacity, we would work closely with each client and the respective manager to secure the best allocation for each client situation, always advocating for the client.

To date, our pacing and forward calendar process has helped us avoid situations with multiple clients vying for an over-subscribed fund.

5. What are the different Private Credit asset segments that the firm will typically consider when planning an investment program?

When building an investment program, RVK recommends private credit segments across the following broad categories: direct lending, asset-backed, distressed/special situations, and specialty finance. Each is described on the next page.

- **Direct Lending:** Private loans to stable corporate borrowers which are backed by borrower cash flows.
- **Asset-backed:** Private loans to established corporate borrowers which are backed by borrower assets, such as pools of receivables, inventory, property, plant and equipment, royalty streams, or portfolios of investments owned by the borrower.
- **Distressed/Special Situations:** Debt investments in unstable borrowers where borrower companies may not be expected to persist as going concerns.
- **Specialty Finance:** Niche investments where targeted borrowers, loan structures, or collateral packages have atypical features.

6. **Outline the firm's process for monitoring and reporting on market trends.**

We aim to keep our consulting professionals apprised of industry developments via the following methods and tools:

- **Daily Market Update** – RVK investment professionals receive a brief capital market update at the beginning of each business day. The update includes key economic indicators, index performance, and the performance of a selection of recommended RVK managers.
- **RVK Investment Committee Meetings** – RVK's consulting professionals meet quarterly, or more frequently as needed, to discuss asset class themes, macro outlook, and new strategies for consideration.
- **Annual Capital Markets Assumptions** – Each year, RVK conducts a firmwide research initiative which culminates in the publication of our annual risk/return assumptions for every major asset class. Several internal educational sessions are held to facilitate communication of the changes in our assumptions for the year.
- **Team-Based Model** – Having consultants serve on multiple client service teams creates an environment of information sharing and helps to stimulate conversation among our professional staff on trends, solutions, and new ideas.
- **Manager Developments** – Investment consultants are apprised of manager developments via memorandums distributed by our dedicated Investment Manager Research Team. We continually meet with all managers approved for investments to identify meaningful changes in strategy, staff, organizational attributes and performance.
- **Conferences** – Our consulting staff continuously reviews academic and practitioner journals for emerging concepts and attends many major conferences (frequently as requested speakers) with an eye toward advancing our knowledge of contending investment approaches, new investment products, or major issues influencing the capital markets generally.

In addition to these methods, RVK has a thought leadership practice through which we keep clients abreast of market trends, strategies, and the changing legal landscape.

7. **Discuss the firm's experience and philosophy regarding direct investments or co-investments in Private Credit.**

In RVK's experience, the most important considerations in deciding the structure of a private credit portfolio are the client's ability to tolerate the administrative burden of direct funds, sensitivity to fees, and desire to tailor allocations to specific exposures or areas of investment. A portfolio of direct funds can be a significant burden in terms of staff resources and committee time. We have assisted clients with fund-of-fund portfolios, large direct portfolios, hybrid solutions involving a mix of both structures, custom separate accounts, and everything in between. Our view is that clients should carefully consider which structure is most suited to their goals. We are agnostic to portfolio structure and strive to understand each client's objectives and constraints before recommending the structure most likely to achieve them.

Should a client have specific goals or exposures for the private credit allocation, then a direct investment approach may be the only way to gain the desired exposure. Similarly, if the currently low second layer of fees of fund-of-funds is a non-starter, direct funds are likely the most appropriate choice. Should a client be interested in limiting the administrative burden, then fund-of-funds would likely be the appropriate choice, given the ease of selecting a single qualified partner and investing in each fund vintage. While fund of funds of the previous decade were often subject to over-diversification and high fees, the current market for these strategies offers interesting products with significantly lower fees than other fund of funds in the alternatives space.

RVK has also assisted clients with hybrid approaches, with commitments to direct funds, select fund-of-funds, and secondaries or co-investment funds where appropriate. Barring extreme resource limitations or a strong preference to tailor the portfolio in a specific manner, our default recommendation would likely fall into this category. We will be pleased to discuss these types of strategies in further detail with SBCERS.

C. Firm Capabilities and Implementation

1. **Indicate the types of investment strategies and vehicles that the firm has experience with for defined benefit U.S. public pension fund clients.**

Investment Vehicle	Experience: Yes/No
Open-End Commingled Funds	Yes
Closed-End Commingled Funds	Yes
Direct Investments	Not applicable
Public Private Credit Securities	Yes*
Co-Investment Opportunities	Yes

*For purposes of this response, we are considering business development companies as "public private credit securities."

2. Describe the optimal situation for using one of the following investment vehicle types versus the others (maximum 1 page):

i. Open-End Commingled Funds

Open-end funds are best utilized when a client wants exposure to an asset class with relatively stable risk/return characteristics and opportunity set. Income is typically the main driver of return. Direct lending would fall into this category.

ii. Closed-End Commingled Funds

Closed-end funds are best utilized when the opportunity to invest in an asset class is opportunistic and/or caused by a market dislocation. In these cases, the opportunity typically ends when economic conditions normalize. Capital appreciation tends to be a major driver of return in these cases. Distressed debt is an example of an asset class where this structure would be more optimal.

iii. Direct Investments

Direct investments are not typically utilized within private credit and are more typical when investing in real estate.

iv. Public Private Credit Securities

Public private credit securities (business development companies) make the most sense if an allocator wants to put capital to work immediately, or prizes liquidity, and is willing to accept the volatility that comes with investing in public markets. These securities can and do trade at discounts/premiums to their underlying net asset values.

v. Co-investment Opportunities

Co-investment opportunities are best for allocators with large staff and very large allocations to private markets. The operational complexity is more than made up for by the lower fee burden of the assets in the co-investment portfolio.

3. Explain the firm's overall investment process for a full service, non-discretionary relationship. Include how do you construct portfolios to optimize diversification across the number of general partner relationships, number of fund commitments, capital commitment per fund, etc.?

RVK's Private Credit Research Team provides specialty research and portfolio advisory services to clients investing across the private credit landscape, as shown on the next page.



RVK believes investor portfolios should be diversified along a number of axes, including, vintage year, stage of company, and size of company. We seek a diversified selection of private credit strategy types across the full market cycle:

Strategy Type	Growth	Slowing	Recession	Recovery	Growth
Direct Lending	35%	10%	5%	25%	35%
Asset-Backed / Real Estate Debt	25%	40%	35%	20%	25%
Specialty Finance	35%	40%	20%	30%	35%
Distressed Debt / Special Situations	5%	10%	40%	25%	5%

Presented for illustrative purposes only. Client specific recommended allocations should depend on individual investment goals and constraints. Please see the Appendix for strategy profiles and typical terms of each asset class.

4. Describe how the firm sources new investment opportunities. Does your firm prefer to strengthen existing relationships and do follow-on funds or seek new general partners to find added value? Explain how investment recommendations are identified and monitored within the firm.

As a result of our research efforts, RVK has developed strong networks within the private credit universe. As such, we often receive pre-marketing notifications from private credit managers regarding their fundraising plans. Additionally, RVK's research team proactively maintains ongoing communication with private credit managers, placement agents, allocators, and other industry participants with the express purpose of gathering information for sourcing potential investment candidates.

Our sourcing process is best summarized below:

- **Third-party data provider:** We use a third-party alternatives data provider, Preqin, as our primary database for tracking prospective private credit investments. This database includes fund statistics and performance data for the known universe of private credit funds across the globe.
- **Customized private credit deal log:** RVK maintains a robust proprietary database that includes a screening filter for all funds in the market.
- **Private credit team monthly meeting:** As needed, the private credit team discusses upcoming research priorities and the current pipeline. The current deal log is used as a basis for discussion.

Once a potential opportunity has been sourced through RVK's research efforts, the fund is included within RVK's proprietary deal log, a screening filter for all funds in the market and used for tracking each fund's primary strategy, geographic focus, target size, target return, and fundraising information, among other screening filters. Each fund within the deal log is assigned a priority level to determine which opportunities will move forward in our due diligence process.

5. What is your approach to allow the client to source its own partnerships funds for referral to the Private Credit consultant? Please describe any experience your firm may have in this arrangement.

Our Investment Manager Research Team has an open-door policy of meeting with all investment managers and strategies; we do not maintain a "buy list" of managers or strategies that are recommended to clients. Rather, RVK has a "client-first" culture whereby everything we do is customized to client needs and preferences. Before making a recommendation, however, we must first and foremost have confidence in a manager's firm, team, and process. We will not recommend the hiring of a manager/strategy solely based on client request, as we believe this would violate our fiduciary duty as a consultant.

RVK is agnostic pertaining to the source of investment ideas. While our research professionals have deep industry networks and routinely source opportunities from new and previously recommended general partners, we often receive investment ideas from clients. For some of our clients, we spearhead portfolio construction and lead fund recommendations while for others, we may operate more as a sounding board, providing feedback as clients source opportunities, and we conduct diligence alongside them.

As a part of these collaborative processes, we work with clients to provide both feedback and data (or manager comparisons) to assist in their evaluation process.

We have conducted our full due diligence on many client-sourced opportunities in the past, providing our formal recommendation where the opportunity qualifies as a "best idea" or clear feedback on why we feel other opportunities are more compelling. We have also reviewed opportunities for general prudence from clients, in cases where an investment fund may not represent what we feel is a best opportunity but is also not an unreasonable investment.

6. **Briefly describe the firm's experience with opportunistic, non-traditional Private Credit investments.**

   RVK has ample experience in the opportunistic and non-traditional space. This includes underwriting and recommending strategies in the distressed/dislocation space, as well as multi-strategy or opportunistic managers that are able to allocate across the different segments of private credit to quickly take advantage of prevailing market conditions.

7. **Describe the firm's partnership monitoring philosophy and process. What criteria are evaluated? How frequently are current client investments reviewed?**

   RVK is in regular communication with our clients' investment managers. Performance is monitored at least quarterly with qualitative reviews occurring annually (at a minimum) and more frequently as warranted. Qualitative reviews include firm, team, philosophy/process, and performance reviews. We look for consistency and stability within the firm and performance patterns that meet previously communicated expectations. Any material changes will trigger and further diligence to determine what, if any action is taken.

   Clients are kept abreast of any developments with their managers that could have a material impact on their ability to execute their mandate.

8. **How does the firm ensure compliance with terms of limited partnership agreements?**

   RVK verifies compliance with partnership agreements in two ways.

   1. A thorough review of the agreement and terms is conducted during the underwriting diligence stage. We compare a particular manager's terms and language versus industry standards and make suggestions to both clients and managers for items outside of market standards.

   2. We monitor a manager's activities on an ongoing basis through amendments and fund activities, with such examples as verifying that the manager is complying with reporting timelines, following stated investment guidelines (if any), and not experiencing any key personnel departures (potentially creating a trigger event).

9. How do you verify performance information provided by fund managers?

Data is entered into third-party databases by managers on a quarterly basis. RVK's research team verifies manager information (as provided in these databases) by meeting with managers in person or virtually. More often than not, the senior portfolio management professionals they meet with are not the people that complete the database on behalf of the firm, thus our meetings help to reconcile data from two different sources at the manager. We also cross-check returns entered into the databases to verify they are consistent with returns that managers show in their GIPS compliant presentations.

For private market managers, we verify data through our independent stress-testing as well as through third-party verification. We also conduct reference checks and spot checks of significant investments made by the manager. We verify that proper calculation of IRR and time-weighted returns are conducted as well as reviewing the net equity multiple, which best demonstrates the quality of the manager's returns and is also the most difficult type of performance metric to manipulate. We have found that many managers use various "tricks," including purchase of assets using subscription facilities, to artificially inflate IRRs. Therefore, we rely on net equity multiple in concert with IRR when evaluating a manager's performance.

10. Describe how you have been helpful in dissolving partnerships, assisting in a timely and orderly liquidation of assets, and selling off unwanted partnership positions.

Not applicable as we are a non-discretionary consultant.

11. Describe the firm's position on attending partnership annual meetings and serving on advisory boards. Are reports of such meetings made available to clients as part of the firm's basic consulting services?

RVK professionals do not take seats on advisory boards in adherence to our firm's independence and our no-conflicts-of-interest policy.

12. Provide a list of partnerships in which the firm or any employee of the firm currently holds an advisory board seat, and whether such relationships are on behalf of clients or the firm's Fund of Funds.

Not applicable.

13. Provide examples of portfolio status reports and other reports useful in ongoing monitoring of existing investments include as Exhibit #4.

Please reference Exhibit #4 for a sample Alternatives Investment Performance Report.

14. Provide a detailed description of the peer universe to which a client such as SBCERS would be compared. Describe how benchmarks are chosen or developed for clients and how performance is compared to similar portfolios.

RVK uses a wide variety of peer groups to provide an apples-to-apples comparison when ranking a total fund portfolio and investment managers. At the total fund level, we use two peer group universes: Mellon Analytical Solutions Trust Universe and Confluence Plan Sponsor Universe. The combined universes use actual client returns compiled from consultant and custodial data and are used to compare total fund composite results. The Master Trust Plan Sponsor Peer Group database includes performance and other quantitative data for over 2,000 plans which include public, corporate, endowment, foundation, healthcare, and Taft-Hartley plans.

Depending on client preferences, distinct peer groups can be established, such as: "all pensions greater than $3 billion". Other customizations are available related to asset structures, such as: "all pensions with real estate exposure capped at 10%".

We recognize that plan sponsors need benchmarks that reflect the long-term structure and biases of their total fund portfolio. To address this need, we use the following benchmarking philosophy, which is further explored in RVK's published white paper entitled, *Total Portfolio Benchmarking*.

- **Reference Portfolio:** A simplified blend of public equity and fixed income, which can be used to identify and measure the risk tolerance as set by the Board of Administration.
- **Target/Policy Index:** A normalized portfolio consisting of passive portfolios to reflect the fund's asset allocation policies.

15. Provide examples of other reports (internal and external) that would be useful in evaluating current investment activities and providing oversight of the investment program include as Exhibit #5.

Please reference Exhibits 5a and 5b for a sample Desktop Review and sample Due Diligence Report – Distressed Debt, respectively.

16. Please discuss how the firm approaches client education. Is education provided by the primary consulting team? If so, outline their areas of expertise or recent educational presentations. If education is done by other members of the firm, outline how they work with clients to provide educational materials.

RVK's educational programs vary based on client-specific preferences (i.e., conducting an offsite training versus focusing on one particular topic at each meeting). Our consultants are involved in developing training curricula for our clients and have extensive experience developing and conducting educational seminars. Seminars range in length from 30 minutes to several days and can be designed to appeal to an audience with various levels of investment experience. RVK also participates and leads client retreats that are focused on a variety of investment topics.

Specific examples of our educational programs range from presentations to clients on an extremely broad array of investment topics, peer fund trends (often using data drawn from RVK's Public Fund Survey) and technical topics (IRR vs Time Weighted Returns, Measuring and Monitoring Portfolio Risks, Defining and Using Statistical Investment Metrics, etc.). Special presentations are created for new trustee training sessions that incorporate not only standard issues and techniques in institutional investing but also the historical development of the portfolio they now oversee.

The consultants and associates who conduct client trainings each have impressive educational backgrounds, and many of them have pursued advanced educational and career-related post-graduate studies. RVK's team of Consultants and Associate Consultants collaborate internally on our firm's research initiatives and work on research topics to benefit our ongoing client relationships. Additionally, RVK's many practice experts can be brought to training and education sessions, depending upon the topic and specific individual's area of expertise (i.e., specialists in the areas of manager research, capital markets, asset/liability, custodian searches/reviews, etc.).

Lastly, RVK has a Thought Leadership practice through which we keep clients abreast of market trends, strategies, and the changing legal landscape. We offer three thought leadership products that extend our longstanding "shelf" of research presentations and white papers. These products include an intra-quarter "insights" article pertaining to current market events, a quarterly market review and commentary, and a periodic topical research paper. They equip our firm to develop investment insights and to understand the implications of emerging market data, while also enabling us to offer valuable perspective on actions that our institutional clients should consider (or sometimes avoid). Past topics of our white papers are available on our LinkedIn page and our website at the following URL: http://www.RVKInc.com/research/investment_perspectives.php.

D. Portfolio Management and Reporting

1. **Describe any comprehensive program-level risk management tools you use to understand and evaluate the various types of risk associated with a client's Private Credit program. Do these tools allow for look-through to portfolio companies?**

   We have refined our downside risk modeling tools substantially over the past decade to incorporate more realistic downside loss and probability scenarios than what the industry has historically relied upon. The goal of this exercise is to help clients evaluate the potential rewards (expected higher returns) against the potential risks (realistic downside loss potential) for any asset allocation changes under consideration as well as the associated probabilities. We have also frequently partnered with our pension client's actuarial consultants to help inform how these ranges of potential investment outcomes may impact key measurements, such as funding ratios and contribution requirements.

We have developed the "RVK Liquidity Metric" which enables clients to gauge the liquidity risks of the current allocation to various asset classes. As the liquidity of underlying securities is difficult to accurately quantify, we believe this measure should be used as a qualitative tool to determine the relative amount of liquidity in a portfolio. The characteristics considered when determining relative liquidity include trading volume, gates for redemption, leverage, nature of transactions, and pricing mechanisms. This measure is included in a client's quarterly performance report.

At the total portfolio level, we use both traditional asset allocation Mean Variance Analysis followed by Monte Carlo stochastic forecasts to assess current and prospective portfolio risk versus investment objectives and sponsor risk preference and requirements. Note that our Monte Carlo analysis uses a non-normal distribution thus introducing 'fat tail' market outcomes that are more realistic than typically normal distribution models.

At the asset class level, we use a Mean Benchmark Optimization process that allows us to allocate, in an optimal fashion, active risk within traditional asset classes, expressed as tracking error relative to the relevant asset class benchmark.

At a manager level, we consistently monitor prospective and current manager portfolio exposures and performance trends to verify that appropriate levels of benchmark relative risk are maintained and that each manager plays the expected structural role with the relevant asset class. Expected and historical beta, tracking error, downside deviation and down market performance are typical risk-oriented measures included in our analysis and performance reporting.

For many clients, RVK has implemented the FinAnalytica models through RiskPlus powered by FactSet in our risk management processes. This model produces annual total portfolio risk evaluation using non-normal modeling. It allows us to generate useful measures when evaluating portfolio risk, including:

- Contribution to risk
- Expected Tail Loss (ETL)
- Expected Tail Return (ETR)
- Factor Exposures
- Implied Returns
- Rachev Ratio (ETL/ETR)
- Robust Correlations
- STARR Performance (Excess Return/ETL)
- Value at Risk (VaR)

In addition to these total fund measures, the tool evaluates each major asset class for its factor betas to help assess whether each asset class contributes to total portfolio diversification, which is challenged in many cases by being dominated by equity risk despite best efforts to spread risk to other asset classes. RVK also provides customized risk management reports that address less standard needs, such as risk contribution analysis, beta exposure, thematic measures and liability analytics.

We do not charge additional fees for customized report requests.

2. **Does the firm keep a record of all recommendations made to clients? How are consultants' recommendations to client reviewed and monitored by your organization?**

   Yes. As a firm, we hold ourselves accountable for the recommendations we make to our clients as well as their outcomes. We electronically record each manager search requested by a client, including the unique requirements of the mandate, and electronically store the final search comparison and client communication. Manager turnover is low at approximately 5% annually. Portfolio manager turnover is one of the most common reasons for termination recommendations, followed by firm instability, product restructure, and performance/risk-adjusted performance concerns.

3. **Describe your performance measurement system:**

   i. **How are investments categorized in the system? Provide the specific characteristics unique to each strategy, region, and type.**

   Please see the table below:

Traditional Broad Category Universes	Number of Firms*	Number of Products		Alternative Asset Classes Main Strategy	No. of Active Firms	No. of Active Share Classes
Total*	**2,127**	**14,890**		**Total**	**2,629**	**7,485**
Equity				Absolute Return	348	622
All Global Equity	700	1,867		Currency	67	87
All US Equity	1,160	4,538		Distressed Debt	13	22
All EAFE Equity	329	773		Equity Long Short	1,294	2,373
All ACWI ex-US Equity	54	79		Infrastructure	18	14
All Emerging Mkts Equity	290	569		Mezzanine Debt	5	3
Fixed Income				Portable Alpha	21	13
All Global Fixed Income	286	949		Private Equity	45	54
All US Fixed Income	476	2,628		Real Estate Financing	22	17
All EAFE Fixed Income	14	20		Secondary Markets	5	4
All Emerging Mkts Fixed Income	127	336		Special Situations	17	39
				Venture Capital	3	1
Multi-Asset				Commodities	139	237
All Global Balanced / TAA	256	577		Credit Long Short	409	702
All US Balanced / TAA	90	173		Event Driven	144	224
All Lifestyle/Target Risk	34	109		Insurance	10	18
All Lifecycle/Target Date	41	809		Macro	830	1,912
				Multi Strategy	540	964
Other**	NA	323		Niche	126	86
				Real Estate	112	188
				Volatility	61	73

*Firms can be counted in multiple sub asset classes
**Includes products in a specialty universe or not yet defined

ii. Is the property level information used for both direct and commingled fund analysis?

Not applicable, as this refers to real estate data.

iii. Is the system proprietary or a third-party product?

It is a third-party product, engineered by Confluence.

iv. How many years of useable performance data are in your database?

The years of performance for each manager in our databases is available back to inception, enabling RVK to compare long-term performance for all asset classes.

v. What portfolio analytics are provided by the database?

Please see below for the extensive list of analytics that we provide to clients in their performance reports:

- Asset Allocation by Type, Tier, and/or Management Style
- Performance versus Benchmarks and Peer Groups at the Asset Class and Manager Level
- Risk & Return and Correlation Analyses
- Returns-Based Statistics and Style Analysis
- Manager Profiles (Performance, Risk Statistics, Portfolio Holdings, Sector and Region Allocation)
- Fee Analysis – Using Morningstar and eVestment peer group data, we rank investment managers' fees against an appropriate universe.
- Long-Term Performance of each Manager Compared to Indices and Relevant Peer Groups
- Returns Based Statistics including -
  - Attribution (Sector, Country, Composite)
  - Time-weighted Rate of Return
  - Internal Rate of Return
  - Standard Deviation
  - Sharpe Ratio
  - Alpha
  - Beta
  - R-Squared
  - Treynor Ratio
  - Downside Risk
  - Tracking Error
  - Information Ratio
  - Consistency
  - Excess Return vs. Risk Free/Market
  - Excess Risk
  - Simple Alpha
  - Up Market Capture
  - Down Market Capture

  - Actual Correlation
  - Excess Correlation
- Domestic and International Equity Manager Portfolio Characteristics -
  - Top Ten Holdings
  - Weighted Average Market Cap
  - Median Market Cap
  - Price/Earnings Ratio
  - Price/Book Ratio
  - 5 Year EPS Growth Rate
  - Current Yield
  - Beta
  - Number of Stocks
  - Distribution of Market Capitalization
- Domestic and Int'l Equity Manager Portfolio Sector and Region Diversification and Stock Selection
- Domestic and Int'l Fixed Income and Stable Value Manager Portfolio Characteristics, including:
  - Effective, Modified, and Spread Duration
  - Convexity
  - Yield to Maturity
  - Yield to Worst
  - Average Maturity
  - Average Quality
  - Coupon Rate
  - Current Yield
  - Holdings Count
  - Sector Allocation
  - Crediting Rate (stable value)
  - Wrap Providers (stable value)
  - Market-to-Book Ratio (stable value)

This is not an exhaustive list of the metrics, but rather representative.

vi. How are these analytics used in evaluating manager performance and portfolio construction?

Taken as a whole, we use these analytics to continuously monitor the success of our clients' investments based on simple, yet powerful, metrics including:

- Are investment managers compliant with established policies (e.g., meet credit quality guidelines, duration targets, etc.)?
- How did individual managers perform (e.g., outperform their benchmark, rank in the 40th percentile or better over a market cycle, etc.)?
- Is the client operating in line with their investment policy?
- How do investment management fees rank relative to peers? Are fees reasonable?
- How have initiatives to improve diversification or asset allocation worked?

- How are the individual managers/investment options performing (e.g. outperform their benchmarks, rank above median over a market cycle, etc.)?
- How did funded status change year over year and did the changes follow expectations of the relationship of assets and liabilities?
- Did the Liability Hedging portfolio do its job relative to the liability profile and mitigate funded status volatility as expected?

vii. Does your firm follow the Global Investment Performance Standard (GIPS)? If not, please explain why.

Yes. We calculate performance in accordance with GIPS guidance for asset owners seeking to voluntarily comply with the GIPS performance presentation standards.

viii. How are total fund performance numbers calculated?

RVK primarily calculates time-weighted returns and uses the Modified Dietz methodology for composites. In using this methodology, we revalue a portfolio on the date of all large external cash flows. Performance is calculated for interim periods between all large external cash flows for a given month and geometrically linked to calculate period returns. RVK calculates performance gross and net of fees, depending on a client's investments and preference. RVK incorporates fund contributions and withdrawals using the Modified Dietz methodology to calculate total fund composite, asset class, and sub-asset class performance.

4. Briefly describe your performance calculation methodology. Include how the firm computes partnership returns, describing the actual formula utilized, the frequency of calculation, and the treatment of cash flows, and fees.

RVK uses two primary systems to calculate client performance:

1. **PARis**, engineered by Confluence, is our general purpose reporting software for traditional investments. PARis is used to calculate returns across liquid asset classes and composites and produces the majority of our retainer client's reports. PARis primarily calculates time-weighted returns and uses the Modified Dietz methodology for composites. PARis is able to separate fees from other cash flows, computing both gross and net time-weighted returns.

2. **AltInvest** is RVK's proprietary investment analysis software, used for non-marketable alternatives. Our Performance Measurement & Analytics group enters all cash flows and quarterly NAV data into AltInvest, which is used to calculate internal rates of return and multiples across private real estate, private equity, private credit, and private real assets. Cash flows are segmented into return of capital, appreciation, fees, expenses, income, and a variety of other categories based on the information provided by the general partner. AltInvest is able to calculate performance quarterly and uses month-end dates to calculate performance via the same methodology as Excel's XIRR formula.

5. What is the basis for portfolio valuations? Do you utilize the general partners' valuations? Do you independently verify the reasonableness of general partners' valuations and what tools, or service do you use to do this?

We rely on two sources of information for portfolio valuations. The first is manager provided reporting, while the second is the annual independent audit conducted on the fund's investments and financials. Each fund is required to undergo a comprehensive annual audit of both their financials as well as each valuation assigned to an investment. This process enables the independent auditor to validate the manager's investment valuations and processes.

Other steps taken by RVK involve reviewing the manager's valuation policies during diligence, and monitoring ongoing amendments to the limited partnership agreements to verify that valuation policies do not change. RVK also reviews the manager's service providers and any changes to those providers to confirm they are accredited and institutional quality.

6. What benchmark(s) do you recommend for evaluating the performance of a defined benefit U.S. public pension plan's Private Credit program?

Typically we recommend the Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index, and depending on the client situation, may suggest an additional premium on top of that index.

7. Describe how your organization identifies problems with general partner activities and performance. Include the process by which steps are taken to rectify problems.

RVK has an active monitoring process that includes both quarterly performance monitoring, as well as any ad hoc monitoring as a result of a fund or organization update, LPA amendment, or other noteworthy change. Also, as a meaningful and ongoing capital commitment source, we are in very regular contact with the manager universe, conducting ongoing review and diligence as an effort to potentially make future recommendations to a specific manager, or maintain a comparison database with other similar strategies. One advantage of private markets investing is that any particular manager has to come back to the marketplace in hopes of raising future capital, and that provides an ongoing opportunity to reassess that general partner's activities.

8. Describe the steps you have taken or would take on behalf of your clients who have partnership investments that are performing poorly, have legal issues, or where there is a non-performing general partner.

Step one is almost always to start with a conversation with the manager and communicate the area in which they are underperforming (unrelated to performance). In many instances, a manager will take constructive feedback in these conversations, and apply it to how the fund is managed or reported on. In cases that go beyond a manager's willingness to address any issues, the next step would be to speak with other limited partners in the fund and hope to gather a larger base of support that can be used to go back to the manager and hope to enact change again. Finally, if that fails, again working in coordination with other limited partners and any relevant advisory board, steps can be taken to remedy a very troublesome general partner through legal action as outlined in the limited partnership agreement. This is very rare that a relationship gets to this point.

One other potential remedy, if this were an open ended fund structure, would be to recommend liquidation to a client.

9. What challenges do you have in reporting valuations back to your clients on a timely basis? Please describe some of the issues that your firm has encountered with reporting for defined benefit U.S. public pension plan clients.

Ultimately, we are beholden to the managers for their timelines and reporting information. We seek to verify the stated reporting timelines in legal documents during our diligence process and recommend changes or amendments to potential investors when we see deviations from reasonable or market standards.

Most challenges come in a manager providing annual audited financial statements. This process is lengthy and involved, and while a manager is typically given between 90 and 120 days to complete an annual audit, there are some cases where those timelines are extended due to a variety of issues. We stay in consistent contact with a manager in these events and do what we can to communicate the importance of timing. In certain cases where an audit process is going to be delayed, most managers are able to provide a year-end unaudited estimate of performance and valuations. In most cases, those numbers do not materially change from audited financials.

10. Provide performance data, net of investment management fees, for the top five (5) best performing clients and the bottom five (5) worst performing clients of which the firm has discretionary authority in the below format with data as of December 31, 2022.

Not applicable, as RVK does not provide discretionary services for any of its clients.

Clients	1 year TWR	3 Year TWR	5 Year TWR	10 Year TWR	Since Inception IRRs
Top 1	Not Applicable				
Top 2					
Top 3					
Top 4					
Top 5					
Bottom 1					
Bottom 2					
Bottom 3					
Bottom 4					
Bottom 5					

11. Assuming information is available in a timely basis from general partners, how soon after quarter and year end are reports are delivered to clients?

While RVK distributes performance reports and meeting materials to clients based on their requests or specifications, quarterly performance reports are typically available 30 calendar days following quarter-end.

12. How are potential Private Credit investment opportunities identified? How many Private Credit investment opportunities have been evaluated per year since 2017?

Private Credit Investment Opportunities	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
# Evaluated	86	99	129	100	37
# Committed	10	20	18	5	15

Opportunities are identified through databases, such as Preqin, and from manager outreach, both incoming and outgoing. Because RVK helps clients place meaningful amounts of capital every year, managers willingly meet with RVK and proactively reach out with new strategies or funds as the come to market.

13. Discuss the number of individuals assigned to monitoring investment products and frequency of both their internal and external manager visits.

Tricia Lynn, Todd Simones, Layne Johnson, and Reed Harmon research and monitor Private Credit on behalf of RVK's clients. Since 2018, RVK has averaged over 110 private credit meetings—either in person or via phone/virtual platform—per calendar year. Further, during this same period, RVK conducted approximately 12 onsite visits per year.

E. Other

1. **Describe all arrangements or understandings (written or oral) between the firm and any advisor, placement agent, broker, law firm or other individual or entity in connection with the solicitation or referral of clients.**

   RVK's only source of revenue is direct fees from our non-discretionary investment consulting clients.

2. **What potential conflicts of interest are posed by other activities undertaken by the organization, if any? How are these addressed?**

   We are not aware of any potential conflicts of interest in our working relationship with SBCERS.

3. **What is your firm's position on third-party placement agents, and do you currently engage or do business with such service providers? What is the policy for disclosure of placement agents? When and who is responsible for paying the placement agent fees? Is there one-for-one reduction in management fee of the fund for the placement agent fee?**

   While asset managers may employ placement agents to convey information from time to time, we do not rely on them and, instead, work directly with senior investment professionals at asset managers to conduct due diligence. We have no relationships with placement agents.

Part E: Additional Materials and Documents

In addition to the information requested in the INQUIRY, please submit a copy of the following additional materials and documents:

1. **If the firm performs industry or asset class analyses that have been provided to clients, please submit an example of the work. (Identify as Exhibit #1)**

   Please reference Exhibit #1 for a sample Quarterly Investment Performance Report.

2. **Sample of firm research communication. (Identify as Exhibit #2)**

   Please reference Exhibit #2 for a Tear Sheet for Angelo Gordon Evergreen Fund.

3. **Firm's Allocation Policy. (Identify as Exhibit #3)**

   We do not have a written policy. Please reference our answer to Question B.4 for further explanation.

4. **Examples of portfolio status/performance reports and other reports useful in ongoing monitoring of existing investments. (Identify as Exhibit #4)**

   Please reference Exhibit #4 for a sample Alternatives Investment Performance Report.

5. **Provide examples of other reports you feel are useful in evaluating current investment activities and providing oversight of the investment program. (Identify as Exhibit #5)**

   Please reference Exhibits #5a and #5b to view a sample Desk Review - Private Credit and sample Due Diligence Report - Distressed Debt, respectively.

6. **Please attach a proposed form contract for discretionary Private Credit consultant services that would be provided to SBCERS. (Identify as Exhibit #14)**

   As noted throughout, RVK is a non-discretionary consultant. Please reference Exhibit #14 for our Proposed Contract.

Quarterly Investment Performance Analysis

Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System

Period Ended: March 31, 2023

2022 Greenwich Quality Leader Award

RVK is 1 of 3 firms in the Overall U.S. Investment Consulting “large consultants” category to receive a 2022 *Coalition Greenwich Quality Leader* award. We are proud to be the only firm in this category to receive recognition for a 6th consecutive year. Coalition Greenwich issued the award on April 25, 2023, based on their February through November 2022 study. No direct or indirect compensation has been paid by RVK in connection with obtaining or using this award.

Greenwich Quality Leader 2022

2017 **2018** **2019** **2020** **2021**

We are deeply grateful for your continued confidence and support.
From all of us here at RVK, thank you for the opportunity to serve you!

Award Criteria

- Understanding of Client Goals and Objectives
- Advice on Long-Term Asset Allocation and Liability Issues
- Advice on DC Plan Structure and Design
- Communication of Philosophy and Investment Beliefs
- Proactive Advice and Innovative Ideas
- Client Satisfaction with Manager Recommendations
- Usefulness of Written Investment Performance Reviews
- Sufficient Professional Resources
- Credibility with Investment Committee or Trustees
- Capability of Consultants Assigned to Clients
- Responsiveness and Prompt Follow-up on Client Requests
- Timeliness in Providing Written Reports
- Usefulness of Personal Meetings
- Reasonable Fees Relative to Value Delivered

Please refer to the following URL to learn more:
https://www.greenwich.com/asset-management/investment-consultants-support-us-asset-owners-volatile-markets

Overview of RVK Performance Reports

	Monthly Investment Performance Analysis	Quarterly Investment Performance Analysis
Frequency	**Typically available by the 15th business day following month end**	**Typically available 30-45 calendar days following quarter end**
Analytics Included		
Capital Markets Review (abbreviated)	✓	
Capital Markets Review (with full asset class detail)		✓
Monthly Portfolio Highlights or Executive Summary	✓	✓
Manager Monitoring/Investment Manager Updates/Watch List		✓
Asset Allocation By Manager and Schedule of Investable Assets	✓	✓
Asset Allocation vs. Target Allocation	✓	✓
Plan Asset Overview	✓	✓
Total Fund Asset Allocation & Ranks vs. Peers		✓
Trailing Performance	✓	
Trailing & Fiscal Year Performance (including ranks)		✓
Total Fund IDP Attribution		✓
Composite Profile Pages (including ranks)		✓
Private Credit AltInvest Report	✓	✓
Investment Manager Profile Pages (including ranks)		✓
Fee Schedule for Public Investment Managers	✓	✓
Underlying Indices of SBCERS Policy Index		✓
Work Plan		✓

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RVK

Capital Markets Review



First Quarter Economic Environment

During Q1, both defensive and risk assets generally provided positive returns, following a difficult environment in 2022 characterized by geopolitical risk and rising interest rates. Although, capital markets continued to experience bouts of volatility. Despite this volatility, broad equity market indexes finished Q1 in positive territory. The broad bond market delivered positive returns in Q1 as market participants changed expectations on future interest rate moves from pricing in rate hikes to discounting rate pauses, or in some circumstances, cuts. Internationally, moderate winter temperatures helped to ease energy price inflation in Europe, but the uncertainty around supply shortages persisted due to the ongoing war in Ukraine. The FOMC decided to increase the federal funds rate in Q1 to a target range between 4.75% - 5.00%, representing a second straight monthly increase of 0.25% after a string of 0.50% to 0.75% increases. The FOMC's actions demonstrated continued focus on combating inflation, although FOMC data indicated that most officials expect only one more rate hike in 2023. The most recent data release indicated that Headline CPI for March came in slightly below average expectations, with estimated year-over-year inflation of 5.00%. Recessionary risks remained a concern, and recent FOMC minutes indicated that members thought it was increasingly likely that the US will enter a recession later in 2023 due to banking sector stresses. The IMF revised its global GDP growth forecast at the end of the quarter to 2.80%, a decline from its January 2023 forecast of 2.90%.

Key Economic Indicators



Economic Indicators	Mar-23		Dec-22	Mar-22	Mar-20	20 Yr
Federal Funds Rate (%)	4.83	▲	4.33	0.33	0.08	1.34
Breakeven Infl. - 5 Yr (%)	2.47	▲	2.38	3.43	0.53	1.93
Breakeven Infl. - 10 Yr (%)	2.33	▲	2.30	2.83	0.93	2.09
CPI YoY (Headline) (%)	5.0	▼	6.5	8.5	1.5	2.5
Unemployment Rate (%)	3.5	—	3.5	3.6	4.4	6.0
Real GDP YoY (%)	1.6	▲	0.9	3.7	0.8	2.0
PMI - Manufacturing	46.3	▼	48.4	57.1	49.1	53.6
USD Total Wtd Idx	119.48	▼	121.40	115.35	122.55	103.40
WTI Crude Oil per Barrel ($)	75.7	▼	80.3	100.3	20.5	68.4
Gold Spot per Oz ($)	1,979	▲	1,824	1,937	1,577	1,179

Treasury Yield Curve (%)



Market Performance (%)	QTD	CYTD	1 Yr	5 Yr	10 Yr
S&P 500 (Cap Wtd)	7.50	7.50	-7.73	11.19	12.24
Russell 2000	2.74	2.74	-11.61	4.71	8.04
MSCI EAFE (Net)	8.47	8.47	-1.38	3.52	5.00
MSCI EAFE SC (Net)	4.92	4.92	-9.83	0.87	5.86
MSCI Emg Mkts (Net)	3.96	3.96	-10.70	-0.91	2.00
Bloomberg US Agg Bond	2.96	2.96	-4.78	0.90	1.36
ICE BofAML 3 Mo US T-Bill	1.07	1.07	2.50	1.41	0.87
NCREIF ODCE (Gross)	-3.16	-3.16	-3.07	7.52	9.45
FTSE NAREIT Eq REIT (TR)	2.68	2.68	-19.19	6.02	5.97
HFRI FOF Comp	0.71	0.71	-1.94	3.10	3.24
Bloomberg Cmdty (TR)	-5.36	-5.36	-12.49	5.36	-1.72

Treasury data courtesy of the US Department of the Treasury. Economic data courtesy of Bloomberg Professional Service.

Historical US CPI (12 Month, %)



“Core” and “Sticky” US CPI (%)
5 Years Ending March 31, 2023



As of March 31, 2023. Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Core CPI is represented by the Revised FRB Cleveland Trimmed Mean, 12-month. Sticky CPI is represented by the FRB Atlanta Sticky-Price Index, 3-month.

First Quarter Review

Broad Market

US equity markets performed well in Q1 overall, despite market turmoil caused by the banking sector in March and uncertainty regarding the Fed's path for short-term interest rates. The Russell 1000 Index was up 7.5%, while the Russell 2000 Index was up 2.7%. At the beginning of Q1, US stocks were buoyed by investor optimism after economic data indicated that inflation continued to cool, leading to expectations that the Fed's rate hiking cycle could end soon. However, the remainder of Q1 saw significant volatility due to both bank failures and weakening earnings.

Market Cap

Active large- and mid-cap managers across all style groups struggled to outpace their respective benchmarks in Q1. Small-cap managers performed well, with value-oriented managers having a better success rate than core and growth managers.

Style and Sector

There was a strong rotation back into growth stocks across market capitalizations in Q1. The Russell 1000 Growth and Russell 2000 Growth indexes exceeded their value counterparts by 13.4% and 6.7%, respectively. Information technology and communication services were the best performing sectors while energy, healthcare, financials, and utilities were the largest contractors.

Style and Capitalization Market Performance (%)



Valuations



S&P 500 Index Sector Performance (%)



Valuation data courtesy of Bloomberg Professional Service and Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, Second Edition.
P/E metrics shown represent the 5th through 95th percentiles to minimize the effect of outliers.

First Quarter Review

Developed Markets

Q1 represented another strong showing for developed international equity markets, with the MSCI EAFE returning 8.5%, which outperformed both US as well as emerging markets. Growth stocks outperformed value stocks during the quarter, but they still lagged when measured over the trailing three-year period. Small-cap stocks underperformed large-cap stocks. Active management was broadly additive during the quarter.

Emerging Markets

Although concerns about bank stability began in the US, they soon spread to Europe. After turmoil at Swiss bank Credit Suisse, UBS stepped in at the end of March to buy the troubled firm for $3.25 billion, averting a major failure.

Market Cap & Style

As noted above, emerging markets continued to lag developed markets during Q1 with the MSCI Emerging Market Index returning 4.0%.

MSCI Style and Capitalization Market Performance (%)



Valuations



MSCI Region Performance (%)



Valuation data courtesy of Bloomberg Professional Service.
P/E metrics shown represent the 5th through 95th percentiles to minimize the effect of outliers.
All returns are shown net of foreign taxes on dividends.

RVK

First Quarter Review

Broad Market

The decline in yields across Treasury notes and bonds produced a tailwind for fixed income markets, as the Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index experienced its best quarter in three years, returning 3.0% in Q1. However, volatility from 2022 continued into the new year as the Fed appeared to maintain its focus on fighting inflation. After initially declining in January, intermediate and long-term Treasury yields rose in February before falling again in March.

Credit Market

Corporate credit rallied to start the year amid expectations for a more dovish Fed. The optimism proved to be short-lived, however, as the banking crisis pushed spreads wider again in March. The Bloomberg US Credit Index returned 3.5% in Q1, lagging the Bloomberg US High Yield Index return of 3.6%.

Emerging Market Debt

Emerging market debt added to its recent rally, with the JPMorgan EMBI Global Diversified Index returning 1.9% in Q1, benefitting from the decline in Treasury yields. Despite a resurgence in February, the US dollar weakened over the quarter vs. emerging market currencies, and the JPMorgan GBI-EM Global Diversified Index ended the quarter up 5.2%.

Valuations



Fixed Income Performance (%)



Valuation data courtesy of Bloomberg Professional Service.
Valuations shown represent the 5th through 95th percentiles to minimize the effect of outliers.

First Quarter Review - Absolute Return

General Market - Hedge Funds

During Q1, hedge funds broadly delivered positive results across most peer groups. Led by strong conditions for long/short equity and fixed income trading, the HFRI Fund-Weighted Composite Index delivered a quarterly return of 1.3%. Macro-oriented strategies, one of the top performing peer groups in 2022, widely struggled in Q1, driven by shifting momentum across interest rate and commodity trends that provided strong tailwinds in recent quarters. Although there were significant fluctuations throughout, overall alpha was broadly flat for the quarter, with longs performing above global indices as shorts struggled.

General Market - Global Tactical Asset Allocation (GTAA)

Global Tactical Asset Allocation (GTAA) strategies that RVK follows closely generally posted positive returns during Q1 with moderate dispersion. Almost all active managers with significant diversification underperformed a US centric blend of 60% equity and 40% fixed income during the quarter, which favored larger market cap companies globally.

First Quarter Review - Real Assets

General Market - Diversified Inflation Strategies (DIS)

Diversified Inflation Strategy (DIS) managers tracked closely by RVK generally underperformed a US-centric blend of 60% equity and 40% fixed income over the quarter. Managers with larger exposures to TIPS and energy commodities, lagged peers most significantly in a quarter where strong equity performance on a global basis outperformed nearly all inflation sensitive asset classes.

General Market - Real Estate

Core private real estate returned -3.2% in Q1 (gross of fees), as reported by the NCREIF ODCE Index. The total return comprised of 0.8% income and -4.0% price appreciation. Income returns continue to trend at the lower end of historical levels, while price appreciation continues to trend negatively. Investors of publicly traded real estate outperformed private market, delivering a Q1 total return of 1.5%, as measured by FTSE NAREIT All REIT Index.

HFRI Hedge Fund Performance (%)



Real Asset Performance (%)



Annual Asset Class Performance

As of March 31, 2023

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	YTD
Best	78.51	27.94	22.49	20.00	38.82	30.14	15.02	21.31	37.28	8.35	31.49	19.96	43.24	16.09	8.47
	58.21	26.85	15.99	18.23	32.39	19.31	9.59	17.13	33.01	1.87	26.00	18.40	28.71	7.47	7.50
	46.78	22.04	13.56	18.06	29.30	13.69	3.20	11.96	25.03	0.01	25.53	18.31	27.11	1.46	5.76
	31.78	18.88	8.29	17.32	22.78	12.50	1.38	11.77	21.83	-1.26	24.96	16.12	22.17	-5.31	4.92
	28.01	16.83	7.84	16.35	13.94	5.97	0.55	11.19	14.65	-2.08	22.01	12.34	14.82	-11.19	3.96
	27.17	16.36	4.98	16.00	8.96	4.89	0.05	8.77	10.71	-4.02	19.59	10.99	11.26	-11.85	3.57
	26.46	15.12	2.11	15.81	7.44	3.64	-0.27	8.52	7.77	-4.38	18.42	10.88	10.10	-13.01	3.34
	18.91	15.06	0.10	10.94	2.47	3.37	-0.81	6.67	7.62	-4.62	14.32	7.82	6.17	-14.45	2.96
	11.47	10.16	-4.18	8.78	0.07	2.45	-1.44	4.68	7.50	-4.68	8.72	7.51	5.96	-18.11	2.74
	11.41	7.75	-5.72	6.98	-2.02	0.04	-3.30	2.65	5.23	-11.01	8.43	7.11	5.28	-20.09	2.68
	5.93	6.54	-12.14	4.79	-2.60	-2.19	-4.41	2.18	3.54	-11.25	8.39	1.19	0.05	-20.44	1.57
	1.92	6.31	-13.32	4.21	-8.61	-4.90	-4.47	1.00	3.01	-13.79	7.69	0.67	-1.55	-21.39	1.07
	0.21	5.70	-15.94	0.11	-8.83	-4.95	-14.92	0.51	1.70	-14.57	5.34	-3.12	-2.52	-24.37	-3.16
Worst	-29.76	0.13	-18.42	-1.06	-9.52	-17.01	-24.66	0.33	0.86	-17.89	2.28	-8.00	-2.54	-27.09	-5.36

S&P 500 - US Large Cap	R 2000 - US Small Cap	MSCI EAFE (Net) - Int'l Dev.	MSCI EAFE SC (Net) - Int'l SC	MSCI EM (Net) - Int'l Emg Mkts	Bloombrg US Agg Bond - FI	Bloombrg US Corp Hi Yield - FI	Bloombrg US Trsy US TIPS - FI	Bloombrg US Gov Credit Lng - FI	NCREIF ODCE (Gross) - Real Estate	FTSE NAREIT Eq REITs Index (TR)	HFRI FOF Comp Index - ARS	Bloombrg Cmdty (TR) - Commod.	ICE BofAML 3 Mo T-Bill - Cash Equiv

NCREIF ODCE (Gross) performance is reported quarterly; performance is shown N/A in interim-quarter months.

Total Fund



Q1 2023 Executive Summary

Total Fund Summary

The Total Fund market value was $4.02 billion as of March 31, 2023, an increase of approximately $119.2 million from the previous quarter. The Total Fund returned 3.72% for the first quarter, net of fees, and ranked in the 52nd percentile among the Public Plans $1B-$5B peer group. The Total Fund underperformed the Policy Benchmark by 46 basis points and the Dynamic Policy Benchmark by 23 basis points.

All asset classes were within their respective target ranges as of March 31, 2023.

Contributors to Total Fund Performance

Developed Non-US Equity, US Equity, and Emerging Markets Equity had the highest absolute performance during the quarter, returning 9.08%, 6.55%, and 4.91%, respectively.

Performance relative to the Policy Benchmark was aided by Real Estate, Emerging Markets, and Developed Non-US Equity strong relative performance, which beat their benchmarks by 513, 95, and 61 basis points, respectively.

Performance relative to the Dynamic Policy Benchmark was positively impacted by individual manager relative outperformance, including ORG Real Estate, RHJ, and RBC, which beat their benchmarks by 513, 414, and 220 basis points, respectively.

Detractors from Total Fund Performance

Real Estate, Private Equity, and Non-Core Fixed Income had the lowest absolute performance during the quarter, returning -0.04%, 1.82%, and 2.79%, respectively.

Performance versus the Policy Benchmark was hurt by the weak relative performance of Private Equity, US Equity, and Non-Core Fixed Income which lagged their benchmarks by 616, 63, and 44 basis points, respectively.

Performance relative to the Dynamic Policy Benchmark was negatively impacted by individual manager underperformance, including Dimensional US Small Cap, Nuveen, and BNY HEDI which lagged their benchmarks by 198, 111, and 104 basis points, respectively.

All performance referenced is net of fees.
Total Fund performance excludes 130 RHR and Treasury Cash.

	Significant Events (Yes/No)	Last Meeting with Board of Retirement	Last Meeting with RVK	Last RVK On-Site at Manager Office	Comments
U.S. Equity					
BNY Mellon HEDI (SA)	No		February 2022	September 2022	
BNY Mellon R1000 Index - NL (CF)	No		February 2022	September 2022	
Dimensional U.S. Small Cap Value (CF)	No	November 2020	November 2021	April 2018	
RHJ Small Cap Opportunities (SA)	No	April 2016	November 2021	October 2019	
Developed Market Non-U.S. Equity					
PanAgora Dynamic International Equity (SA)	No		September 2022	June 2017	
Artisan Non-U.S. Growth (SA)	No		April 2023	May 2018	
Acadian Non-US Small Cap Equity (CF)	No	April 2023	January 2023	June 2022	
Emerging Market Equity					
DFA Emg Mkts Value;I (DFEVX)	No	November 2020	June 2022	April 2018	
RBC Emerging Markets Equity (CF)	No	March 2022	March 2023	February 2019	
Core Fixed Income					
Garcia Hamilton Core Fixed Income (SA)	Yes	April 2023	March 2023	December 2019	Gilbert Garcia has filed for Mayor, though he has not made a final decision on whether he will officially run.
PGIM Core Plus Fixed Income (CF)	No	March 2018	November 2022	May 2022	

Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System
Manager Monitoring

As of March 31, 2023

	Significant Events (Yes/No)	Last Meeting with Board of Retirement	Last Meeting with RVK	Last RVK On-Site at Manager Office	Comments
Non-Core Fixed Income					
Wellington Blended Opportunistic EMD (CF)	No	July 2022	November 2022	November 2022	
Beach Point Leveraged Loan (CF)	No		August 2022	August 2019	
AG Direct Lending Fund III, LP	No	April 2023	March 2023	October 2021	
AG Direct Lending Fund IV, LP	No	April 2023	March 2023	October 2021	
AG Direct Lending Evergreen Fund, LP	No	April 2023	March 2023	October 2021	
First Eagle Direct Lending Fund IV, LLC	No	February 2021	September 2022	October 2019	
Deerpath Capital V, LP	No	June 2021	March 2023	March 2020	
Deerpath Capital VI, LP	No	June 2021	Mar-23	March 2020	
PIMCO Private Income Fund OnShore Feeder LLC	No	April 2019	October 2022	August 2022	
First Eagle Direct Lending V-B, LLC	No	February 2021	September 2022	October 2019	
Real Return					
BNY Mellon TIPS	No		February 2021	April 2019	
Cohen & Steers Real Assets Fund (CIT)	No	July 2017	Feburary 2023	August 2022	
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund (SA)	No	July 2017	Feburary 2023	November 2018	
Private Natural Resources	No	February 2023	-	-	
Private Infrastructure	No	February 2023	-	-	
Private Equity					
Hamilton Lane	No	February 2023	-	-	
Real Estate					
ORG	No	February 2023	-	-	

RVK

INVESTMENT MANAGER UPDATES

Garcia Hamilton Core Fixed Income

Gilbert Garcia has filed for Mayor, though he has not made a final decision on whether he will officially run.

Opinion: RVK has discussed this with Mr. Garcia and will continue to monitor the situation.

Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System
Watch List

As of March 31, 2023

Asset Class	Investment Manager	Inception Date	Test 1: If the Manager's rolling, five-year return (net of fees) falls below the rolling, five-year benchmark return for three (3) consecutive quarters. ✓ indicates failed test				Test 2: If the Manager's rolling, five-year return (net of fees) for three (3) consecutive quarters ranks in the bottom third of the General Consultant's peer group universe. ✓ indicates failed test				Qualitative Factor(s) Resulting in Watch List Addition											Benchmark	Peer Group
			2022 Q3	2022 Q4	2023 Q1	Watch List Status	2022 Q3	2022 Q4	2023 Q1	Watch List Status	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	Explanation		
U.S. Equity	Dimensional U.S. Small Cap Value (CF)	4/1/2005																				Russell 2000 Index	U.S. Small Cap Value Equity
U.S. Equity	RHJ Small Cap Opportunities (SA)	6/1/2016																				Russell 2000 Index	U.S. Small Cap Growth Equity
Developed Market non-U.S. Equity	PanAgora Dynamic International Equity (SA)	5/1/2009																				MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)	EAFE Core
Developed Market non-U.S. Equity	Artisan Non-U.S. Growth (SA)	2/1/2014																				MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)	EAFE Growth
Developed Market non-U.S. Equity	Acadian Non-US Small Cap Equity (CF)	12/1/2020				N/A (Insufficient Performance History)				N/A (Insufficient Performance History)												MSCI EAFE Sm Cap Index (USD) (Net)	International SMID Cap Equity
Emerging Markets Equity	DFA Emg Mkts Value;I (DFEVX)	5/1/2013																				MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)	Emerging Markets Equity
Emerging Markets Equity	RBC Emerging Markets Equity (CF)	9/1/2016																				MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)	Emerging Markets Equity
Core Fixed Income	Garcia Hamilton Core Fixed Income (SA)	9/1/2017																				Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index	U.S. Broad Market Core Fixed Income
Core Fixed Income	PGIM Core Plus Fixed Income (CF)	6/1/2018				N/A (Insufficient Performance History)				N/A (Insufficient Performance History)												Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index	U.S. Broad Market Core+ Fixed Income
Non-Core Fixed Income	Wellington Blended Opportunistic EMD (CF)	4/1/2020				N/A (Insufficient Performance History)				N/A (Insufficient Performance History)												Wellington Blended Benchmark	Emerging Markets Debt
Non-Core Fixed Income	Beach Point Leveraged Loan (CF)	10/1/2012																				CS Lvg'd Loan Index	U.S. Bank Loans
Real Return	Cohen & Steers Real Assets Fund (CIT)	9/1/2017								N/A (No Comparable Universe)												Cohen & Steers Real Assets Custom Index	N/A
Real Return	Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund (SA)	9/1/2017								N/A (No Comparable Universe)												Nuveen Real Asset Income Blend Index	N/A

Qualitative Factors Resulting in Watch List Additions:

A. Violation of investment guidelines
B. Deviation from stated investment style or shifts in the firm's philosophy or process
C. Turnover of one or more key personnel
D. Change in firm ownership or structure
E. Significant loss of clients and/or assets under management
F. Significant and persistent lack of responsiveness to client requests
G. The initiation of significant litigation or regulatory action
H. Failure to disclose significant information, including potential conflicts of interest
I. Chronic violations of SBCERS' Investment Policy Statement
J. Any other issue or situation of which the General Investment Consultant and/or Board become aware that is deemed material

March 31, 2023 : $4,021,758,223



	Market Value ($)	Allocation (%)
BNY Mellon HEDI (SA)	291,134,009	7.24
BNY Mellon R1000 Index - NL (CF)	341,863,612	8.50
Dimensional U.S. Small Cap Value (CF)	45,386,081	1.13
RHJ Small Cap Opportunities (SA)	34,845,706	0.87
PanAgora Dynamic International Equity (SA)	205,626,927	5.11
Artisan Non-U.S. Growth (SA)	139,524,453	3.47
Acadian Non-US Small Cap Equity (CF)	56,146,418	1.40
DFA Emg Mkts Value;I (DFEVX)	132,783,373	3.30
RBC Emerging Markets Equity (CF)	127,182,436	3.16
Garcia Hamilton Core Fixed Income (SA)	360,632,931	8.97
PGIM Core Plus Fixed Income (CF)	246,629,757	6.13
Wellington Blended Opportunistic EMD (CF)	122,861,271	3.06
Beach Point Leveraged Loan (CF)	150,346,585	3.74
AG Direct Lending Fund III, LP	17,421,073	0.43
First Eagle Direct Lending Fund IV	15,824,893	0.39
PIMCO Private Income Fund, LLC	25,673,055	0.64
Deerpath Capital V, LP	18,100,805	0.45
AG Direct Lending Fund IV, LP	19,416,982	0.48
First Eagle Direct Lending Fund V-B	14,592,791	0.36
Deerpath Capital VI, LP	15,764,925	0.39
AG Direct Lending Evergreen Fund, LP	9,474,404	0.24
BNY Mellon TIPS - NL (CF)	15,536,875	0.39
Cohen & Steers Real Assets Fund (CIT)	60,820,156	1.51
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund (SA)	60,072,406	1.49
Private Natural Resources	56,762,265	1.41
Private Infrastructure	376,713,761	9.37
Hamilton Lane Real Estate	439,864,995	10.94
130 Robin Hill Rd	10,389,712	0.26
Private Equity Composite	552,547,280	13.74
Transition Account	4,765,073	0.12
Cash Composite	51,734,291	1.29

Schedule of Investable Assets Ex Treasury Cash

Periods Ending	Beginning Market Value ($)	Net Cash Flow ($)	Gain/Loss ($)	Ending Market Value ($)	% Return
FYTD	**3,859,132,211**	**-39,523,536**	**182,298,109**	**4,001,906,784**	**4.76**

Performance shown is net of fees and provided by BNY Mellon. Allocations shown may not sum up to 100% exactly due to rounding. Schedule of Investable Assets excludes Treasury Cash. The fiscal year ends 06/30. Total fund market value includes residual assets from terminated managers, including Copper Rock, First Eagle, Guggenheim, Hotchkis & Wiley, and New Star.

RVK

	Market Value ($)	Allocation (%)	Lower Range (%)	Target (%)	Upper Range (%)
Total Fund Composite	4,021,758,223	100.0	-	100.0	-
US Equity Composite	713,229,408	17.7	15.0	19.0	23.0
Developed Non-US Equity Composite	402,166,591	10.0	8.0	11.0	14.0
Emerging Markets Equity Composite	259,965,809	6.5	4.0	7.0	10.0
Core Fixed Income Composite	607,230,352	15.1	14.0	17.0	20.0
Non-Core Fixed Income Composite	409,959,250	10.2	8.0	11.0	14.0
Real Return Composite	569,905,463	14.2	8.0	15.0	22.0
Real Estate Composite	439,864,995	10.9	5.0	10.0	15.0
Private Equity Composite	552,547,280	13.7	5.0	10.0	15.0
Cash Composite	51,734,291	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.0
Transition Account	4,765,073	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
130 Robin Hill Rd	10,389,712	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0



Allocations shown may not sum up to 100% exactly due to rounding. Market value for the Transition Account represents residual assets from portfolio restructuring. Composite market values includes residual assets from liquidated managers.

RVK

	Market Value ($)	Performance (%)											
		FYTD	FY 2022	FY 2021	FY 2020	FY 2019	FY 2018	FY 2017	FY 2016	FY 2015	FY 2014	FY 2013	Since Incep.
Total Fund	4,021,758,223	4.76	0.28	25.20	-0.10	7.74	7.80	10.49	1.37	0.42	15.25	8.10	8.18

Total Fund Value
(January 1987 - March 2023)



Performance shown is net of fees and is annualized for periods greater than one year. The fiscal year for Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System ends 06/30. Inception date for the Total Fund is 01/01/1987. Total Fund performance excludes Treasury Cash.

Plan Sponsor TF Asset Allocation



	US Equity	Global ex-US Equity	US Fixed	Global ex-US Fixed	Alternatives	Total Real Estate	Cash & Equivalents
◆ Total Fund Composite	17.73 (72)	16.47 (41)	22.35 (31)	3.05 (41)	27.91 (27)	11.20 (42)	1.29 (58)
Median	23.92	15.39	17.26	2.76	19.50	9.61	1.43
Population	53	53	53	18	43	35	43

Parentheses contain percentile ranks. Global ex-US Fixed consists of Wellington Blended Opportunistic EMD (CF). US Fixed includes the Transition Account. Allocation to Total Real Estate includes 130 Robin Hill Road.

Trailing Performance



	QTD	CYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021
◆ Total Fund Composite	3.72 (52)	3.72 (52)	-0.09 (1)	12.35 (13)	7.31 (3)	8.13 (11)	6.94 (31)	-4.71 (4)	16.80 (21)
● SBCERS Policy Benchmark	4.18 (39)	4.18 (39)	-2.47 (6)	9.54 (87)	6.48 (18)	7.72 (30)	6.88 (36)	-7.43 (8)	12.20 (87)
▲ SBCERS Dynamic Policy Benchmark	3.95 (46)	3.95 (46)	-4.47 (43)	9.57 (86)	5.83 (45)	7.26 (43)	6.31 (64)	-9.02 (21)	12.74 (82)
Median	3.73	3.73	-4.72	10.78	5.57	7.03	6.53	-11.74	14.35
Population	38	38	36	35	35	35	34	64	88

Fiscal Year Performance



	FYTD	FY 2022	FY 2021	FY 2020	FY 2019	FY 2018	FY 2017	FY 2016	FY 2015
◆ Total Fund Composite	4.86 (50)	0.43 (3)	25.24 (74)	-0.11 (78)	7.76 (3)	7.80 (56)	10.49 (91)	1.37 (17)	0.42 (91)
● SBCERS Policy Benchmark	4.12 (84)	-3.59 (10)	22.97 (92)	2.99 (17)	7.29 (9)	7.77 (57)	11.47 (76)	2.28 (8)	0.97 (85)
▲ SBCERS Dynamic Policy Benchmark	2.54 (100)	-4.13 (14)	25.11 (74)	1.15 (57)	6.36 (23)	7.92 (48)	11.58 (74)	0.65 (35)	0.01 (93)
Median	4.85	-8.18	26.92	1.26	5.38	7.88	12.31	-0.20	2.32
Population	37	69	96	85	66	49	51	49	48

Performance shown is net of fees. Parentheses contain percentile ranks. The fiscal year ends 06/30. Total Fund performance excludes 130 RHR and Treasury Cash.

RVK

Plan Sponsor Scattergram - 5 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
◆ Total Fund Composite	7.31	8.40
● SBCERS Policy Benchmark	6.48	7.74
— Median	5.57	10.93

Up/Down Markets - 5 Years



■ Total Fund Composite

■ SBCERS Policy Benchmark

Plan Sponsor Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics (Beta vs. S&P 500)



	Standard Deviation 5 Years	Sharpe Ratio 5 Years	Excess Return 5 Years	Downside Risk 5 Years	Beta 5 Years
◆ Total Fund Composite	8.40 (97)	0.71 (3)	6.03 (6)	5.56 (97)	0.43 (97)
● SBCERS Policy Benchmark	7.74 (100)	0.66 (6)	5.19 (33)	4.87 (100)	0.39 (100)
Median	10.93	0.43	4.58	7.65	0.56
Population	35	35	35	35	35

Performance shown is net of fees. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks. Total Fund performance excludes 130 RHR and Treasury Cash.

Plan Sponsor Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Total Fund Composite	6.94	7.13
SBCERS Policy Benchmark	6.88	6.74
Median	6.53	8.97

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Plan Sponsor Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics (Beta vs. S&P 500)



	Standard Deviation 10 Years	Sharpe Ratio 10 Years	Excess Return 10 Years	Downside Risk 10 Years	Beta 10 Years
Total Fund Composite	7.13 (99)	0.85 (7)	6.12 (36)	4.51 (97)	0.44 (97)
SBCERS Policy Benchmark	6.74 (100)	0.89 (3)	6.03 (43)	4.00 (100)	0.41 (100)
Median	8.97	0.66	5.90	5.99	0.57
Population	34	34	34	34	34

Performance shown is net of fees. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks. Total Fund performance excludes 130 RHR and Treasury Cash.

5 Yrs Rolling Percentile Ranking



	Total Period	5-25 Count	25-Median Count	Median-75 Count	75-95 Count
Total Fund Composite	40	5 (13%)	6 (15%)	9 (23%)	20 (50%)
SBCERS Policy Benchmark	40	10 (25%)	5 (13%)	7 (18%)	18 (45%)

Ranks shown are based on net of fees performance. Total Fund performance excludes 130 RHR and Treasury Cash.

5 Yrs Rolling Percentile Ranking



	Total Period	5-25 Count	25-Median Count	Median-75 Count	75-95 Count
◆ Total Fund Composite	40	18 (45%)	1 (3%)	15 (38%)	6 (15%)
● SBCERS Policy Benchmark	40	18 (45%)	6 (15%)	13 (33%)	3 (8%)

Ranks shown are based on net of fees performance. Total Fund performance excludes 130 RHR and Treasury Cash.

Performance Attribution





Performance shown is net of fees. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. See Glossary for additional information regarding the Total Fund Attribution - IDP calculation. Total Fund performance excludes 130 RHR and Treasury Cash.

Performance Attribution





Performance shown is net of fees. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. See Glossary for additional information regarding the Total Fund Attribution - IDP calculation. Total Fund performance excludes 130 RHR and Treasury Cash.

	Allocation		Performance (%)									
	Market Value ($)	%	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	Since Incep.	Inception Date
Total Fund Composite	**4,021,758,223**	**100.00**	**3.70**	**3.70**	**4.76**	**-0.20**	**12.24**	**7.24**	**8.09**	**6.91**	**8.18**	**01/01/1987**
Total Fund Ex 130 Robin Hill Rd	**4,011,368,512**	**99.74**	**3.72**	**3.72**	**4.86**	**-0.09**	**12.35**	**7.31**	**8.13**	**6.94**	**8.18**	**01/01/1987**
SBCERS Policy Benchmark			4.18	4.18	4.12	-2.47	9.54	6.48	7.72	6.88	N/A	
Difference			-0.46	-0.46	0.74	2.38	2.81	0.83	0.41	0.06	N/A	
SBCERS Dynamic Policy Benchmark			3.95	3.95	2.54	-4.47	9.57	5.83	7.26	6.31	N/A	
Difference			-0.23	-0.23	2.32	4.38	2.78	1.48	0.87	0.63	N/A	
US Equity Composite	**713,229,408**	**17.73**	**6.55**	**6.55**	**9.95**	**-6.19**	**18.71**	**11.02**	**12.13**	**11.75**	**10.65**	**01/01/1987**
Russell 3000 Index			7.18	7.18	9.75	-8.58	18.48	10.45	11.99	11.73	10.38	
Difference			-0.63	-0.63	0.20	2.39	0.23	0.57	0.14	0.02	0.27	
US Large Cap Equity Composite	**632,997,621**	**15.74**	**6.98**	**6.98**	**10.10**	**-6.34**	**18.13**	**11.57**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**12.46**	**06/01/2016**
Russell 1000 Index			7.46	7.46	9.93	-8.39	18.55	10.87	12.23	12.01	12.17	
Difference			-0.48	-0.48	0.17	2.05	-0.42	0.70	N/A	N/A	0.29	
US Small Cap Equity Composite	**80,231,787**	**1.99**	**3.33**	**3.33**	**8.72**	**-5.00**	**25.42**	**5.82**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**9.41**	**06/01/2016**
Russell 2000 Index			2.74	2.74	6.75	-11.61	17.51	4.71	8.55	8.04	8.17	
Difference			0.59	0.59	1.97	6.61	7.91	1.11	N/A	N/A	1.24	
Developed Non-US Equity Composite	**402,166,591**	**10.00**	**9.08**	**9.08**	**14.79**	**-0.31**	**12.43**	**3.06**	**5.47**	**5.29**	**6.68**	**07/01/2012**
MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)			8.47	8.47	15.36	-1.38	12.99	3.52	6.21	5.00	6.42	
Difference			0.61	0.61	-0.57	1.07	-0.56	-0.46	-0.74	0.29	0.26	
Emerging Markets Equity Composite	**259,965,809**	**6.46**	**4.91**	**4.91**	**4.88**	**-5.85**	**12.88**	**1.09**	**5.89**	**2.66**	**3.62**	**07/01/2012**
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)			3.96	3.96	0.84	-10.70	7.83	-0.91	4.91	2.00	2.93	
Difference			0.95	0.95	4.04	4.85	5.05	2.00	0.98	0.66	0.69	
Core Fixed Income Composite	**607,230,352**	**15.10**	**3.38**	**3.38**	**0.19**	**-4.86**	**-1.37**	**1.24**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**1.28**	**07/01/2017**
Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index			2.96	2.96	-0.09	-4.78	-2.77	0.90	0.88	1.36	0.74	
Difference			0.42	0.42	0.28	-0.08	1.40	0.34	N/A	N/A	0.54	
Non-Core Fixed Income Composite	**409,959,250**	**10.19**	**2.79**	**2.79**	**6.45**	**1.84**	**6.55**	**2.04**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**2.42**	**07/01/2017**
Custom Non-Core Fixed Income Benchmark			3.23	3.23	6.67	0.03	6.04	2.46	4.12	3.11	2.77	
Difference			-0.44	-0.44	-0.22	1.81	0.51	-0.42	N/A	N/A	-0.35	

Performance shown is net of fees and provided by BNY Mellon. Performance is annualized for periods greater than one year. Total Fund performance excludes Treasury Cash. Indices show N/A for since inception returns when the fund contains more history than the corresponding benchmark. The fiscal year ends 06/30. Composite market values includes residual assets from liquidated managers.

	Allocation		Performance (%)									
	Market Value ($)	%	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	Since Incep.	Inception Date
Real Return Composite	**569,905,463**	**14.17**	**3.30**	**3.30**	**4.95**	**6.13**	**13.97**	**7.81**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**7.25**	**07/01/2017**
Consumer Price Index+4%			2.70	2.70	4.91	9.18	9.57	8.03	7.58	6.74	7.85	
Difference			0.60	0.60	0.04	-3.05	4.40	-0.22	N/A	N/A	-0.60	
Custom Real Return Benchmark			2.37	2.37	3.41	1.35	10.57	5.97	N/A	N/A	5.77	
Difference			0.93	0.93	1.54	4.78	3.40	1.84	N/A	N/A	1.48	
Real Estate Composite	**439,864,995**	**10.94**	**-0.04**	**-0.04**	**3.42**	**12.44**	**15.34**	**12.85**	**12.17**	**12.22**	**7.82**	**04/01/2006**
NCREIF ODCE Index (AWA) (Net) (1 Qtr Lag)			-5.17	-5.17	-0.55	6.55	8.97	7.72	7.57	9.11	6.38	
Difference			5.13	5.13	3.97	5.89	6.37	5.13	4.60	3.11	1.44	
Private Equity Composite	**552,547,280**	**13.74**	**1.82**	**1.82**	**-1.22**	**0.22**	**21.18**	**17.57**	**17.23**	**16.19**	**11.46**	**06/01/2006**
Russell 3000+3% Index (1 Qtr Lag)			7.98	7.98	-12.79	-16.78	10.28	12.05	14.37	15.50	11.98	
Difference			-6.16	-6.16	11.57	17.00	10.90	5.52	2.86	0.69	-0.52	

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	Allocation		Performance (%)										
	Market Value ($)	%	FYTD	FY 2022	FY 2021	FY 2020	FY 2019	FY 2018	FY 2017	FY 2016	FY 2015	FY 2014	FY 2013
Total Fund Composite	**4,021,758,223**	**100.00**	**4.76**	**0.28**	**25.20**	**-0.10**	**7.74**	**7.80**	**10.49**	**1.37**	**0.42**	**15.25**	**8.10**
Total Fund Ex 130 Robin Hill Rd	**4,011,368,512**	**99.74**	**4.86**	**0.43**	**25.24**	**-0.11**	**7.76**	**7.80**	**10.49**	**1.37**	**0.42**	**15.25**	**8.10**
SBCERS Policy Benchmark			4.12	-3.59	22.97	2.99	7.29	7.77	11.47	2.28	0.97	15.72	9.21
Difference			0.74	4.02	2.27	-3.10	0.47	0.03	-0.98	-0.91	-0.55	-0.47	-1.11
SBCERS Dynamic Policy Benchmark			2.54	-4.13	25.11	1.15	6.36	7.92	11.58	0.65	0.01	16.50	7.84
Difference			2.32	4.56	0.13	-1.26	1.40	-0.12	-1.09	0.72	0.41	-1.25	0.26
US Equity Composite	**713,229,408**	**17.73**	**9.95**	**-11.24**	**41.39**	**6.08**	**11.05**	**15.53**	**14.82**	**3.22**	**6.31**	**25.01**	**19.58**
Russell 3000 Index			9.75	-13.87	44.16	6.53	8.98	14.78	18.51	2.14	7.29	25.22	21.46
Difference			0.20	2.63	-2.77	-0.45	2.07	0.75	-3.69	1.08	-0.98	-0.21	-1.88
US Large Cap Equity Composite	**632,997,621**	**15.74**	**10.10**	**-10.88**	**39.45**	**7.64**	**13.54**	**14.95**	**13.48**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**
Russell 1000 Index			9.93	-13.04	43.07	7.48	10.02	14.54	18.03	2.93	7.37	25.35	21.24
Difference			0.17	2.16	-3.62	0.16	3.52	0.41	-4.55	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
US Small Cap Equity Composite	**80,231,787**	**1.99**	**8.72**	**-14.10**	**61.83**	**-9.34**	**-9.65**	**21.14**	**24.44**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**
Russell 2000 Index			6.75	-25.20	62.03	-6.63	-3.31	17.57	24.60	-6.73	6.49	23.64	24.21
Difference			1.97	11.10	-0.20	-2.71	-6.34	3.57	-0.16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Developed Non-US Equity Composite	**402,166,591**	**10.00**	**14.79**	**-17.41**	**29.60**	**-5.62**	**1.78**	**6.23**	**16.86**	**-6.62**	**-0.92**	**23.53**	**19.66**
MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)			15.36	-17.77	32.35	-5.13	1.08	6.84	20.27	-10.16	-4.22	23.57	18.62
Difference			-0.57	0.36	-2.75	-0.49	0.70	-0.61	-3.41	3.54	3.30	-0.04	1.04
Emerging Markets Equity Composite	**259,965,809**	**6.46**	**4.88**	**-16.84**	**39.80**	**-11.30**	**5.80**	**5.86**	**22.55**	**-9.97**	**-6.02**	**12.12**	**4.09**
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)			0.84	-25.28	40.90	-3.39	1.21	8.20	23.75	-12.05	-5.12	14.31	2.87
Difference			4.04	8.44	-1.10	-7.91	4.59	-2.34	-1.20	2.08	-0.90	-2.19	1.22
Core Fixed Income Composite	**607,230,352**	**15.10**	**0.19**	**-10.15**	**0.88**	**8.63**	**7.62**	**1.34**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**
Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index			-0.09	-10.29	-0.34	8.74	7.87	-0.40	-0.31	6.00	1.86	4.37	-0.69
Difference			0.28	0.14	1.22	-0.11	-0.25	1.74	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Non-Core Fixed Income Composite	**409,959,250**	**10.19**	**6.45**	**-6.02**	**10.92**	**-2.28**	**5.43**	**0.37**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**
Custom Non-Core Fixed Income Benchmark			6.67	-8.81	11.11	-1.05	7.44	1.85	8.86	2.75	-1.98	8.51	6.22
Difference			-0.22	2.79	-0.19	-1.23	-2.01	-1.48	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Performance shown is net of fees and provided by BNY Mellon. Total Fund performance excludes Treasury Cash. Indices show N/A for since inception returns when the fund contains more history than the corresponding benchmark. The fiscal year ends 06/30. Composite market values includes residual assets from liquidated managers.

	Allocation		Performance (%)										
	Market Value ($)	%	FYTD	FY 2022	FY 2021	FY 2020	FY 2019	FY 2018	FY 2017	FY 2016	FY 2015	FY 2014	FY 2013
Real Return Composite	**569,905,463**	**14.17**	**4.95**	**12.55**	**23.53**	**-7.17**	**6.27**	**3.90**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**
Consumer Price Index+4%			4.91	13.42	9.61	4.67	5.71	6.99	5.70	5.04	4.13	6.15	5.82
Difference			0.04	**-0.87**	13.92	**-11.84**	0.56	**-3.09**	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Custom Real Return Benchmark			3.41	5.65	16.55	-2.14	5.22	5.32	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Difference			1.54	6.90	6.98	**-5.03**	1.05	**-1.42**	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Real Estate Composite	**439,864,995**	**10.94**	**3.42**	**36.10**	**9.75**	**5.56**	**9.50**	**12.27**	**9.20**	**13.75**	**10.31**	**12.26**	**10.37**
NCREIF ODCE Index (AWA) (Net) (1 Qtr Lag)			-0.55	27.26	1.47	3.93	6.55	7.11	7.36	12.62	12.40	12.74	9.68
Difference			3.97	8.84	8.28	1.63	2.95	5.16	1.84	1.13	**-2.09**	**-0.48**	0.69
Private Equity Composite	**552,547,280**	**13.74**	**-1.22**	**27.41**	**55.88**	**-1.02**	**13.64**	**15.69**	**18.96**	**4.69**	**11.12**	**20.27**	**12.21**
Russell 3000+3% Index (1 Qtr Lag)			-12.79	15.28	67.40	-6.40	12.03	17.23	21.61	2.65	15.74	26.29	18.00
Difference			11.57	12.13	**-11.52**	5.38	1.61	**-1.54**	**-2.65**	2.04	**-4.62**	**-6.02**	**-5.79**

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RVK

	Allocation		Performance (%)									
	Market Value ($)	%	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	Since Incep.	Inception Date
US Equity Composite	**713,229,408**	**17.73**	**6.55**	**6.55**	**9.95**	**-6.19**	**18.71**	**11.02**	**12.13**	**11.75**	**10.65**	**01/01/1987**
Russell 3000 Index			7.18	7.18	9.75	-8.58	18.48	10.45	11.99	11.73	10.38	
Difference			-0.63	-0.63	0.20	2.39	0.23	0.57	0.14	0.02	0.27	
US Large Cap Equity Composite	**632,997,621**	**15.74**	**6.98**	**6.98**	**10.10**	**-6.34**	**18.13**	**11.57**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**12.46**	**06/01/2016**
Russell 1000 Index			7.46	7.46	9.93	-8.39	18.55	10.87	12.23	12.01	12.17	
Difference			-0.48	-0.48	0.17	2.05	-0.42	0.70	N/A	N/A	0.29	
BNY Mellon HEDI (SA)	**291,134,009**	**7.24**	**6.42**	**6.42**	**10.33**	**-3.79**	**17.70**	**12.31**	**12.88**	**N/A**	**10.95**	**05/01/2019**
Russell 1000 Index			7.46	7.46	9.93	-8.39	18.55	10.87	12.23	12.01	10.40	
Difference			-1.04	-1.04	0.40	4.60	-0.85	1.44	0.65	N/A	0.55	
IM U.S. Large Cap Core Equity (MF) Median			6.60	6.60	9.31	-7.77	17.55	10.27	11.55	11.28	9.87	
Rank			55	55	31	7	47	5	12	N/A	16	
BNY Mellon R1000 Index - NL (CF)	**341,863,612**	**8.50**	**7.45**	**7.45**	**9.91**	**-8.41**	**18.58**	**10.98**	**12.32**	**12.09**	**10.51**	**05/01/2019**
Russell 1000 Index			7.46	7.46	9.93	-8.39	18.55	10.87	12.23	12.01	10.40	
Difference			-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.11	
IM U.S. Large Cap Core Equity (MF) Median			6.60	6.60	9.31	-7.77	17.55	10.27	11.55	11.28	9.87	
Rank			32	32	39	61	19	27	22	20	28	
US Small Cap Equity Composite	**80,231,787**	**1.99**	**3.33**	**3.33**	**8.72**	**-5.00**	**25.42**	**5.82**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**9.41**	**06/01/2016**
Russell 2000 Index			2.74	2.74	6.75	-11.61	17.51	4.71	8.55	8.04	8.17	
Difference			0.59	0.59	1.97	6.61	7.91	1.11	N/A	N/A	1.24	
Dimensional U.S. Small Cap Value (CF)	**45,386,081**	**1.13**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**11.53**	**-2.08**	**33.06**	**7.97**	**9.85**	**9.19**	**8.49**	**04/01/2005**
Russell 2000 Index			2.74	2.74	6.75	-11.61	17.51	4.71	8.55	8.04	7.59	
Difference			-1.98	-1.98	4.78	9.53	15.55	3.26	1.30	1.15	0.90	
Russell 2000 Val Index			-0.66	-0.66	2.74	-12.96	21.01	4.55	7.86	7.22	6.75	
Difference			1.42	1.42	8.79	10.88	12.05	3.42	1.99	1.97	1.74	
IM U.S. Small Cap Value Equity (MF) Median			0.68	0.68	6.66	-7.14	25.68	5.66	8.16	7.57	6.86	
Rank			49	49	13	12	11	13	14	14	3	
RHJ Small Cap Opportunities (SA)	**34,845,706**	**0.87**	**6.88**	**6.88**	**5.27**	**-8.54**	**17.68**	**3.36**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**8.90**	**06/01/2016**
Russell 2000 Index			2.74	2.74	6.75	-11.61	17.51	4.71	8.55	8.04	8.17	
Difference			4.14	4.14	-1.48	3.07	0.17	-1.35	N/A	N/A	0.73	
Russell 2000 Grth Index			6.07	6.07	10.72	-10.60	13.36	4.26	8.74	8.49	8.38	
Difference			0.81	0.81	-5.45	2.06	4.32	-0.90	N/A	N/A	0.52	
IM U.S. Small Cap Growth Equity (MF) Median			6.24	6.24	9.54	-11.42	15.45	6.89	10.37	9.14	10.05	
Rank			40	40	89	24	28	89	N/A	N/A	69	

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RVK

	Allocation		Performance (%)									
	Market Value ($)	%	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	Since Incep.	Inception Date
Developed Non-US Equity Composite	**402,166,591**	**10.00**	**9.08**	**9.08**	**14.79**	**-0.31**	**12.43**	**3.06**	**5.47**	**5.29**	**6.68**	**07/01/2012**
MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)			8.47	8.47	15.36	-1.38	12.99	3.52	6.21	5.00	6.42	
Difference			0.61	0.61	-0.57	1.07	-0.56	-0.46	-0.74	0.29	0.26	
PanAgora Dynamic International Equity (SA)	**205,626,927**	**5.11**	**8.66**	**8.66**	**15.31**	**-0.45**	**14.68**	**2.67**	**5.71**	**5.37**	**7.84**	**05/01/2009**
MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)			8.47	8.47	15.36	-1.38	12.99	3.52	6.21	5.00	7.05	
Difference			0.19	0.19	-0.05	0.93	1.69	-0.85	-0.50	0.37	0.79	
IM EAFE Core (MF) Median			8.52	8.52	14.19	-0.96	12.80	3.09	5.78	4.77	6.81	
Rank			46	46	29	41	19	64	52	22	16	
Artisan Non-U.S. Growth (SA)	**139,524,453**	**3.47**	**8.69**	**8.69**	**16.00**	**-0.14**	**9.19**	**3.45**	**5.74**	**N/A**	**4.23**	**02/01/2014**
MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)			8.47	8.47	15.36	-1.38	12.99	3.52	6.21	5.00	4.16	
Difference			0.22	0.22	0.64	1.24	-3.80	-0.07	-0.47	N/A	0.07	
IM EAFE Growth (MF) Median			9.70	9.70	14.59	-3.03	11.27	3.73	6.46	5.33	4.80	
Rank			63	63	24	23	85	61	73	N/A	74	
Acadian Non-US Small Cap Equity (CF)	**56,146,418**	**1.40**	**5.73**	**5.73**	**11.14**	**-8.51**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**4.25**	**12/01/2020**
MSCI EAFE Sm Cap Index (USD) (Net)			4.92	4.92	9.54	-9.83	12.07	0.87	5.26	5.86	-1.29	
Difference			0.81	0.81	1.60	1.32	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.54	
IM International SMID Cap Equity (MF) Median			6.38	6.38	10.50	-8.38	13.07	1.19	5.43	5.15	-1.60	
Rank			69	69	41	52	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	14	

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	Allocation		Performance (%)									
	Market Value ($)	%	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	Since Incep.	Inception Date
Emerging Markets Equity Composite	**259,965,809**	**6.46**	**4.91**	**4.91**	**4.88**	**-5.85**	**12.88**	**1.09**	**5.89**	**2.66**	**3.62**	**07/01/2012**
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)			3.96	3.96	0.84	-10.70	7.83	-0.91	4.91	2.00	2.93	
Difference			0.95	0.95	4.04	4.85	5.05	2.00	0.98	0.66	0.69	
DFA Emg Mkts Value;I (DFEVX)	**132,783,373**	**3.30**	**3.74**	**3.74**	**3.18**	**-7.88**	**16.23**	**0.24**	**6.19**	**N/A**	**2.19**	**05/01/2013**
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)			3.96	3.96	0.84	-10.70	7.83	-0.91	4.91	2.00	1.94	
Difference			-0.22	-0.22	2.34	2.82	8.40	1.15	1.28	N/A	0.25	
MSCI Emg Mkts Val Index (USD) (Net)			3.91	3.91	1.56	-9.44	10.04	-1.15	3.92	0.69	0.69	
Difference			-0.17	-0.17	1.62	1.56	6.19	1.39	2.27	N/A	1.50	
IM Emerging Markets Equity (MF) Median			5.02	5.02	2.83	-9.28	7.93	-1.08	4.67	1.77	1.66	
Rank			76	76	47	35	8	26	19	N/A	35	
RBC Emerging Markets Equity (CF)	**127,182,436**	**3.16**	**6.16**	**6.16**	**6.73**	**-3.63**	**9.98**	**1.84**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**4.98**	**09/01/2016**
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)			3.96	3.96	0.84	-10.70	7.83	-0.91	4.91	2.00	3.96	
Difference			2.20	2.20	5.89	7.07	2.15	2.75	N/A	N/A	1.02	
MSCI Emg Mkts Grth Index (USD) (Net)			4.00	4.00	0.20	-11.87	5.65	-0.79	5.78	3.18	4.67	
Difference			2.16	2.16	6.53	8.24	4.33	2.63	N/A	N/A	0.31	
IM Emerging Markets Equity (MF) Median			5.02	5.02	2.83	-9.28	7.93	-1.08	4.67	1.77	3.70	
Rank			27	27	21	9	29	12	N/A	N/A	21	
Core Fixed Income Composite	**607,230,352**	**15.10**	**3.38**	**3.38**	**0.19**	**-4.86**	**-1.37**	**1.24**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**1.28**	**07/01/2017**
Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index			2.96	2.96	-0.09	-4.78	-2.77	0.90	0.88	1.36	0.74	
Difference			0.42	0.42	0.28	-0.08	1.40	0.34	N/A	N/A	0.54	
Garcia Hamilton Core Fixed Income (SA)	**360,632,931**	**8.97**	**3.51**	**3.51**	**-0.13**	**-3.94**	**-1.57**	**1.14**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**0.99**	**09/01/2017**
Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index			2.96	2.96	-0.09	-4.78	-2.77	0.90	0.88	1.36	0.53	
Difference			0.55	0.55	-0.04	0.84	1.20	0.24	N/A	N/A	0.46	
IM U.S. Broad Market Core Fixed Income (MF) Median			3.14	3.14	-0.02	-5.31	-1.85	0.85	0.99	1.32	0.48	
Rank			15	15	59	8	39	26	N/A	N/A	11	
PGIM Core Plus Fixed Income (CF)	**246,629,757**	**6.13**	**3.19**	**3.19**	**0.78**	**-5.75**	**-0.62**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**1.56**	**06/01/2018**
Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index			2.96	2.96	-0.09	-4.78	-2.77	0.90	0.88	1.36	0.94	
Difference			0.23	0.23	0.87	-0.97	2.15	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.62	
IM U.S. Broad Market Core+ Fixed Income (MF) Median			3.23	3.23	0.47	-5.51	-1.07	1.07	1.32	1.48	1.12	
Rank			56	56	36	57	32	N/A	N/A	N/A	27	

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	Allocation		Performance (%)									
	Market Value ($)	%	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	Since Incep.	Inception Date
Non-Core Fixed Income Composite	**409,959,250**	**10.19**	**2.79**	**2.79**	**6.45**	**1.84**	**6.55**	**2.04**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**2.42**	**07/01/2017**
Custom Non-Core Fixed Income Benchmark			3.23	3.23	6.67	0.03	6.04	2.46	4.12	3.11	2.77	
Difference			-0.44	-0.44	-0.22	1.81	0.51	-0.42	N/A	N/A	-0.35	
Wellington Blended Opportunistic EMD (CF)	**122,861,271**	**3.05**	**3.93**	**3.93**	**8.07**	**-2.50**	**1.51**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**-2.98**	**03/01/2020**
Wellington Blended Index			3.51	3.51	6.90	-3.83	0.46	-1.44	1.15	0.29	-3.80	
Difference			0.42	0.42	1.17	1.33	1.05	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.82	
IM Emerging Markets Debt (MF) Median			1.76	1.76	5.61	-6.07	1.43	-0.74	1.62	0.73	-3.75	
Rank			1	1	16	24	49	N/A	N/A	N/A	36	
Beach Point Leveraged Loan (CF)	**150,346,585**	**3.74**	**3.72**	**3.72**	**7.69**	**1.99**	**7.75**	**3.25**	**3.31**	**3.45**	**3.73**	**10/01/2012**
Credit Suisse Lvg'd Loan Index			3.11	3.11	6.77	2.12	8.38	3.55	4.57	3.86	4.05	
Difference			0.61	0.61	0.92	-0.13	-0.63	-0.30	-1.26	-0.41	-0.32	
IM U.S. Bank Loans (MF) Median			2.95	2.95	6.63	1.12	6.95	2.36	3.46	2.82	3.04	
Rank			6	6	16	25	22	8	59	10	6	
AG Direct Lending Fund III, LP	**17,421,073**	**0.43**										**11/01/2018**
First Eagle Direct Lending Fund IV	**15,824,893**	**0.39**										**06/01/2019**
PIMCO Private Income Fund, LLC	**25,673,055**	**0.64**										**11/01/2019**
AG Direct Lending Fund IV, LP	**19,416,982**	**0.48**										**06/01/2021**
Deerpath Capital V, LP	**18,100,805**	**0.45**										**11/01/2020**
Deerpath Capital VI, LP	**15,764,925**	**0.39**										**11/01/2021**
First Eagle Direct Lending Fund V-B	**14,592,791**	**0.36**										**06/01/2021**
AG Direct Lending Evergreen Fund, LP	**9,474,404**	**0.24**										**09/01/2022**

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	Allocation		Performance (%)									
	Market Value ($)	%	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	Since Incep.	Inception Date
Real Return Composite	**569,905,463**	**14.17**	**3.30**	**3.30**	**4.95**	**6.13**	**13.97**	**7.81**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**7.25**	**07/01/2017**
Consumer Price Index+4%			2.70	2.70	4.91	9.18	9.57	8.03	7.58	6.74	7.85	
Difference			0.60	0.60	0.04	-3.05	4.40	-0.22	N/A	N/A	-0.60	
Custom Real Return Benchmark			2.37	2.37	3.41	1.35	10.57	5.97	N/A	N/A	5.77	
Difference			0.93	0.93	1.54	4.78	3.40	1.84	N/A	N/A	1.48	
Public Real Return Composite	**136,429,437**	**3.39**	**1.06**	**1.06**	**-1.00**	**-9.88**	**9.64**	**4.15**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**4.00**	**07/01/2017**
BNY Mellon TIPS - NL (CF)	**15,536,875**	**0.39**	**2.91**	**2.91**	**-0.62**	**-6.68**	**1.54**	**2.81**	**2.35**	**1.41**	**2.82**	**05/01/2019**
Bloomberg US Trsy US TIPS Index			3.34	3.34	0.02	-6.06	1.75	2.94	2.44	1.49	2.98	
Difference			-0.43	-0.43	-0.64	-0.62	-0.21	-0.13	-0.09	-0.08	-0.16	
IM U.S. TIPS (MF) Median			3.05	3.05	0.02	-6.09	2.14	2.67	2.22	1.12	2.75	
Rank			64	64	82	74	68	40	36	27	45	
Cohen & Steers Real Assets Fund (CIT)	**60,820,156**	**1.51**	**-0.21**	**-0.21**	**-1.25**	**-11.01**	**15.08**	**5.87**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**5.49**	**09/01/2017**
Cohen & Steers Real Assets Custom Index			-0.25	-0.25	-0.74	-10.86	13.95	4.77	5.33	2.37	4.50	
Difference			0.04	0.04	-0.51	-0.15	1.13	1.10	N/A	N/A	0.99	
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund (SA)	**60,072,406**	**1.49**	**1.85**	**1.85**	**-0.29**	**-9.82**	**9.34**	**3.11**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**2.52**	**09/01/2017**
Nuveen Real Asset Income Blend Index			2.96	2.96	1.00	-9.78	8.09	2.82	3.79	4.06	2.18	
Difference			-1.11	-1.11	-1.29	-0.04	1.25	0.29	N/A	N/A	0.34	
Private Real Return Composite	**433,476,026**	**10.78**	**3.92**	**3.92**	**7.88**	**18.41**	**14.86**	**10.85**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**10.18**	**07/01/2017**
Private Natural Resources	**56,762,265**	**1.41**	**2.42**	**2.42**	**1.93**	**6.20**	**6.84**	**4.41**	**5.95**	**N/A**	**4.93**	**10/01/2013**
Consumer Price Index+4% (1 Qtr Lag)			0.98	0.98	6.31	10.71	9.12	7.93	7.43	6.70	6.66	
Difference			1.44	1.44	-4.38	-4.51	-2.28	-3.52	-1.48	N/A	-1.73	
Private Infrastructure	**376,713,761**	**9.37**	**4.15**	**4.15**	**8.94**	**20.73**	**16.63**	**12.37**	**14.30**	**N/A**	**-1.77**	**01/01/2014**
Consumer Price Index+4%			2.70	2.70	4.91	9.18	9.57	8.03	7.58	6.74	6.95	
Difference			1.45	1.45	4.03	11.55	7.06	4.34	6.72	N/A	-8.72	

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RVK

	Allocation		Performance (%)									
	Market Value ($)	%	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	Since Incep.	Inception Date
Real Estate Composite	**439,864,995**	**10.94**	**-0.04**	**-0.04**	**3.42**	**12.44**	**15.34**	**12.85**	**12.17**	**12.22**	**7.82**	**04/01/2006**
NCREIF ODCE Index (AWA) (Net) (1 Qtr Lag)			-5.17	-5.17	-0.55	6.55	8.97	7.72	7.57	9.11	6.38	
Difference			5.13	5.13	3.97	5.89	6.37	5.13	4.60	3.11	1.44	
ORG Real Estate	**439,864,995**	**10.94**	**-0.04**	**-0.04**	**3.42**	**12.44**	**15.34**	**12.85**	**12.24**	**12.43**	**7.81**	**04/01/2006**
NCREIF ODCE Index (AWA) (Net) (1 Qtr Lag)			-5.17	-5.17	-0.55	6.55	8.97	7.72	7.57	9.11	6.38	
Difference			5.13	5.13	3.97	5.89	6.37	5.13	4.67	3.32	1.43	
Private Equity Composite	**552,547,280**	**13.74**	**1.82**	**1.82**	**-1.22**	**0.22**	**21.18**	**17.57**	**17.23**	**16.19**	**11.46**	**06/01/2006**
Russell 3000+3% Index (1 Qtr Lag)			7.98	7.98	-12.79	-16.78	10.28	12.05	14.37	15.50	11.98	
Difference			**-6.16**	**-6.16**	11.57	17.00	10.90	5.52	2.86	0.69	**-0.52**	

Performance shown is net of fees and provided by BNY Mellon. Performance is annualized for periods greater than one year. Total Fund performance excludes Treasury Cash. Indices show N/A for since inception returns when the fund contains more history than the corresponding benchmark. The fiscal year ends 06/30. Composite market values includes residual assets from liquidated managers.

RVK

Composite Profiles





	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years
US Equity Composite	6.57 (38)	6.57 (38)	10.01 (45)	-6.11 (41)	18.81 (53)	11.12 (24)	12.27 (34)	11.91 (34)
Russell 3000 Index	7.18 (33)	7.18 (33)	9.75 (51)	-8.58 (64)	18.48 (60)	10.45 (33)	11.99 (40)	11.73 (36)
5th Percentile	14.36	14.36	17.25	1.52	30.04	13.65	15.40	14.57
1st Quartile	7.73	7.73	12.16	-4.09	22.43	11.01	12.75	12.26
Median	5.03	5.03	9.76	-7.30	18.97	9.09	11.24	10.89
3rd Quartile	2.01	2.01	7.21	-10.53	16.83	7.16	9.55	9.48
95th Percentile	-1.16	-1.16	2.98	-16.71	12.18	4.42	7.34	7.44
Population	1,804	1,804	1,799	1,796	1,752	1,710	1,639	1,518

Performance shown is gross of fees. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Peer Group Scattergram - 5 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
US Equity Composite	11.12	20.13
Russell 3000 Index	10.45	21.09
Median	9.09	23.95

Up/Down Markets - 5 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics



	Sharpe Ratio 5 Years	Tracking Error 5 Years	Info Ratio 5 Years	Downside Risk 5 Years	Up Mkt Capture 5 Years	Down Mkt Capture 5 Years
US Equity Composite	0.56 (17)	1.53 (98)	0.27 (16)	13.06 (87)	98.73 (66)	94.16 (76)
Russell 3000 Index	0.52 (29)	0.00 (100)	N/A	13.91 (72)	100.00 (59)	100.00 (63)
Median	0.44	9.06	-0.05	15.56	101.67	106.65
Population	1,710	1,710	1,710	1,710	1,710	1,710

Performance shown is gross of fees. Calculation is based on quarterly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System
US Equity Composite vs. Russell 3000 Index
Portfolio Characteristics

As of March 31, 2023

Top Ten Equity Holdings

	Portfolio Weight (%)	Benchmark Weight (%)	Active Weight (%)	Quarterly Return (%)
Apple Inc	5.74	6.17	-0.43	27.11
Microsoft Corp	5.20	5.37	-0.17	20.52
Amazon.com Inc	1.82	2.29	-0.47	22.96
Alphabet Inc	1.56	1.55	0.01	17.57
Alphabet Inc	1.50	1.36	0.14	17.21
Berkshire Hathaway Inc	1.40	1.39	0.01	-0.04
Unitedhealth Group Inc	1.11	1.10	0.01	-10.54
NVIDIA Corporation	1.10	1.64	-0.54	90.10
Johnson & Johnson	1.09	1.02	0.07	-11.64
Meta Platforms Inc	1.08	1.17	-0.09	76.12
% of Portfolio	21.60	23.06	-1.46	

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	429,557	462,697
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	3,704	2,051
Price/Earnings Ratio	19.71	19.78
Price/Book Ratio	4.02	3.95
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	18.56	18.82
Current Yield (%)	1.57	1.64
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	0.96	1.00
Number of Securities	1,933	2,928

Distribution of Market Capitalization (%)



Alphabet Inc. is shown twice in the Top Ten Equity Holdings, but represents two different share classes: GOOGL (Class A) and GOOG (Class C).



	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years
◆ Developed Non-US Equity Composite	9.19 (43)	9.19 (43)	15.28 (54)	0.29 (34)	13.11 (59)	3.68 (62)	6.07 (71)	5.86 (54)
● MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)	8.47 (65)	8.47 (65)	15.36 (52)	-1.38 (61)	12.99 (61)	3.52 (64)	6.21 (67)	5.00 (85)
5th Percentile	12.51	12.51	20.01	6.11	21.02	7.64	9.74	8.30
1st Quartile	10.25	10.25	17.16	1.11	15.12	5.33	7.96	6.85
Median	8.83	8.83	15.42	-0.67	13.80	4.09	6.69	5.97
3rd Quartile	7.77	7.77	13.18	-3.33	12.56	3.14	5.93	5.34
95th Percentile	5.97	5.97	9.85	-6.63	9.54	1.46	4.55	4.55
Population	116	116	116	116	116	115	113	111

Performance shown is gross of fees. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Peer Group Scattergram - 5 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
◆ Developed Non-US Equity Composite	3.68	19.43
● MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)	3.52	20.38
— Median	4.09	21.08

Up/Down Markets - 5 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics



	Sharpe Ratio 5 Years	Tracking Error 5 Years	Info Ratio 5 Years	Downside Risk 5 Years	Up Mkt Capture 5 Years	Down Mkt Capture 5 Years
◆ Developed Non-US Equity Composite	0.22 (62)	2.63 (84)	-0.01 (72)	13.79 (80)	97.03 (86)	96.03 (82)
● MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)	0.21 (65)	0.00 (100)	N/A	14.24 (71)	100.00 (82)	100.00 (66)
Median	0.23	4.85	0.17	14.64	105.93	103.48
Population	115	115	115	115	115	115

Performance shown is gross of fees. Calculation is based on quarterly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Top Ten Equity Holdings

	Portfolio Weight (%)	Benchmark Weight (%)	Active Weight (%)	Quarterly Return (%)
Nestle SA, Cham Und Vevey	2.49	2.19	0.30	5.30
Novo Nordisk A/S	2.00	1.71	0.29	18.42
Lvmh Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton	1.85	1.66	0.19	26.25
UBS Group AG	1.77	0.46	1.31	13.48
Deutsche Telekom AG	1.66	0.51	1.15	21.90
Shell Plc	1.65	1.31	0.34	2.79
Deutsche Boerse AG Frankfurt	1.61	0.24	1.37	13.03
Linde Plc	1.48	0.00	1.48	8.27
L'Air Liquide SA	1.42	0.57	0.85	18.40
Alibaba Group Holding Ltd	1.40	0.00	1.40	15.99
% of Portfolio	17.33	8.65	8.68	

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	96,835	83,612
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	651	12,647
Price/Earnings Ratio	13.46	13.61
Price/Book Ratio	2.70	2.58
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	11.18	8.67
Current Yield (%)	3.01	3.25
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	0.91	1.00
Number of Securities	1,865	795

Distribution of Market Capitalization (%)





	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years
Emerging Markets Equity Composite	4.91 (52)	4.91 (52)	4.88 (43)	-5.85 (28)	12.88 (31)	1.09 (39)	5.89 (55)	2.78 (66)
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)	3.96 (72)	3.96 (72)	0.84 (77)	-10.70 (72)	7.83 (75)	-0.91 (80)	4.91 (80)	2.00 (90)
5th Percentile	8.69	8.69	13.38	3.13	22.35	5.29	9.59	6.67
1st Quartile	6.31	6.31	7.83	-5.36	14.46	1.96	7.31	4.34
Median	4.94	4.94	3.75	-8.78	10.01	0.69	6.07	3.30
3rd Quartile	3.66	3.66	0.94	-11.04	7.82	-0.74	5.10	2.49
95th Percentile	1.36	1.36	-6.43	-16.98	4.68	-2.25	3.57	1.84
Population	277	277	276	276	259	232	217	174

Performance shown is gross of fees. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Peer Group Scattergram - 5 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Emerging Markets Equity Composite	1.09	21.17
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)	-0.91	21.26
Median	0.69	23.11

Up/Down Markets - 5 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics



	Sharpe Ratio 5 Years	Tracking Error 5 Years	Info Ratio 5 Years	Downside Risk 5 Years	Up Mkt Capture 5 Years	Down Mkt Capture 5 Years
Emerging Markets Equity Composite	0.10 (43)	4.14 (78)	0.49 (27)	14.98 (66)	99.70 (80)	87.45 (81)
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)	0.00 (83)	0.00 (100)	N/A	14.67 (77)	100.00 (78)	100.00 (51)
Median	0.08	6.30	0.30	15.52	110.21	100.01
Population	232	232	232	232	232	232

Performance shown is gross of fees. Calculation is based on quarterly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Top Ten Equity Holdings

	Portfolio Weight (%)	Benchmark Weight (%)	Active Weight (%)	Quarterly Return (%)
Reliance Industries Ltd	2.92	1.31	1.61	-7.84
China Construction Bank Corp	2.52	0.95	1.57	3.39
SK Hynix Inc	1.54	0.57	0.97	14.12
Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd	1.21	0.65	0.56	5.04
Ping An Insurance Group	1.20	0.63	0.57	-1.73
Alibaba Group Holding Ltd	1.11	2.89	-1.78	15.62
Ind. & Com. Bank of China Ltd	1.09	0.46	0.63	3.28
Housing Development Fin Corp Ltd	0.97	0.84	0.13	0.24
Bank of China Ltd	0.93	0.46	0.47	5.27
Axis Bank Ltd	0.93	0.36	0.57	-7.41
% of Portfolio	14.42	9.12	5.30	

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	32,040	102,229
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	457	6,315
Price/Earnings Ratio	7.18	11.01
Price/Book Ratio	1.61	2.42
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	10.82	15.03
Current Yield (%)	5.68	3.35
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	0.95	1.00
Number of Securities	3,302	1,379

Distribution of Market Capitalization (%)



Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System
Fixed Income Composite vs. IM Global Fixed Income (SA+CF)
Peer Group Analysis

As of March 31, 2023



	QTD	CYTD	FYTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years
Fixed Income	3.20 (47)	3.20 (47)	2.77 (49)	-2.04 (18)	1.93 (50)	1.93 (46)	2.30 (57)	1.99 (51)
Bloomberg US Unv Bond Index	2.93 (67)	2.93 (67)	0.55 (80)	-4.61 (41)	-2.02 (85)	1.05 (60)	1.24 (69)	1.62 (54)
5th Percentile	5.32	5.32	9.97	1.32	10.45	5.47	6.35	5.19
1st Quartile	3.61	3.61	6.38	-2.98	5.68	3.01	4.71	3.38
Median	3.16	3.16	2.69	-5.54	1.86	1.70	2.58	2.06
3rd Quartile	2.64	2.64	0.91	-8.79	-1.30	-0.81	0.76	0.44
95th Percentile	0.63	0.63	-2.24	-12.38	-4.05	-2.51	-0.52	-0.56
Population	180	180	180	180	177	165	156	139

Performance shown is gross of fees. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

RVK

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Avg. Maturity	8.20	8.50
Avg. Quality	Aa2	Aa1/Aa2
Convexity	0.83	0.59
Coupon Rate (%)	3.56	2.79
Current Yield (%)	3.86	N/A
Effective Duration	6.60	6.33
Yield To Maturity (%)	5.11	4.40
Yield To Worst (%)	5.07	4.40

Sector Distribution (%)



Allocation to "Other" consists of equity and swaps.

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Avg. Maturity	6.62	6.07
Avg. Quality	Ba2	Ba2
Coupon Rate (%)	5.65	7.47
Current Yield (%)	8.09	8.07
Modified Duration	2.74	N/A
Yield To Maturity (%)	N/A	8.90

Sector Distribution (%)



Please see the Addendum for custom index definitions. Non-Core Fixed Income Composite portfolio characteristics and sector distribution exclude private credit funds.

Fund Name	Vintage	Asset Class	Commitment ($)	Paid In Capital ($)	Distributions ($)	Valuation ($)	Fund IRR (%)	Index IRR (%)	Fund Multiple
AG Direct Lending Fund III, LP	2018	Private Credit - Direct Lending	25,000,000	23,035,117	13,503,653	17,788,864	10.40	3.90	1.36
First Eagle Direct Lending Fund IV	2019	Private Credit - Direct Lending	20,000,000	37,102,322	23,587,845	16,529,782	6.43	3.71	1.08
PIMCO Private Income Fund Onshore Feeder LLC	2019	Private Credit - Direct Lending	20,000,000	20,000,000	0	25,673,055	9.39	5.00	1.28
AG Direct Lending Fund IV, LP	2020	Private Credit - Direct Lending	20,000,000	17,129,726	1,421,156	18,764,314	14.97	0.23	1.18
Deerpath Capital V, LP	2020	Private Credit - Direct Lending	20,000,000	18,338,462	2,218,389	18,828,602	7.93	2.58	1.15
Deerpath Capital VI, LP	2021	Private Credit - Direct Lending	20,000,000	15,460,563	903,186	15,764,925	8.19	-0.61	1.08
First Eagle Direct Lending Fund V-B	2021	Private Credit - Direct Lending	20,000,000	15,292,750	3,518,493	13,040,188	9.06	-1.08	1.08
AG Direct Lending Evergreen Fund LP	2022	Private Credit - Direct Lending	20,000,000	9,500,000	0	9,474,404	N/M	N/M	1.00
			165,000,000	**155,858,939**	**45,152,722**	**135,864,134**	**9.23**	**3.18**	**1.16**

Certain valuations (marked with a '*') are preliminary estimates of valuation as of the date of reporting and reflect the estimated impact of subsequent net cash contributions/distributions. These figures may be used in calculations contained in this report. Index IRR represents the dollar-weighted returns calculated using the Credit Suisse Lvg'd Loan Index assuming an index investment with the same cash flow timing. IRRs are shown only for investments with one year or more of cash flows and for which an accurate IRR could be calculated. Applicable IRRs are marked with 'N/M' for not material. Fund IRR is the annualized since-inception net internal rate for the indicated fund or composite. Fund Multiple is the since inception sum of distributions and valuation divided by paid in capital.

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

Fund	BNY Mellon HEDI (SA)	BNY Mellon R1000 Index - NL (SA)	Dimensional U.S. Small Cap Value (CF)	RHJ Sm Cap Opportunities (SA)	PanAgora Dynamic International Equity (SA)	Artisan Non-U.S. Growth (SA)	Acadian Non-US Small Cap Equity (CF)	DFA Emg Mkts Value;I (DFEVX)
Peer Group	U.S. Large Cap Core Equity (SA+CF)	U.S. Large Cap Core Equity (SA+CF)	U.S. Small Cap Value Equity (SA+CF)	U.S. Small Cap Growth Equity (SA+CF)	EAFE Core (SA)	EAFE Growth (SA)	International Small Cap Equity (SA+CF)	Emerging Markets Equity (MF)
◆ **Fund Expense Ratio**	**0.02**	**0.01**	**0.28**	**0.80**	**0.31**	**0.67**	**0.75**	**0.44**
Median Expense Ratio	0.45	0.45	0.89	0.90	0.58	0.63	0.88	1.03
Percentile Rank	1	1	2	27	6	62	27	6
Population	*590*	*590*	*481*	*503*	*219*	*49*	*224*	*220*

Fund Expense Ratios are intuitively ranked (i.e., a lower expense ratio yields a better percentile rank than a higher expense ratio).
The fee peer groups consist of only institutional share classes.
Peer group data is sourced from eVestment & Morningstar.



Fund	RBC Emerging Markets Equity (CF)	Garcia Hamilton Core Fixed Income (SA)	PGIM Core Plus Fixed Income (CF)	Wellington Blended Opportunistic EMD (CF)	Beach Point Leveraged Loan (CF)	BNY Mellon TIPS - NL (CF)	Cohen & Steers Real Assets Fund (CIT)	Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund (SA)
Peer Group	Emerging Market Equity (SA+CF)	U.S. Broad Market Core Fixed Income (SA+CF)	U.S. Broad Market Core+ Fixed Income (SA+CF)	Emerging Markets Debt (SA+CF)	U.S Bank Loans (SA+CF)	U.S. TIPS (SA+CF)		
Fund Expense Ratio	**0.50**	**0.14**	**0.26**	**0.55**	**0.50**	**0.01**	**0.65**	**0.79**
Median Expense Ratio	0.83	0.25	0.27	0.53	0.50	0.15	N/A	N/A
Percentile Rank	7	10	45	63	82	6	N/A	N/A
Population	*398*	*375*	*271*	*172*	*59*	*36*	N/A	N/A

Fund Expense Ratios are intuitively ranked (i.e., a lower expense ratio yields a better percentile rank than a higher expense ratio).
The fee peer groups consist of only institutional share classes.
Peer group data is sourced from eVestment & Morningstar.

Investment Manager Profiles



Manager: BNY Mellon HEDI (SA) **As of March 31, 2023**

Benchmark: Russell 1000 Index

Peer Group: IM U.S. Large Cap Core Equity (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**6.43**	**-3.74**	**17.76**	**12.38**	**12.96**	**N/A**	**-15.07**	**25.37**	**18.63**	**32.61**	**-0.05**
Benchmark	7.46	-8.39	18.55	10.87	12.23	12.01	-19.13	26.45	20.96	31.43	-4.78
Difference	-1.03	4.65	-0.79	1.51	0.73	N/A	4.06	-1.08	-2.33	1.18	4.73
Peer Group Median	6.36	-7.07	18.28	10.34	12.10	12.06	-16.49	27.71	17.54	30.03	-5.07
Rank	48	18	62	10	22	N/A	41	68	45	22	9
Population	179	177	173	169	164	145	204	212	229	256	277

Peer Group Scattergram - 7 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	12.96	14.92
Benchmark	12.23	16.39
Median	12.10	16.19

Up/Down Markets - 7 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 7 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	12.16 (27)	3.56 (50)	0.12 (33)	0.81 (8)	9.48 (88)
Benchmark	11.74 (42)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.71 (49)	10.77 (35)
Median	11.54	3.53	-0.06	0.71	10.55

Portfolio Characteristics and Dist. of Market Cap (%)

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	473,891	490,584
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	37,303	12,236
Price/Earnings Ratio	23.65	20.40
Price/Book Ratio	4.95	4.10
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	18.05	18.83
Current Yield (%)	1.55	1.65
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	0.89	1.00
Number of Securities	231	1,007
Active Share	44.08	N/A



Sector Weights (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and client specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.
Performance prior to 04/11/2019 is represented by Rhumbline HEDI (SA).

Manager: BNY Mellon R1000 Index - NL (CF) **As of March 31, 2023**
Benchmark: Russell 1000 Index
Peer Group: IM U.S. Large Cap Core Equity (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**7.46**	**-8.40**	**18.53**	**10.86**	**12.22**	**12.01**	**-19.14**	**26.46**	**20.91**	**31.42**	**-4.77**
Benchmark	7.46	-8.39	18.55	10.87	12.23	12.01	-19.13	26.45	20.96	31.43	-4.78
Difference	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.01	0.01
Peer Group Median	6.36	-7.07	18.28	10.34	12.10	12.06	-16.49	27.71	17.54	30.03	-5.07
Rank	27	75	45	38	44	53	75	59	30	34	46
Population	179	177	173	169	164	145	204	212	229	256	277

Peer Group Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	12.01	15.46
Benchmark	12.01	15.47
Median	12.06	15.30

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 10 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	11.86 (51)	0.01 (100)	-0.55 (97)	0.76 (56)	9.86 (37)
Benchmark	11.87 (51)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.76 (56)	9.86 (37)
Median	11.90	3.24	0.01	0.78	9.63

Portfolio Characteristics and Dist. of Market Cap (%)

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	490,594	490,584
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	12,236	12,236
Price/Earnings Ratio	20.40	20.40
Price/Book Ratio	4.10	4.10
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	18.83	18.83
Current Yield (%)	1.65	1.65
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	1.00	1.00
Number of Securities	1,011	1,007
Active Share	0.18	N/A



Sector Weights (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on quarterly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Manager: Dimensional U.S. Small Cap Value (CF) **As of March 31, 2023**
Benchmark: Russell 2000 Index
Peer Group: IM U.S. Small Cap Value Equity (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**0.83**	**-1.80**	**33.53**	**8.42**	**10.33**	**9.69**	**-1.62**	**40.61**	**3.47**	**19.22**	**-14.84**
Benchmark	2.74	-11.61	17.51	4.71	8.55	8.04	-20.44	14.82	19.96	25.53	-11.01
Difference	-1.91	9.81	16.02	3.71	1.78	1.65	18.82	25.79	-16.49	-6.31	-3.83
Peer Group Median	2.34	-5.04	24.50	6.85	9.59	9.28	-10.61	29.80	5.13	24.99	-14.08
Rank	76	25	7	27	36	41	6	9	56	86	59
Population	160	160	156	152	149	141	169	177	189	195	212

Peer Group Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	9.69	21.34
Benchmark	8.04	19.37
Median	9.28	19.71

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 10 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	10.75 (31)	6.83 (38)	0.29 (32)	0.50 (53)	14.26 (19)
Benchmark	8.79 (84)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.45 (83)	13.09 (57)
Median	10.06	6.50	0.21	0.50	13.26

Portfolio Characteristics and Dist. of Market Cap (%)

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	2,819	2,871
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	687	939
Price/Earnings Ratio	8.09	12.06
Price/Book Ratio	1.49	2.39
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	16.28	18.49
Current Yield (%)	1.94	1.57
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	1.06	1.00
Number of Securities	967	1,921
Active Share	72.26	N/A



Sector Weights (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

RVK

Manager: RHJ Small Cap Opportunities (SA) — As of March 31, 2023
Benchmark: Russell 2000 Index
Peer Group: IM U.S. Small Cap Growth Equity (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**7.08**	**-7.77**	**18.63**	**4.21**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**-23.84**	**16.27**	**24.70**	**18.89**	**-6.24**
Benchmark	2.74	-11.61	17.51	4.71	8.55	8.04	-20.44	14.82	19.96	25.53	-11.01
Difference	4.34	3.84	1.12	-0.50	N/A	N/A	-3.40	1.45	4.74	-6.64	4.77
Peer Group Median	7.19	-10.55	17.83	9.30	12.69	11.40	-27.24	11.57	42.40	28.99	-3.83
Rank	53	32	39	95	N/A	N/A	29	38	88	92	67
Population	116	115	113	112	108	102	126	133	139	148	159

Peer Group Scattergram - 5 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	4.21	23.48
Benchmark	4.71	23.70
Median	9.30	24.17

Up/Down Markets - 5 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 5 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	5.52 (95)	7.76 (82)	-0.07 (96)	0.23 (95)	15.85 (55)
Benchmark	6.07 (94)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.26 (94)	16.61 (34)
Median	10.42	9.08	0.46	0.44	16.01

Portfolio Characteristics and Dist. of Market Cap (%)

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	3,335	2,871
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	2,236	939
Price/Earnings Ratio	18.43	12.06
Price/Book Ratio	3.14	2.39
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	24.42	18.49
Current Yield (%)	0.53	1.57
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	0.94	1.00
Number of Securities	66	1,921
Active Share	96.82	N/A



Sector Weights (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and client specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

RVK

Manager: PanAgora Dynamic International Equity (SA) **As of March 31, 2023**
Benchmark: MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)
Peer Group: IM EAFE Core (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**8.75**	**-0.11**	**15.05**	**3.00**	**6.05**	**5.72**	**-13.32**	**13.94**	**6.62**	**17.67**	**-15.30**
Benchmark	8.47	-1.38	12.99	3.52	6.21	5.00	-14.45	11.26	7.82	22.01	-13.79
Difference	0.28	1.27	2.06	-0.52	-0.16	0.72	1.13	2.68	-1.20	-4.34	-1.51
Peer Group Median	8.43	-1.09	13.85	3.99	6.69	5.98	-14.57	11.96	8.70	23.71	-14.37
Rank	40	33	17	82	73	59	30	27	70	94	72
Population	67	67	66	66	65	62	68	72	80	85	90

Peer Group Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	5.72	14.91
Benchmark	5.00	14.93
Median	5.98	15.04

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 10 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	5.83 (63)	1.85 (97)	0.37 (42)	0.39 (62)	9.93 (57)
Benchmark	5.14 (92)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.34 (86)	9.90 (61)
Median	6.10	3.25	0.30	0.40	9.99

Portfolio Characteristics and Dist. of Market Cap (%)

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	78,315	83,612
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	16,081	12,647
Price/Earnings Ratio	13.32	13.61
Price/Book Ratio	2.56	2.58
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	8.92	8.67
Current Yield (%)	3.41	3.25
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	1.01	1.00
Number of Securities	256	795
Active Share	56.13	N/A



Region Weights (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and client specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Manager: Artisan Non-U.S. Growth (SA) **As of March 31, 2023**
Benchmark: MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)
Peer Group: IM EAFE Growth (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**8.87**	**0.58**	**9.94**	**4.17**	**6.47**	**N/A**	**-18.72**	**10.33**	**6.93**	**30.66**	**-9.79**
Benchmark	8.47	-1.38	12.99	3.52	6.21	5.00	-14.45	11.26	7.82	22.01	-13.79
Difference	0.40	1.96	-3.05	0.65	0.26	N/A	-4.27	-0.93	-0.89	8.65	4.00
Peer Group Median	9.14	-3.28	13.23	5.49	8.20	6.76	-21.03	12.69	20.07	26.99	-14.12
Rank	57	3	95	91	93	N/A	32	79	95	19	14
Population	26	26	26	26	26	26	28	35	36	37	39

Peer Group Scattergram - 7 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	6.47	15.52
Benchmark	6.21	15.51
Median	8.20	16.18

Up/Down Markets - 7 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 7 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	6.29 (93)	5.23 (39)	0.05 (93)	0.41 (80)	10.66 (63)
Benchmark	6.04 (94)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.39 (93)	10.42 (66)
Median	7.99	4.70	0.34	0.49	10.87

Portfolio Characteristics and Dist. of Market Cap (%)

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	167,641	83,612
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	69,731	12,647
Price/Earnings Ratio	19.95	13.61
Price/Book Ratio	3.25	2.58
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	12.36	8.67
Current Yield (%)	1.93	3.25
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	0.93	1.00
Number of Securities	55	795
Active Share	82.07	N/A



Region Weights (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and client specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

RVK

Manager: Acadian Int'l Sm Cap (CF) **As of March 31, 2023**
Benchmark: MSCI EAFE Sm Cap Index (USD) (Net)
Peer Group: IM International Small Cap Equity (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**5.97**	**-7.59**	**17.14**	**3.44**	**8.13**	**8.53**	**-18.38**	**20.63**	**14.27**	**23.71**	**-18.54**
Benchmark	4.92	-9.83	12.07	0.87	5.26	5.86	-21.39	10.10	12.34	24.96	-17.89
Difference	1.05	2.24	5.07	2.57	2.87	2.67	3.01	10.53	1.93	-1.25	-0.65
Peer Group Median	6.51	-7.35	14.21	2.57	6.67	7.03	-21.48	13.78	13.73	24.78	-17.85
Rank	64	52	26	37	29	18	35	10	49	57	55
Population	111	111	106	99	90	70	118	116	128	129	135

Peer Group Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	8.53	15.95
Benchmark	5.86	16.14
Median	7.03	16.33

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 10 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	8.64 (19)	2.93 (89)	0.84 (3)	0.54 (18)	10.80 (67)
Benchmark	6.16 (77)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.38 (77)	11.10 (56)
Median	7.36	4.53	0.23	0.44	11.21

Portfolio Characteristics and Dist. of Market Cap (%)

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	2,517	2,674
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	490	1,165
Price/Earnings Ratio	8.14	12.09
Price/Book Ratio	2.13	2.18
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	17.38	8.91
Current Yield (%)	4.02	3.30
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	0.97	1.00
Number of Securities	1,601	2,267
Active Share	75.83	N/A



Region Weights (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.
Allocation to "Other" represents Jersey, Luxembourg, and Gurensey.

Manager: DFA Emg Mkts Value;I (DFEVX) **As of March 31, 2023**

Benchmark: MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)

Peer Group: IM Emerging Markets Equity (MF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**3.74**	**-7.88**	**16.23**	**0.20**	**6.17**	**2.24**	**-10.74**	**12.41**	**2.73**	**9.64**	**-11.93**
Benchmark	3.96	-10.70	7.83	-0.91	4.91	2.00	-20.09	-2.54	18.31	18.42	-14.57
Difference	-0.22	2.82	8.40	1.11	1.26	0.24	9.35	14.95	-15.58	-8.78	2.64
Peer Group Median	5.02	-9.28	7.93	-1.08	4.67	1.77	-22.44	-1.62	17.66	20.17	-16.45
Rank	76	35	8	27	20	38	4	9	92	91	12
Population	828	789	702	615	529	368	772	765	780	821	818

Peer Group Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	2.24	18.10
Benchmark	2.00	16.94
Median	1.77	17.28

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 10 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	3.01 (35)	5.47 (45)	0.08 (36)	0.17 (38)	12.50 (21)
Benchmark	2.55 (46)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.15 (46)	11.45 (73)
Median	2.41	5.24	-0.03	0.14	11.77

Portfolio Characteristics and Dist. of Market Cap (%)

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	28,285	102,229
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	448	6,315
Price/Earnings Ratio	6.96	11.01
Price/Book Ratio	1.54	2.42
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	11.03	15.03
Current Yield (%)	5.83	3.35
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	0.98	1.00
Number of Securities	3,271	1,379
Active Share	67.06	N/A



Region Weights (%)



Performance shown is net of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.
Allocation to "Other" represents Russia, Kuwait, Cyprus, and Panama.

RVK

Manager: **RBC GAM Emg Mkts Equity (CF)** | **As of March 31, 2023**

Benchmark: MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)

Peer Group: IM Emerging Markets Equity (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**6.33**	**-2.99**	**10.70**	**2.51**	**6.38**	**N/A**	**-13.25**	**-3.56**	**17.39**	**18.93**	**-9.52**
Benchmark	3.96	-10.70	7.83	-0.91	4.91	2.00	-20.09	-2.54	18.31	18.42	-14.57
Difference	2.37	7.71	2.87	3.42	1.47	N/A	6.84	-1.02	-0.92	0.51	5.05
Peer Group Median	4.94	-8.78	10.01	0.69	6.07	3.30	-19.72	0.75	18.93	20.64	-15.23
Rank	25	16	45	19	44	N/A	21	69	58	59	10
Population	277	276	259	232	217	174	291	306	334	358	358

Peer Group Scattergram - 7 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	6.38	16.08
Benchmark	4.91	17.09
Median	6.07	17.76

Up/Down Markets - 7 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 7 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)

	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	6.28 (51)	4.24 (73)	0.29 (46)	0.39 (39)	10.27 (94)
Benchmark	5.07 (79)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.30 (78)	11.41 (74)
Median	6.28	5.61	0.26	0.36	11.91

Portfolio Characteristics and Dist. of Market Cap (%)

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap ($M)	102,298	102,229
Median Mkt. Cap ($M)	22,831	6,315
Price/Earnings Ratio	16.85	11.01
Price/Book Ratio	2.88	2.42
5 Yr. EPS Growth Rate (%)	7.24	15.03
Current Yield (%)	2.44	3.35
Beta (5 Years, Monthly)	0.92	1.00
Number of Securities	47	1,379
Active Share	79.24	N/A



Region Weights (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.
Allocation to "Other" represents Argentina.

RVK

Manager: Garcia Hamilton Core Fixed Income (SA) **As of March 31, 2023**
Benchmark: Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index
Peer Group: IM U.S. Broad Market Core Fixed Income (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**3.55**	**-3.80**	**-1.42**	**1.30**	**1.36**	**2.08**	**-11.28**	**-2.20**	**8.59**	**7.56**	**1.00**
Benchmark	2.96	-4.78	-2.77	0.90	0.88	1.36	-13.01	-1.55	7.51	8.72	0.01
Difference	0.59	0.98	1.35	0.40	0.48	0.72	1.73	-0.65	1.08	-1.16	0.99
Peer Group Median	3.16	-4.67	-1.82	1.34	1.39	1.78	-12.96	-1.23	8.51	9.18	0.06
Rank	11	10	35	55	53	20	9	100	47	95	7
Population	130	130	130	127	125	122	140	147	155	157	164

Peer Group Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	2.08	4.54
Benchmark	1.36	4.35
Median	1.78	4.42

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 10 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	1.30 (20)	1.09 (33)	0.65 (30)	0.29 (23)	3.02 (63)
Benchmark	0.58 (96)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.14 (97)	3.03 (56)
Median	1.00	0.87	0.49	0.23	3.04

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Effective Duration	6.80	6.33
Spread Duration	3.55	N/A
Avg. Maturity	8.00	8.50
Avg. Quality	Aa1	Aa1/Aa2
Yield To Maturity (%)	4.22	4.40
Coupon Rate (%)	2.92	2.79
Current Yield (%)	3.14	N/A
Holdings Count	38	13,278

Sector Distribution (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific prior to client inception. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

RVK

Manager: PGIM Core Plus Bond Qual (CF) **As of March 31, 2023**
Benchmark: Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index
Peer Group: IM U.S. Broad Market Core+ Fixed Income (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**3.25**	**-5.50**	**-0.37**	**1.69**	**2.32**	**2.61**	**-14.31**	**-0.66**	**9.55**	**11.67**	**-0.13**
Benchmark	2.96	-4.78	-2.77	0.90	0.88	1.36	-13.01	-1.55	7.51	8.72	0.01
Difference	0.29	-0.72	2.40	0.79	1.44	1.25	-1.30	0.89	2.04	2.95	-0.14
Peer Group Median	3.19	-4.65	-0.37	1.75	2.02	2.24	-12.91	-0.24	8.96	9.94	-0.24
Rank	47	83	51	55	34	24	92	68	36	15	43
Population	140	139	136	131	127	124	149	156	164	167	174

Peer Group Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	2.61	5.44
Benchmark	1.36	4.35
Median	2.24	4.77

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 10 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	1.86 (24)	2.39 (31)	0.53 (48)	0.34 (37)	3.83 (17)
Benchmark	0.58 (100)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.14 (99)	3.03 (72)
Median	1.48	1.80	0.51	0.31	3.20

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Effective Duration	6.27	6.33
Spread Duration	3.75	N/A
Avg. Maturity	8.61	8.50
Avg. Quality	A1	Aa1/Aa2
Yield To Maturity (%)	6.19	4.40
Coupon Rate (%)	4.35	2.79
Current Yield (%)	4.73	N/A
Holdings Count	1,105	13,278

Sector Distribution (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.
Allocation to "Other" consists of equity and swaps.

RVK

Manager: Wellington Opportunistic EMD (CF) | **As of March 31, 2023**

Benchmark: Wellington Blended Index

Peer Group: IM Emerging Markets Debt (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**4.16**	**-1.79**	**2.18**	**-0.12**	**2.81**	**N/A**	**-13.45**	**-5.10**	**6.62**	**17.23**	**-5.61**
Benchmark	3.51	-3.83	0.46	-1.44	1.15	0.29	-14.75	-5.32	4.02	14.31	-5.15
Difference	0.65	2.04	1.72	1.32	1.66	N/A	1.30	0.22	2.60	2.92	-0.46
Peer Group Median	2.35	-3.46	2.66	-0.11	2.40	1.70	-12.28	-2.12	6.72	14.30	-5.23
Rank	27	39	65	51	35	N/A	59	70	52	6	58
Population	119	118	117	113	108	82	130	138	149	159	169

Peer Group Scattergram - 7 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	2.81	10.78
Benchmark	1.15	10.09
Median	2.40	10.97

Up/Down Markets - 7 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 7 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	2.16 (39)	1.30 (100)	1.31 (1)	0.20 (39)	7.97 (59)
Benchmark	0.46 (97)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.05 (96)	7.66 (67)
Median	1.77	4.09	0.30	0.16	8.23

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Effective Duration	5.71	5.88
Spread Duration	5.62	3.39
Avg. Maturity	8.85	9.57
Avg. Quality	Baa2	Ba2
Yield To Maturity (%)	7.37	7.34
Coupon Rate (%)	5.22	5.20
Current Yield (%)	6.36	5.68
Holdings Count	156	1,264

Sector Distribution (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Manager: Beach Point Leveraged Loan (CF) **As of March 31, 2023**
Benchmark: Credit Suisse Lvg'd Loan Index
Peer Group: IM U.S. Bank Loans (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**3.85**	**2.46**	**8.30**	**3.96**	**4.05**	**4.23**	**-1.26**	**5.11**	**3.36**	**9.28**	**0.64**
Benchmark	3.11	2.12	8.38	3.55	4.57	3.86	-1.06	5.40	2.78	8.17	1.14
Difference	0.74	0.34	-0.08	0.41	-0.52	0.37	-0.20	-0.29	0.58	1.11	-0.50
Peer Group Median	3.15	2.97	8.09	3.75	4.50	3.85	-0.87	5.34	2.67	8.71	0.80
Rank	10	57	35	25	91	28	67	55	29	34	65
Population	47	47	46	45	43	41	52	54	57	60	67

Peer Group Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	4.23	5.11
Benchmark	3.86	5.31
Median	3.85	5.06

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 10 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	3.42 (28)	1.15 (31)	0.30 (31)	0.66 (39)	4.03 (47)
Benchmark	3.07 (47)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.57 (69)	4.29 (29)
Median	3.05	0.97	-0.02	0.60	4.00

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Effective Duration	N/A	0.25
Spread Duration	N/A	N/A
Avg. Maturity	4.80	4.32
Avg. Quality	B2	Ba2
Yield To Maturity (%)	N/A	9.68
Coupon Rate (%)	6.00	8.60
Current Yield (%)	9.50	9.27
Holdings Count	144	1,688

Quality Distribution (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.

Manager: BNY Mellon TIPS - NL (CF) | As of March 31, 2023

Benchmark: Bloomberg US Trsy US TIPS Index

Peer Group: IM U.S. TIPS (SA+CF)

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**3.34**	**-6.09**	**1.81**	**2.98**	**2.48**	**1.51**	**-11.83**	**6.14**	**10.97**	**8.43**	**-1.26**
Benchmark	3.34	-6.06	1.75	2.94	2.44	1.49	-11.85	5.96	10.99	8.43	-1.26
Difference	0.00	-0.03	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.18	-0.02	0.00	0.00
Peer Group Median	3.41	-5.91	2.05	3.08	2.58	1.60	-11.76	5.92	11.01	8.44	-1.23
Rank	63	74	65	57	78	82	59	17	55	55	59
Population	27	27	26	26	26	25	30	31	33	34	38

Peer Group Scattergram - 10 Years



	Return	Standard Deviation
Manager	1.51	5.27
Benchmark	1.49	5.26
Median	1.60	5.27

Up/Down Markets - 10 Years



Peer Group Analysis - Multi Statistics - 10 Years (Excess Return vs. Risk Free)



	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info Ratio	Sharpe Ratio	Downside Risk
Manager	0.77 (80)	0.13 (89)	0.20 (37)	0.15 (76)	3.82 (46)
Benchmark	0.75 (91)	0.00 (100)	N/A	0.14 (93)	3.82 (49)
Median	0.85	0.88	0.14	0.17	3.82

Portfolio Characteristics

	Portfolio	Benchmark
Effective Duration	6.88	5.05
Spread Duration	N/A	5.05
Avg. Maturity	7.40	7.39
Avg. Quality	Aaa/Aaa	Aaa
Yield To Maturity (%)	4.02	4.07
Coupon Rate (%)	0.68	0.68
Current Yield (%)	0.72	N/A
Holdings Count	48	48

Sector Distribution (%)



Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Parentheses contain percentile ranks.
Performance prior to 05/2019 is represented by BNY Mellon TIPS - SL (CF).

RVK

Manager: **Cohen & Steers Real Assets Multi-Strategy B (CF)** — **As of March 31, 2023**

Benchmark: Cohen & Steers Real Assets Custom Index

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**-0.21**	**-11.12**	**15.04**	**5.83**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**-2.12**	**23.63**	**-0.50**	**17.57**	**-8.24**
Benchmark	-0.26	-10.87	14.06	4.87	5.43	2.45	-3.02	21.23	-2.00	16.53	-7.48
Difference	0.05	-0.25	0.98	0.96	N/A	N/A	0.90	2.40	1.50	1.04	-0.76

Historical Asset Allocation - 5 Years



Asset Allocation vs. Benchmark



Historical Statistics - 5 Years



	Manager	Benchmark	S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd)	Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index
Standard Deviation	13.55	14.10	18.48	5.42
Sharpe Ratio	0.38	0.31	0.59	-0.07
Downside Risk	9.83	10.40	12.30	3.84
Excess Return	5.22	4.39	10.97	-0.35

Actual Correlation - 5 Years

	Actual Correlation
Benchmark	0.99
S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd)	0.83
Russell 2000 Index	0.80
MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)	0.86
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)	0.76
Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index	0.29
Bloomberg US Trsy US TIPS Index	0.51
Wilshire US REIT Index	0.84
HFRI FOF Comp Index	0.78
Bloomberg Cmdty Index (TR)	0.84
ICE BofAML 3 Mo US T-Bill Index	-0.30
Cons Price Index (Unadjusted)	0.09

Performance shown is net of fees and product specific. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Primary Real Return strategies and asset classes are represented by the colored shades. Allocation to Equity – Real Assets includes listed infrastructure and natural resource equities. Allocation to "Other" includes gold and cash equivalents. Please see the Addendum for custom index definitions.

Manager: Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund (SA) | **As of March 31, 2023**

Benchmark: Nuveen Real Asset Income Blend Index

Performance

	QTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	7 Years	10 Years	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Manager	**2.10**	**-8.96**	**10.34**	**3.94**	**5.04**	**5.52**	**-11.19**	**13.05**	**-2.24**	**24.25**	**-5.41**
Benchmark	2.96	-9.78	8.09	2.82	3.79	4.06	-14.24	11.22	0.81	20.01	-6.59
Difference	-0.86	0.82	2.25	1.12	1.25	1.46	3.05	1.83	-3.05	4.24	1.18

Historical Asset Allocation - 10 Years



Asset Allocation vs. Benchmark



Historical Statistics - 10 Years



	Manager	Benchmark	S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd)	Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index
Standard Deviation	11.62	11.05	14.79	4.35
Sharpe Ratio	0.45	0.34	0.80	0.14
Downside Risk	8.90	8.04	9.44	3.03
Excess Return	5.23	3.75	11.84	0.58

Actual Correlation - 10 Years

	Actual Correlation
Benchmark	0.98
S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd)	0.78
Russell 2000 Index	0.72
MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)	0.79
MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net)	0.72
Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index	0.48
Bloomberg US Trsy US TIPS Index	0.59
Wilshire US REIT Index	0.83
HFRI FOF Comp Index	0.76
Bloomberg Cmdty Index (TR)	0.49
ICE BofAML 3 Mo US T-Bill Index	-0.18
Cons Price Index (Unadjusted)	0.01

Performance shown is gross of fees and product specific prior to client inception. Calculation is based on monthly periodicity. Primary Real Return strategies and asset classes are represented by the colored shades and are denoted by categories 1 through 5. Historical asset allocation prior to client inception is represented by Nuveen Real Asset Inc;I (NRIIX). Please see the Addendum for custom index definitions.

RVK

Addendum & Glossary



Performance Related Comments

- RVK, Inc. began monitoring the assets of the Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System in 06/2016. Prior historical data was provided by the previous investment consultant.
- Inception dates shown represent the first full month following initial funding.
- Performance is annualized for periods greater than one year.
- Total Fund performance excludes Treasury Cash.
- Performance shown is provided by BNY Mellon.
- Historical performance prior to 04/11/2019 for BNY Mellon HEDI (SA), BNY Mellon R1000 Index - NL (CF), and BNY Mellon TIPS - NL (CF) is represented by RhumbLine HEDI (SA), SSgA Russell 1000 Index - NL (CF), and BlackRock TIPS (CF), respectively.

Custom Index Comments

- RVK began calculating the SBCERS Policy Benchmark on 04/01/2016. Historical performance was provided be the previous consultant. The passive **Policy Benchmark** currently consists of 19% Russell 3000 Index, 11% MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net), 7% MSCI Emg Mkts Index (USD) (Net), 17% Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index, 11% Custom Non-Core Fixed Income Benchmark, 15% Consumer Price Index+4%, 10% NCREIF ODCE Index (AWA) (Net) (Monthly) (1 Qtr Lag), and 10% Russell 3000 Index+3% (1 Qtr Lag).
- The active **SBCERS Dynamic Policy Benchmark** is calculated monthly using beginning of month manager weights applied to each corresponding primary benchmark return.
- The passive **Custom Non-Core Fixed Income Benchmark** currently consists of 25% Wellington Blended Benchmark and 75% CS Lvg'd Loan Index. Prior to 09/01/2022 the benchmark consisted of 33.3% Wellington Blended Benchmark, and 66.6% CS Lvg'd Loan Index. Prior to 12/01/2020 the benchmark consisted of 33.3% Bloomberg US Corp Hi Yld Index, 33.3% Wellington Blended Benchmark, and 33.3% CS Lvg'd Loan Index.
- The passive **Wellington Blended Benchmark** currently consists of 50% JPM GBI-EM Gbl Dvf'd Index (USD) (TR) (Unhedged) and 50% JPM Emg Mkts Bond Glb Dvf'd Index (TR).
- The active **Custom Real Return Benchmark** is calculated monthly using beginning of month manager weights within the Real Return Composite applied to each corresponding primary benchmark return.
- The passive **Cohen & Steers Real Assets Custom Index** is a custom benchmark created by the manager and currently consists of 27.5% FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Dvld Index (USD) (Net), 27.5% Bloomberg Cmdty Index (TR), 15% S&P Gbl Natural Res Sect Index (TR), 15% DJ Brookfield Gbl Infrastructure Index, 10% ICE BofAML 1-3 Yr US Corp Index, and 5% Gold Spot Per Ounce Index. Prior to 9/30/2013 benchmark consisted of 30% FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Dvld Index (USD) (Net), 30% Bloomberg Cmdty Index (TR), 20% S&P Gbl Natural Res Sect Index (TR), 12.5% ICE BofAML 1-3 Yr Corp Index, and 7.5% Gold Spot Per Ounce Index.
- The passive **Nuveen Real Asset Income Blend Index** is a custom benchmark created by the manager and currently consists of 22% S&P Global Infrastructure Index (Net), 25% FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Devl'd Index (USD) (Net), 20% Bloomberg US Corp Hi Yld Index, 13% FTSE NAREIT Preferred Stock Index, and 20% ICE Hybrid & Preferred Infrastructure 7% Issuer Constrained Custom Index. Prior to 4/01/2021 benchmark consisted of 28% S&P Gbl Infrastructure Index, 21% FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Dvl'd Index (USD) (Net), 18% Wells Fargo Hybrid & Preferred Securities REIT Index, 15% Bloomberg Global Capital Securities Index and 18% Bloomberg US Corp Hi Yld Index.

	Fee Schedule	Market Value As of 03/31/2023 ($)	Estimated Annual Fee ($)	Estimated Annual Fee (%)
Total Fund Public Assets		**2,449,211,284**	**7,158,627**	**0.29**
U.S. Equity Composite				
BNY Mellon HEDI (SA)	0.02 % of Assets	291,134,009	58,227	0.02
BNY Mellon R1000 Index - NL (CF)	0.01 % of Assets	341,863,612	34,186	0.01
Dimensional U.S. Small Cap Value (CF)	0.28 % of Assets	45,386,081	127,081	0.28
RHJ Small Cap Opportunities (SA)	0.80 % of First $50 M 0.60 % Thereafter	34,845,706	278,766	0.80
Dev'd Mkt. Non-U.S. Equity Composite				
PanAgora Dynamic International Equity (SA)	0.33 % of First $100 M 0.30 % of Next $100 M 0.25 % Thereafter	205,626,927	644,067	0.31
Artisan Non-U.S. Growth (SA)	0.80 % of First $50 M 0.60 % Thereafter	139,524,453	937,147	0.67
Acadian Non-US Small Cap Equity (CF)	0.75 % of Assets	56,146,418	421,098	0.75
Emerging Mkt. Equity Composite				
DFA Emg Mkts Value;I (DFEVX)	0.44 % of Assets	132,783,373	584,247	0.44
RBC Emerging Markets Equity (CF)	0.50 % of Assets	127,182,436	635,912	0.50
Core Fixed Income Composite				
Garcia Hamilton Core Fixed Income (SA)	0.25 % of First $25 M 0.20 % of Next $25 M 0.15 % of Next $50 M 0.14 % of Next $100 M 0.10 % Thereafter	360,632,931	488,133	0.14
PGIM Core Plus Fixed Income (CF)	0.26 % of Assets	246,629,757	641,237	0.26
Non-Core Fixed Income Composite				
Wellington Blended Opportunistic EMD (CF)	0.55 % of Assets	122,861,271	675,737	0.55
Beach Point Leveraged Loan (CF)	0.50 % of Assets	150,346,585	751,733	0.50
Public Real Return Composite				
BNY Mellon TIPS - NL (CF)	0.01 % of Assets	15,536,875	1,554	0.01
Cohen & Steers Real Assets Fund (CIT)	0.65 % of Assets	60,820,156	395,331	0.65
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund (SA)	0.80 % of First $50 M 0.75 % of Next $50 M 0.65 % Thereafter	60,072,406	475,543	0.79

Mutual fund fees are sourced from Morningstar and/or the investment manager.

RVK

Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System
Addendum
Underlying Indices of SBCERS Policy Index

As of March 31, 2023

Time Period		Composition
11/01/1999-12/31/2001	45.0%	Russell 3000 Index
	20.0%	MSCI EAFE
	28.5%	Lehman Aggregate
	4.5%	SB World Gov Bond
	2.0%	CG 3-Month U.S. T-Bill
01/01/2002-12/31/2006	49.0%	Russell 3000 Index
	19.0%	MSCI AC Wld ex U.S.
	27.0%	Lehman Universal
	4.0%	DJ Wilshire REIT Full Cap
	1.0%	CG 3-Month U.S. T-Bill
01/01/2007-12/31/2008	48.0%	Russell 3000 Index
	19.0%	MSCI ACWI ex U.S.
	26.0%	Lehman Universal
	2.0%	Russell 3000+3%
	4.0%	NCREIF / T-Bill+3% (50/50)
	1.0%	CG 3-Month U.S. T-Bill
01/01/2009-02/28/2009	47.0%	Russell 3000 Index
	18.0%	MSCI ACWI ex U.S.
	25.0%	BC U.S. Universal
	4.0%	Russell 3000+3% Index
	5.0%	NCREIF / T-Bill+3% (50/50)
	1.0%	CG 3-Month U.S. T-Bill
03/01/2009-06/30/2010	37.0%	Russell 3000 Index
	18.0%	MSCI ACWI ex U.S.
	32.0%	BC U.S. Universal
	4.0%	T-Bill Lag 1 Qtr Lag
	4.0%	NCREIF Index Lag 1 QTR
	3.0%	Russell 3000 Lag 1 QTR
	2.0%	CG 3-Month U.S. T-Bill
07/01/2010-02/28/2011	37.0%	Russell 3000 Index (includes 2% Covered Calls)
	18.0%	MSCI ACW ex U.S.
	32.0%	BC U.S. Universal
	4.0%	T-Bill Lag 1 QTR (Real Return)
	4.0%	NCREIF Index Lag 1 QTR
	3.0%	Russell 3000 Lag 1 QTR (Private Equity)
	2.0%	CG 3-Month U.S. Bill
03/01/2011-05/31/2012	37.0%	Russell 3000 Index (includes 2% Covered Calls)
	18.0%	MSCI ACW ex U.S.
	30.0%	BC U.S. Universal
	4.0%	T-Bill Lag 1 QTR (Real Return)
	4.0%	NCREIF Index Lag 1 QTR
	5.0%	Russell 3000 Lag 1 QTR (Private Equity)
	2.0%	CG 3-Month U.S. Bill

Time Period		Composition
06/01/2012-04/30/2013	21.0%	Russell 3000 Index
	2.0%	HFRI Composite
	9.0%	MSCI EAFE
	10.0%	MSCI Emerging Markets
	1.0%	MSCI Frontier Markets
	10.0%	Barclays Capital Aggregate
	4.0%	JPM GBI Global ex. U.S.
	3.0%	JPM GBI - Emerging Global Diversified
	7.0%	Barclays Capital U.S. Tips
	4.0%	Barclays High Yield
	2.0%	CSFB Leveraged Loan Index
	3.0%	Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index
	2.0%	S&P Global Large Mid Comm and NR
	3.0%	CPI+4% Lagged
	2.0%	Dow Jones Brookfield Glabal Infra.
	2.0%	CPI+4% Lagged
	7.0%	Russell 3000+3% Lagged
	6.0%	NCREIF ODCE Lagged
	2.0%	NAREIT Equity REITs Lagged
	0.0%	90 Day T-Bills
05/01/2013-03/31/2016	23.0%	Russell 3000 Index
	9.0%	MSCI EAFE
	10.0%	MSCI Emerging Markets
	1.0%	MSCI Frontier Markets
	10.0%	Barclays Capital Aggregate
	4.0%	JPM GBI Global ex. U.S.
	3.0%	JPM GBI - Emerging Global Diversified
	7.0%	Barclays Capital U.S. Tips
	4.0%	Barclays High Yield
	2.0%	CSFB Leveraged Loan Index
	3.0%	Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index
	2.0%	S&P Global Large Mid Comm and NR
	3.0%	CPI+4% Lagged
	2.0%	Dow Jones Brookfield Glabal Infra.
	2.0%	CPI+4% Lagged
	7.0%	Russell 3000+3% Lagged
	6.0%	NCREIF ODCE Lagged
	2.0%	NAREIT Equity REITs Lagged
	0.0%	90 Day T-Bills

Time Period		Composition
04/01/2016-06/30/2017	23.0%	Russell 3000 Index
	9.0%	MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)
	10.0%	MSCI Emerging Markets Index (USD) (Net)
	1.0%	MSCI Frontier Markets Index (USD) (Net)
	10.0%	Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index
	4.0%	JP Morgan Global Government Bond Excluding US Index
	3.0%	Stone Harbor Blended Benchmark
	7.0%	Bloomberg US Treasury: US TIPS Index
	4.0%	Bloomberg US Corporate: High Yield Index
	2.0%	Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index
	3.0%	Bloomberg Commodity Index (Total Return)
	2.0%	S&P Glbl Lg Mid Cap Commodity & Resources Index (USD) (Gross)
	3.0%	Consumer Price Index+4% (1 Qtr Lag)
	2.0%	Dow Jones Brookfield Global Infrastructure Composite Index (Net)
	2.0%	Consumer Price Index+4%
	7.0%	Russell 3000 Index+3% (1 Qtr Lag)
	6.0%	NCREIF ODCE Index (AWA) (Net) (1 Qtr Lag)
	2.0%	FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Total Return Index (1 Qtr Lag)
	0.0%	ICE BofA Merrill Lynch 3 Month US Treasury Bill Index
07/01/2017-Present	19.0%	Russell 3000 Index
	11.0%	MSCI EAFE Index (USD) (Net)
	7.0%	MSCI Emerging Markets Index (USD) (Net)
	17.0%	Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index
	11.0%	Custom Non-Core Fixed Income Benchmark
	15.0%	Consumer Price Index+4%
	10.0%	NCREIF ODCE Index (AWA) (Net) (1 Qtr Lag)
	10.0%	Russell 3000 Index+3% (1 Qtr Lag)

RVK, Inc. began calculating performance for the SBCERS Policy Index in 06/2016. Prior performance data was provided by the previous investment consultant.

RVK

The following work plan outlines RVK's proposed action items for Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System. The proposed timing for future meetings is intended to correspond with anticipated meeting dates for the Board.

Action Item	Anticipated Presentation	Status	Comments
Q4 Performance Report	February 2023	Completed	
Capital Market Assumptions	March 2023	Completed	
Private Credit Pacing Study	April 2023	Completed	
Asset Allocation	April 2023	Completed	
Q1 Performance Report	May 2023	In Progress	
Strategic Plan	June 2023	In Progress	
Private Credit Recommendation	July 2023	In Progress	
Q2 Performance Report	August 2023	In Progress	

RVK

Glossary

Active Return - The difference between the investment manager/composite performance relative to the performance of an appropriate market benchmark.

Active Share - Measures the degree to which the holdings of a fund differ from the holdings of the benchmark. Active share is calculated by taking the sum of the absolute value of the differences of the weight of each holding in the fund versus the weight of each holding in the benchmark and dividing by two.

Alpha - A measure of the difference between a portfolio's actual returns and its expected performance, given its level of risk as measured by beta. It is a measure of the portfolio's historical performance not explained by movements of the market or a portfolio's non-systematic return.

Alpha Ratio - A measure of a portfolio's non-systematic return per unit of downside risk. It is measured by dividing the alpha of a portfolio by the downside risk. The non-systematic return is a measure of a portfolio's historical performance not explained by movements of the market.

Average Quality - Bond quality ratings are reported using the investment managers' and the index providers' preferred rating agency. *Average Quality for managers unable to provide this statistic is instead provided by Morningstar; if unavailable on Morningstar, it has been estimated using a credit quality distribution provided by the manager.* There are two primary rating agencies in the US. *Moody's* assigns ratings on a system that employs up to four symbols (consisting of letters and numbers), such as, Aaa, Aa2, etc., with Aaa being the highest or safest rating. S*tandard & Poor's (S&P)* employs a system that uses + and - along with letters, such as AAA, AA+, etc. The two rating agencies' systems are summarized below:

S&P	Moody's	Explanation	S&P	Moody's	Explanation
Higher Credit Quality – Investment Grade			**Lower Credit Quality – Below Investment Grade**		
AAA	Aaa	Prime/Highest credit quality	BB+	Ba1	Speculative/Low credit quality
AA+	Aa1	High credit quality	BB	Ba2	
AA	Aa2		BB-	Ba3	
AA-	Aa3		B+	B1	Highly speculative
A+	A1	Upper-medium credit quality	B	B2	
A	A2		B-	B3	
A-	A3		CCC+	Caa1	Substantial credit/default risk
BBB+	Baa1	Lower-medium credit quality	CCC	Caa2	Extremely speculative
BBB	Baa2		CCC-	Caa3	
BBB-	Baa3		CC	Ca	Vulnerable to default
			C	Ca	
			D	C	In default

Benchmark Effect - The difference between the blended return of each respective managers' benchmark within a composite and the composite's benchmark return.

Beta - A measure of the sensitivity of a portfolio to the movements in the market. It is a measure of a portfolio's non-diversifiable or systematic risk.

Box Plots - A graphical representation of the distribution of observations. From top to bottom, the four boxes represent the spread between the maximum value and the minimum value in each quartile. A quartile represents the values that divide the observations into four quarters (i.e., 1st quartile, 2nd quartile, 3rd quartile, and 4th quartile). The median observation is where the 2nd quartile and 3rd quartile meet.

Buy and Hold Attribution - At the beginning of the time period under analysis, the manager and benchmark portfolios are broken down into segments (i.e., styles, sectors, countries, and regions) based on the desired type of attribution. The formula assumes zero turn-over to the manager and benchmark portfolios throughout the period and calculates the segment returns ("buy and hold returns") to arrive at performance attribution. Due to portfolio turnover, buy and hold attribution may not accurately represent quarterly performance relative to the benchmark. Country, region, sector, and style allocations are as of the date one quarter prior to the reporting date, and the returns shown are for those segments throughout the quarter reported. Due to disclosure guidelines set by each investment manager, equity characteristics shown are as of the most recent date available. The following is the methodology for segment classification:

- **Sector** - Attribution is calculated using the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), which is a detailed and comprehensive structure for sector and industry analysis. Stocks are classified by their primary sector as defined by S&P Capital IQ data. Attribution to "other" is the result of securities based in industries that do not fit into any GICS classification.
- **Country/Region** - Attribution is calculated using the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) region standards. Stocks are classified by their domicile country/region, as defined by S&P Capital IQ data, and thus may differ from the classification of the investment manager and/or index provider. Attribution to "other" is the result of securities based in countries/regions that do not fit into any MSCI classification.
- **Style** - Stocks are classified into the following style boxes: large/mid/small vs. growth/neutral/value. Stocks are classified along large/mid/small categories at the time of the Russell index rebalancing, using the index market cap boundaries as cutoff points. Stocks are classified along growth/neutral/value categories at the time of the Russell index rebalancing, using the price/book ratio as supplied by S&P Capital IQ. Stocks in the Russell 3000 Index portfolio are sorted by price/book ratio; names with the highest price/book ratio that make up 1/3 of the total market capitalization are assigned to the growth category, and names that make up the subsequent 1/3 of the total market capitalization are assigned to the neutral category, while the balance of the names are assigned to the value category. Stocks are unclassified when there is not enough data to determine a size and style metric.

Portfolio Characteristics and Buy and Hold Attribution reports utilize product-specific data for all mutual funds and commingled funds.

Capital Markets Review -

- **Breakeven Inflation** - Measures the expected inflation rate at each stated maturity by taking the difference between the real yield of the inflation-linked maturity curve and the yield of the closest nominal Treasury maturity.
- **Consumer Confidence** - Measures domestic consumer confidence as defined by the degree of optimism on the state of the economy that consumers express through saving and spending.
- **Consumer Price Index (CPI)** - Measures the change in the price level of consumer goods and services.

Glossary

- **Federal Funds Rate** - The interest rate at which a depository institution lends funds maintained at the Federal Reserve to another depository institution overnight. It is one of the most influential interest rates in the US economy, since it affects monetary and financial conditions, which in turn have a bearing on key aspects of the broad economy including employment, growth and inflation.
- **Option-Adjusted Spread** - Measures the flat spread of an index or bond to the Treasury yield curve after removing the effect of any embedded options.
- **Purchasing Managers Index (PMI)** - Measures economic activity by surveying purchasing managers on a monthly basis as to whether business conditions have improved, worsened, or stayed the same.
- **Real Gross Domestic Product (Real GDP)** - An inflation-adjusted measure that reflects the value of all goods and services produced by an economy in a given year.
- **Unemployment Rate** - The percentage of the total labor force that is unemployed but actively seeking employment.
- **US Dollar Total Weighted Index** - Measures the value of the US Dollar relative to a basket of other world currencies. It is calculated as the weighted geometric mean of the dollar's value versus the EUR, GBP, CAD, SEK, CHF, and JPY.
- **VIX** - Measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 Index options by looking at the market's expectation of the S&P 500 Index volatility over the next 30 day period. Commonly referred to as the "fear index" or the "fear gauge."

Cash Flow Effect – The composite's active return minus the sum of each managers' active return minus the benchmark effect.

Consistency - The percentage of quarters that a product achieved a rate of return higher than that of its benchmark. The higher the consistency figure, the more value a manager has contributed to the product's performance.

Convexity - A measure of the shape of the curve that describes the relationship between bond prices and bond yields.

Correlation - A statistical measure of the relationship between asset class returns. A value of 1.00 is a perfect correlation; that is, the asset classes always move in the same direction. A value of -1.00 indicates a perfect negative correlation, in which the asset classes always move in opposite directions of each other. A value of 0 indicates there is no relationship between the direction of returns of the two asset classes. Correlation calculations only consider the direction of changes relative to two variables and not the magnitude of those changes.

Coupon Rate - The percentage rate of interest paid on a bond or fixed income security; it is typically paid twice per year.

Current Yield - The annual income of a security divided by the security's current price.

Down Market Capture - Down market by definition is negative benchmark return and down market capture represents the ratio in % terms of the average portfolios return over the benchmark during the down market period. The lower the value of the down market capture the better the product's performance.

Downside Risk - A measure similar to standard deviation that focuses only on the negative movements of the return series. It is calculated by taking the standard deviation of the negative returns for the selected periodicity. The higher the factor, the riskier the product.

Earnings Per Share - It is backward looking, calculated using the one year current EPS divided by the one year EPS five years ago.

Effective Duration - The approximate percentage change in a bond's price for a 100 basis point change in yield.

Excess Return vs. Market - Average of the monthly arithmetic difference between the manager's return and the benchmark return over a specified time period, shown on an annualized basis.

Excess Return vs. Risk Free - Average of the monthly arithmetic difference between the manager's return and the risk-free return (i.e., ICE BofAML 3 Mo US T-Bill Index unless specified otherwise) over a specified time period, shown on an annualized basis.

Excess Risk - A measure of the standard deviation of a portfolio's performance relative to the risk-free return.

Expense Ratios - Morningstar is the source for mutual fund expense ratios.

Gain/Loss - The net increase or decrease in the market value of a portfolio excluding its Net Cash Flow for a given period.

Indices - All indices and related information are considered intellectual property and are licensed by each index provider. The indices may not be copied, used, or distributed without the index provider's prior written approval. Index providers make no warranties and bear no liability with respect to the indices, any related data, their quality, accuracy, suitability, and/or completeness.

Information Ratio - Measured by dividing the active rate of return by the tracking error. The higher the information ratio, the more value-added contribution by the manager.

Liability Driven Investing (LDI) - A method to optimally structure asset investments relative to liabilities. The change in liabilities is estimated by the Ryan Labs Generic PPA Index of appropriate duration for that Plan. This benchmark is based on generic data and is therefore an approximation. RVK is not an actuarial firm, and does not have actuarial expertise.

- **Estimated Funded Status** - The estimated ratio of a Plan's assets relative to its future liabilities. This is calculated by dividing the Plan's asset market value by the estimated present value of its liabilities. The higher the estimated funded status, the better the Plan's ability to cover its projected benefit obligations. An estimated funded status of 100% indicates a Plan that is fully funded.
- **Estimated PV of Liabilities** - An estimate of a Plan's future liabilities in present value terms. The beginning of the period liability is provided by the Plan's actuary. The period-end present value liability estimate provided in this report is derived by applying the estimated percentage change generated using the Ryan Labs Generic PPA Index with duration similar to that reported on the most recent actuarial valuation report.
- **Duration of Liabilities** - The sensitivity of the value of a Plan's liabilities to changes in interest rates, as calculated by the Plan's actuary.
- **Duration of Assets** - The dollar-weighted average duration of all the individual Plan assets.
- **Estimated Plan Hedge Ratio** - The estimate of how well a Plan's investment portfolio is hedged against changes in interest rates - a primary driver of funded status movements. This is calculated by dividing the dollar-weighted values of both the Plan asset duration by the liability duration and

multiplying by the estimated funded status. An estimated plan hedge ratio of zero indicates that the Plan's liabilities have not been hedged, whereas a value of one indicates fully hedged.

Modified Duration - The approximate percentage change in a bond's price for a 100 basis point change in yield, assuming the bonds' expected cash flows do not change.

Mutual Fund Performance - Whenever possible, manager performance is extended for any share class that does not have 10 years of history. Using Morningstar's methodology, a single ticker within the same fund family (often the oldest share class) is chosen to append historical performance.

Net Cash Flow - The sum, in dollars, of a portfolio's contributions and withdrawals. This includes all management fees and expenses only when performance shown is gross of fees.

Peer Groups -
Plan Sponsor Peer Groups - RVK utilizes the Mellon Analytical Solutions Trust Universe along with the Investment Metrics Plan Sponsor Universe. The combined Mellon Analytical Solutions Trust Universe and Investment Metrics Plan Sponsor Universe is used for comparison of total fund composite results and utilizes actual client performance compiled from consultant and custodian data. The Plan Sponsor Peer Group database includes performance and other quantitative data for over 2,100 plans which include corporate, endowment, foundation, public, and Taft Hartley plans.
Investment Manager Peer Groups - RVK utilizes Investment Metrics' Peer Groups for investment manager peer comparison and ranking. The Investment Metrics Peer Group database includes performance and other quantitative data for over 840 investment management firms and 29,000 investments products, across more than 160 standard peer groups. Mutual Fund Peer Groups are net of fees.

Percentile Rankings - Percentile rank compares an individual fund's performance with those of other funds within a defined peer group of managers possessing a similar investment style. Percentile rank identifies the percentage of a fund's peer group that has a higher return (or other comparative measurement) than the fund being ranked. Conversely, 100 minus the individual fund's ranking will identify the percentage of funds within the peer group that have a lower return than the fund being ranked.

1 - Highest Statistical Value   100 - Lowest Statistical Value

Example: American Funds AMCP;R-4 (RAFEX) is ranked in the 4th percentile within the IM US Equity Large-Cap Growth Funds (MF) Peer Group for the Sharpe Ratio. Within the IM US Equity Large-Cap Growth Funds peer group, 4% of the other funds performed better than American Funds AMCP;R-4 (RAFEX), while 96% of the funds performed worse.

Performance Methodology - RVK calculates performance for investment managers and composites using different methodologies.
Investment Managers - Performance is calculated for interim periods between all large external cash flows for a given month and geometrically linked to calculate period returns. An external cash flow is defined as cash, securities, or assets that enter or exit a portfolio. RVK defines a "large cash flow" as a net aggregate cash flow of ≥10% of the beginning-period portfolio market value or any cash flow that causes RVK calculated performance to deviate from manager/custodian reported performance in excess of 5 basis points for a given month.
Composites - The Modified Dietz methodology is utilized to calculate asset class, sub-asset class, and total fund composite performance. The Modified Dietz method calculates a time-weighted total rate of return that considers the timing of external cash flows; however, it does not utilize interim period performance to mitigate the impact of significant cash in- and outflows to the composite.

RVK calculates performance beginning with the first full month following inception. Since inception performance may vary from manager reported performance due to RVK using the first full month of returns as the inception date. Performance for both managers and composites is annualized for periods greater than one year.

Portfolio Characteristics - Due to disclosure guidelines set by each investment manager, portfolio characteristics shown are as of the most recent date available.

Price to Earnings Ratio - The ratio valuing a company's current share price relative to its trailing 12-month per-share earnings (EPS).

Private Equity Quartile Ranks - Private Equity quartile ranks are generated using vintage year peer group data provided by Thomson Reuters, and are based on each fund's annualized, since inception internal rate of return (IRR). Three Private Equity peer groups are available via Thomson Reuters: Buyout, Venture, and All Private Equity. Ranks are available quarterly, at a one-quarter lag.

R-Squared - The percentage of a portfolio's performance explained by the behavior of the appropriate benchmark. High R-Squared means a higher correlation of the portfolio's performance to the appropriate benchmark.

Return - Compounded rate of return for the period.

% Return - The time-weighted rate of return of a portfolio for a given period.

Risk Free Benchmark – ICE BofAML 3 Mo US T-Bill Index unless specified otherwise.

Glossary

RVK Liquidity Rating - A qualitative method for determining the relative amount of liquidity in a portfolio. The characteristics considered when determining relative liquidity include trading volume, gates for redemption, leverage, nature of transactions, and pricing mechanisms. The RVK Liquidity Rating is calculated using beginning of month investment weights applied to each corresponding asset class liquidity rating.

Asset Class	RVK Liquidity Rating	Asset Class	RVK Liquidity Rating
Liquid Investments		**Less Liquid Investments**	
T-Bills and Treasurys	100	Fixed Income Plus Sector	50
Cash Equivalents	98	Stable Value (Plan Sponsor Directed)	50
TIPS	95	Hedge Funds of Funds	35
US Large Cap Equity	95		
Diversified Real Return	93		
Stable Value (Participant Directed)	91		
Global Equity	90	**Not Liquid Investments**	
Non-US Large Cap Equity	90	Core Real Estate	25
Global Tactical Asset Allocation	88	Core Plus Real Estate	15
MLPs	85	Non-Core Real Estate	5
US Mid Cap Equity	85	Private Equity	5
US SMid Cap Equity	85	Private Credit	5
US Small Cap Equity	85		
REITs	85		
Non-US Small Cap Equity	85		
Emerging Markets Equity	85		
Core Fixed Income	85		
Core Plus Fixed Income	80		

Sector Allocation - Negative fixed income sector allocation reflects manager's use of derivatives, short selling, or interest rate swaps.

Sharpe Ratio - Represents the excess rate of return over the risk-free return (i.e., ICE BofAML 3 Mo US T-Bill Index unless specified otherwise), divided by the standard deviation of the excess return to the risk free asset. The result is the absolute rate of return per unit of risk. The higher the value, the better the product's historical risk-adjusted performance.

Simple Alpha - The difference between the manager's return and the benchmark's return.

Spread Duration - The approximate percentage change in a bond's price for a 100 basis point change in its spread over a Treasury of the same maturity.

Standard Deviation - A statistical measure of the range of a portfolio's performance. The variability of a return around its average return over a specified time period.

Thematic Classification - Represents dedicated manager allocations; as such, thematic allocations are approximations. RVK categorizes the following asset classes as Alpha, Capital Appreciation, Capital Preservation, and Inflation:

Alpha	Capital Appreciation	Capital Preservation	Inflation
Absolute Return Strategies	Public Equity	Core Fixed Income	TIPS
Currency Overlay	Private Equity	CMBS Fixed Income	Bank Loans
	Preferred Securities	Asset Backed Fixed Income	Core Real Estate
	High Yield	Domestic Core Plus Fixed Income	Real Return
	Convertible Fixed Income	Mortgage Backed Fixed Income	Inflation Hedges
	TALF Funds	International Developed Fixed Income	REITs
	Distressed Debt	Cash Equivalents	Commodities
	Emerging Market Fixed Income	Stable Value	
	Value Added Real Estate		
	Opportunistic Real Estate		

Time Period Abbreviations - **QTD** - Quarter-to-Date. **CYTD** - Calendar Year-to-Date. **FYTD** - Fiscal Year-to-Date. **YOY** - Year Over Year.

Total Fund Attribution – The Investment Decision Process (IDP) model provides an approach to evaluating investment performance that applies to all asset classes and investment styles. The IDP model is based on a top-down hierarchy framework of investment decisions, with each decision contributing to the overall profit or loss. The IDP approach starts from the strategic asset allocation and follows the flow of the investments down to the manager's skill.

Strategic Asset Allocation (SAA) – The percentage return gained or lost from the long-term strategic asset allocation decision, the most significant determinant of long-term performance. SAA is the product of the target asset allocation multiplied by the corresponding benchmark returns.

Tactical Asset Allocation (TAA) – The percentage return gained or lost from not having been precisely allocated at the target asset allocation mix, whether by deviations that are tactical in nature or a by-product of moving towards the target mix. TAA is the product of the actual asset allocation multiplied by the broad asset class benchmarks, less the SAA.

Style Selection (SS) – The percentage return gained or lost from intentional style biases within each asset class (e.g. value rather than core or overweight to emerging markets relative to benchmark). SS is the product of the actual manager allocation within each asset class multiplied by their specific benchmark, less TAA.

Manager's Skill (MS) – The percentage return gained or lost from manager value added relative to their specific benchmark. MS is the product of the actual manager allocation multiplied by their achieved excess return.

Total Fund Beta - Total Fund Beta is calculated using the S&P 500 as the benchmark. It represents a measure of the sensitivity of the total fund to movements in the S&P 500 and is a measure of the Total Fund's non-diversifiable or systematic risk.

Glossary

Tracking Error - A measure of the standard deviation of a portfolio's performance relative to the performance of an appropriate market benchmark.

Treynor Ratio - Similar to Sharpe ratio, but focuses on beta rather than excess risk (standard deviation). Treynor ratio represents the excess rate of return over the risk-free rate (i.e., ICE BofAML 3 Mo US T-Bill Index unless specified otherwise) divided by the beta. The result is the absolute rate of return per unit of risk. The higher the value, the better historical risk-adjusted performance.

Unit Value - The dollar value of a portfolio, assuming an initial nominal investment of $100, growing at the compounded rate of %Return for a given period.

Up Market Capture - Up market by definition is positive benchmark return and up market capture represents the ratio in % terms of the average portfolio's return over the benchmark during the up market period. The higher the value of the up market capture the better the product's performance.

Yield to Maturity - The rate of return achieved on a bond or other fixed income security assuming the security is bought and held to maturity and that the coupon interest paid over the life of the bond will be reinvested at the same rate of return. The 30-Day SEC Yield is similar to the Yield to Maturity and is reported for mutual funds.

Yield to Worst - The bond yield calculated by using the worst possible yield taking into consideration all call, put, and optional sink dates.

PORTLAND BOISE CHICAGO NEW YORK

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RVK

Private Credit Fund Tear Sheet

Offering Overview & Terms Summary			
Fund Name	Angelo Gordon Direct Lending Evergreen Fund	**Management Fee**	1.00% on Invested Capital (Potential RVK Client & First-Close Discounts)
Fund Size	$1 Billion Initial Target	**Incentive Fee and Hurdle**	15% over a 7% Hurdle (100% GP Catch-Up)
Term	Evergreen, Rolling 3-Year Investment Periods	**Fund-Level Leverage**	1.25x-1.5x Leverage Expected (up to 2.5x)
Liquidity	Redemption Option Every 3 Years with “Slow Pay” Liquidity	**Target Return**	10-13% Net IRR
Fund Focus	US Middle and Lower-Middle Market Senior Direct Lending	**Closing Schedule**	Evergreen, Open 18-months after first close in June 2022

Strategy Track Record (As of 12/31/2022)

Fund	Vintage	Commitments ($M)	Net IRR*	Net Multiple*	Net IRR Quartile	Net Multiple Quartile
Fund I	2015	$594	10.4%	1.4x	2nd	2nd
Fund II	2016	$1,580	10.6%	1.4x	2nd	1st
Fund III	2018	$2,751	10.8%	1.4x	2nd	1st
Fund IV	2020	$2,671	13.2%	1.2x	2nd	1st

Fund Description Summary

Overview	The AG Direct Lending Evergreen Fund is a direct lending strategy that seeks to source, underwrite, and actively manage a diversified portfolio of private, senior secured loans to performing and stable corporate borrowers in the middle and lower-middle market.
Investment Strategy	The strategy focuses on first-lien loans to private equity sponsor-backed companies with an EBITDA of under $25 million. By taking a leadership role in the loan structuring process, the team can employ strong lender protections, including a covenant in every loan. Additionally, the strategy takes a differentiated approach to dynamically monitor its loans by supplying a revolving loan facility in every deal, which provides real-time data for each borrower’s financial health and liquidity needs. The portfolio will be highly diversified and is expected to include more than 150 loans across several industries.
Platform	Angelo Gordon is one of the most active participants within direct lending markets, investing more than $16 billion across nearly 1,300 transactions with over 200 unique borrowers since 2014. Further, the team has established a substantial sourcing network, completing deals with more than 125 private equity sponsors. Finally, the Fund is captained by a group of senior investors with over 20 years of investment experience on average, leading a well-resourced team of more than 70 investment professionals and 100 total employees.

Summary of Merits and Issues to Consider

Merits	Issues to Consider
• Defensive Strategy through Transaction Leadership • Dynamic Monitoring Capability • Robust Sourcing Network • Investing Efficiency via Evergreen Vehicle	• Elevated Competition within Direct Lending Markets • Dependence on Fund-Level Leverage

Source: Angelo Gordon, RVK. Peer group performance provided by Preqin. Data as of 12/31/2022. *Performance is representative of onshore levered investment vehicles only.

Alternative Investment Supplemental Disclosure

Sample Client

Period Ended: September 30, 2022

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Executive Summary

General Comments

- Through this reporting period, Sample Client has committed a total of $2,687,222,720 to 24 non-marketable alternative investments.
- The average age of active investments (based upon vintage year and weighted by commitment) was 7.15 years.
- A total of $2,652,448,415 has been called or otherwise contributed to date.
- Distributions have totaled $2,449,790,361 since plan inception.
- The residual estimated value of interests in these partnerships/investments is $1,671,769,273.
- Since inception net performance for the investments are as follows:
    - Annualized since-inception estimated Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 12.63%.
    - Were an investment into the benchmark index (S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd)) ("Index IRR") made with the identical cash-flow pattern, the resulting return would be equal to 10.51% indicating roughly 211 basis points of annualized out-performance.
    - For every $1 paid into the portfolio, $1.55 has been returned as a distribution or is held in residual value (multiple on invested capital = 1.55x).

Executive Summary

Hedge Funds - Opportunistic

- Hedge Funds - Opportunistic funds account for 16.75% of commitments, 16.97% of contributed funds, 22.74% of distributed funds, and 1.91% of reported residual value.
- Pooled portfolio since inception performance is as follows:
  - Annualized since-inception IRR of 7.74%
  - S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) IRR of 12.10%
  - A multiple on invested capital of 1.31x.

Private Credit - Opportunistic Credit

- Private Credit - Opportunistic Credit funds account for 5.58% of commitments, 0.00% of contributed funds, 0.00% of distributed funds, and 0.00% of reported residual value.
- Pooled portfolio since inception performance is as follows:
  - Annualized since-inception IRR - Not Material
  - S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) IRR - Not Material
  - A multiple on invested capital - Not Material

Private Equity - Buyout

- Private Equity - Buyout funds account for 19.54% of commitments, 12.01% of contributed funds, 0.15% of distributed funds, and 28.15% of reported residual value.
- Pooled portfolio since inception performance is as follows:
  - Annualized since-inception IRR of 31.38%
  - S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) IRR of 0.17%
  - A multiple on invested capital of 1.49x.

Private Equity - Growth Equity

- Private Equity - Growth Equity funds account for 4.54% of commitments, 1.75% of contributed funds, 0.00% of distributed funds, and 3.65% of reported residual value.
- Pooled portfolio since inception performance is as follows:
  - Annualized since-inception IRR of 31.09%
  - S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) IRR of -2.91%
  - A multiple on invested capital of 1.31x.

Executive Summary

Private Equity - Multi-Stage

- Private Equity - Multi-Stage funds account for 24.48% of commitments, 37.76% of contributed funds, 56.46% of distributed funds, and 25.21% of reported residual value.
- Pooled portfolio since inception performance is as follows:
  - Annualized since-inception IRR of 14.07%
  - S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) IRR of 9.64%
  - A multiple on invested capital of 1.80x.

Private Equity - Secondaries

- Private Equity - Secondaries funds account for 1.75% of commitments, 0.71% of contributed funds, 0.00% of distributed funds, and 1.23% of reported residual value.
- Pooled portfolio since inception performance is as follows:
  - Annualized since-inception IRR - Not Material
  - S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) IRR - Not Material
  - A multiple on invested capital of 1.10x.

Private Equity - Venture

- Private Equity - Venture funds account for 0.37% of commitments, 0.38% of contributed funds, 0.70% of distributed funds, and 0.08% of reported residual value.
- Pooled portfolio since inception performance is as follows:
  - Annualized since-inception IRR of 8.93%
  - S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) IRR of 13.22%
  - A multiple on invested capital of 1.86x.

Real Estate - Opportunistic

- Real Estate - Opportunistic funds account for 5.58% of commitments, 8.27% of contributed funds, 6.82% of distributed funds, and 11.98% of reported residual value.
- Pooled portfolio since inception performance is as follows:
  - Annualized since-inception IRR of 14.53%
  - S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) IRR of 10.90%
  - A multiple on invested capital of 1.67x.

Executive Summary

Real Estate - Value Added

- Real Estate - Value Added funds account for 21.41% of commitments, 22.16% of contributed funds, 13.13% of distributed funds, and 27.80% of reported residual value.
- Pooled portfolio since inception performance is as follows:
  - Annualized since-inception IRR of 9.39%
  - S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) IRR of 11.26%
  - A multiple on invested capital of 1.34x.

Alternative Investment Composite Performance and Cash Flow Summary

Since Inception Annualized Composite IRR



Since Inception Cash Flow ($)



Index IRR represents the dollar-weighted returns calculated using the S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) assuming an index investment with the same cash flow timing. This report may contain valuations for investments that are preliminary estimates of valuation as of the date of reporting which reflect the estimated impact of subsequent net cash contributions/distributions. These figures may be used in calculations contained in this report. IRRs are shown only for investments with one year or more of cash flows and for which an accurate IRR could be calculated.

Alternative Investment Asset Class Composite Performance

Asset Class	Commitment ($)	Paid In Capital ($)	Distributions ($)	Valuation ($)	Asset Class IRR (%)	Index IRR (%)	Asset Class Multiple
Hedge Funds - Opportunistic	450,000,000	450,000,000	557,015,208	31,864,152	7.74	12.10	1.31
Private Credit - Opportunistic Credit	150,000,000	0	0	0	N/M	N/M	
Private Equity - Buyout	525,000,000	318,488,622	3,618,309	470,557,685	31.38	0.17	1.49
Private Equity - Growth Equity	122,000,000	46,456,374	0	60,936,560	31.09	-2.91	1.31
Private Equity - Multi-Stage	657,950,000	1,001,504,841	1,383,144,382	421,462,934	14.07	9.64	1.80
Private Equity - Secondaries	47,022,000	18,808,800	0	20,621,723	N/M	N/M	1.10
Private Equity - Venture	10,000,000	10,000,000	17,245,700	1,326,711	8.93	13.22	1.86
Real Estate - Opportunistic	150,000,000	219,439,859	167,094,024	200,240,919	14.53	10.90	1.67
Real Estate - Value Added	575,250,720	587,749,919	321,672,738	464,758,588	9.39	11.26	1.34
	2,687,222,720	**2,652,448,415**	**2,449,790,361**	**1,671,769,273**	**12.63**	**10.51**	**1.55**

Index IRR represents the dollar-weighted returns calculated using the S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) assuming an index investment with the same cash flow timing. IRRs are shown only for investments with one year or more of cash flows and for which an accurate IRR could be calculated. Applicable IRRs are marked with 'N/M' for not material. Asset Class IRR is the annualized since-inception net internal rate for the indicated fund or composite. This report may contain valuations for investments that are preliminary estimates of valuation as of the date of reporting which reflect the estimated impact of subsequent net cash contributions/distributions. These figures may be used in calculations contained in this report. Asset Class Multiple is the since inception sum of distributions and valuation divided by paid in capital.

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Alternative Investment Vintage Year Composite

Average Commitment-weighted Active Investment Age (in years): 7.15

Vintage Year	Commitment ($)	Paid In Capital ($)	Distributions ($)	Valuation ($)	Vintage Year IRR (%)	Index IRR (%)	Vintage Year Multiple	Cumulative Multiple
2003	257,950,000	625,727,426	988,816,513	111,555,576	13.78	7.71	1.76	1.76
2006	25,000,000	25,000,000	32,150,143	1,326,711	3.57	10.32	1.34	1.74
2007	10,000,000	9,647,233	14,158,891	0	8.58	10.45	1.47	1.74
2009	150,000,000	150,000,000	199,755,208	0	12.54	13.70	1.33	1.66
2010	102,225,000	87,930,692	136,432,558	8,507,598	9.99	13.21	1.65	1.66
2013	648,025,720	719,233,815	691,801,729	512,063,650	13.40	12.06	1.67	1.67
2014	300,000,000	300,000,000	357,260,000	31,864,152	5.85	10.86	1.30	1.61
2016	100,000,000	101,155,453	13,732,494	113,810,215	6.74	11.60	1.26	1.59
2019	275,000,000	274,222,721	0	420,960,844	30.62	1.25	1.54	1.59
2020	400,000,000	314,143,257	15,682,825	428,647,704	33.05	0.13	1.41	1.56
2021	174,022,000	39,728,262	0	38,864,821	N/M	N/M	0.98	1.56
2022	245,000,000	5,659,556	0	4,168,001	N/M	N/M	0.74	1.55
TOTAL	**2,687,222,720**	**2,652,448,415**	**2,449,790,361**	**1,671,769,273**	**12.63**	**10.51**		**1.55**

Index IRR represents the dollar-weighted returns calculated using the S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) assuming an index investment with the same cash flow timing. IRRs are shown only for investments with one year or more of cash flows and for which an accurate IRR could be calculated. Applicable IRRs are marked with 'N/M' for not material. Vintage Year IRR is the annualized since-inception net internal rate for the indicated fund or composite. This report may contain valuations for investments that are preliminary estimates of valuation as of the date of reporting which reflect the estimated impact of subsequent net cash contributions/distributions. These figures may be used in calculations contained in this report. Vintage Year Multiple is the since inception sum of distributions and valuation divided by paid in capital. Cumulative Multiple is the since inception sum of distributions and valuation divided by paid in capital for all investments through the indicated vintage year.

RVK

Alternative Investment Private Equity Fund Performance Listing

Fund Name	Vintage	Asset Class	Commitment	Paid In Capital	Distributions - Total	Distributions - Gain/Income	Distributions - ROC	Valuation	Fund IRR (%)	Quartile	Index IRR (%)	Fund Multiple
Cheyenne Capital Fund, LP	2003	Private Equity - Multi-Stage	$257,950,000	$625,727,426	$988,816,513	$21,216,586	$967,599,927	$111,555,576	13.78	N/A	12.72	1.76
Access Venture Partners II, LP	2006	Private Equity - Venture	$10,000,000	$10,000,000	$17,245,700	$14,155,517	$3,090,183	$1,326,711	8.93	N/A	14.3	1.86
Hamilton Lane Wyoming Nowood Fund, LP	2013	Private Equity - Multi-Stage	$200,000,000	$236,577,415	$206,907,510	$80,465,407	$126,442,103	$136,361,234	11.39	N/A	16.81	1.45
Neuberger Berman Sauger Fund, LP	2013	Private Equity - Multi-Stage	$200,000,000	$139,200,000	$187,420,359	$79,724,872	$107,695,487	$173,546,124	17.53	N/A	16.07	2.59
BlackRock Long Term Private Capital	2019	Private Equity - Buyout	$275,000,000	$274,222,721	$0	$0	$0	$420,960,844	30.62	N/A	22.08	1.54
Valor Equity Partners V, LP	2020	Private Equity - Growth Equity	$50,000,000	$39,283,257	$0	$0	$0	$55,682,992	35.01	N/A	22.14	1.42
GTCR Fund XIII, LP	2020	Private Equity - Buyout	$100,000,000	$24,860,000	$3,618,309	$678,132	$2,940,177	$32,439,310	N/M	N/A	N/M	1.45
Veritas Capital Vantage Fund, LP	2021	Private Equity - Buyout	$40,000,000	$9,269,314	$0	$0	$0	$7,889,338	N/M	N/A	N/M	0.85
Nautic Partners X	2021	Private Equity - Buyout	$60,000,000	$10,136,587	$0	$0	$0	$9,268,193	N/M	N/A	N/M	0.91
StepStone VC Secondaries Fund V, LP	2021	Private Equity - Secondaries	$47,022,000	$18,808,800	$0	$0	$0	$20,621,723	N/M	N/A	N/M	1.10
Accel-KKR Growth Capital Partners IV LP	2021	Private Equity - Growth Equity	$27,000,000	$1,513,561	$0	$0	$0	$1,085,567	N/M	N/A	N/M	0.72
Veritas Capital Fund VIII LP	2022	Private Equity - Buyout	$50,000,000	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	N/M	N/A	N/M	0.00
Dragoneer Opportunities Fund VI, LP	2022	Private Equity - Growth Equity	$45,000,000	$5,659,556	$0	$0	$0	$4,168,001	N/M	N/A	N/M	0.74
Ashbridge Secondaries Fund II LP	2022	Private Equity - Secondaries	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	N/M	N/A	N/M	0.00
TOTAL			**$1,361,972,000**	**$1,395,258,637**	**$1,404,008,391**	**$196,240,515**	**$1,207,767,876**	**$974,905,613**	**14.65**		**13.74**	**1.70**

Index IRR represents the dollar-weighted returns calculated using the Cambridge PE Index assuming an index investment with the same cash flow timing. IRRs are shown only for investments with one year or more of cash flows and for which an accurate IRR could be calculated. Applicable IRRs are marked with 'N/M' for not material. Fund IRR is the annualized since-inception net internal rate for the indicated fund or composite. Fund Multiple is the since inception sum of distributions and valuation divided by paid in capital. Quartile data is based on information provided by Preqin.

Cheyenne Capital Fund valuations set forth herein could be materially different once underlying investments are realized. Market conditions at the time of exit could be substantially different than at the reporting period, resulting in valuations different than those represented above. Fund valuations shown above may differ from the traditional investment performance report due to the exclusion of assets held in cash. Non-recallable return of capital distributions are included in Distribution - Gain/Income as they do not reduce the remaining fund commitment. Paid In Capital is adjusted for closing true-ups and closing fee remittances.

RVK

Alternative Investment Private Real Estate Fund Performance Listing

Fund Name	Vintage	Asset Class	Commitment	Paid In Capital	Distributions - Total	Distributions - Gain/Income	Distributions - ROC	Valuation	Fund IRR (%)	Quartile	Index IRR (%)	Fund Multiple
TA Realty VIII	2006	Real Estate - Value Added	$15,000,000	$15,000,000	$14,904,443	$1,450,837	$13,453,606	$0	-0.07	N/A	5.11	0.99
Heitman Value Partners II	2007	Real Estate - Value Added	$10,000,000	$9,647,233	$14,158,891	$6,364,503	$7,794,388	$0	8.58	N/A	6.14	1.47
Cornerstone Core Mortgage Fund I	2010	Real Estate - Value Added	$27,225,000	$25,235,654	$34,144,840	$29,352,471	$4,792,369	$0	6.68	N/A	11.20	1.35
WestRiver RE Finance Fund	2010	Real Estate - Value Added	$75,000,000	$62,695,038	$102,287,718	$68,290,412	$33,997,306	$8,507,598	11.20	N/A	10.51	1.77
M&G Real Estate Debt Fund III	2013	Real Estate - Value Added	$98,025,720	$124,016,541	$130,379,836	$28,378,614	$102,001,222	$1,915,373	2.33	N/A	8.67	1.07
Northwood Real Estate Partners (Series IV)	2013	Real Estate - Opportunistic	$150,000,000	$219,439,859	$167,094,024	$69,848,269	$97,245,755	$200,240,919	14.53	N/A	9.62	1.67
SC Core Fund	2016	Real Estate - Value Added	$100,000,000	$101,155,453	$13,732,494	$13,497,225	$235,269	$113,810,215	6.74	N/A	10.52	1.26
Realterm Logistics Income Fund	2020	Real Estate - Value Added	$250,000,000	$250,000,000	$12,064,516	$12,064,516	$0	$340,525,402	30.53	N/A	20.37	1.41
TOTAL			**$725,250,720**	**$807,189,778**	**$488,766,762**	**$229,246,847**	**$259,519,915**	**$664,999,507**	**10.89**		**10.11**	**1.43**

M&G commitment is converted using the noon New York City Federal exchange rate as of the report date. Index IRR represents the dollar-weighted returns calculated using the NCREIF ODCE Index assuming an index investment with the same cash flow timing. IRRs are shown only for investments with one year or more of cash flows and for which an accurate IRR could be calculated. Applicable IRRs are marked with 'N/M' for not material. Fund IRR is the annualized since-inception net internal rate for the indicated fund or composite. Fund Multiple is the since inception sum of distributions and valuation divided by paid in capital. Quartile data is based on information provided by Preqin.

Fund valuations shown above may differ from the traditional investment performance report due to the exclusion of assets held in cash. Non-recallable return of capital distributions are included in Distribution - Gain/Income as they do not reduce the remaining fund commitment. Paid In Capital is adjusted for closing true-ups and closing fee remittances.

Alternative Investment Diversified Hedge Funds Fund Performance Listing

Fund Name	Vintage	Asset Class	Commitment	Paid In Capital	Distributions - Total	Distributions - Gain/Income	Distributions - ROC	Valuation	Fund IRR (%)	Quartile	Index IRR (%)	Fund Multiple
Grosvenor Global Recovery Fund, Ltd.	2009	Hedge Funds - Opportunistic	$150,000,000	$150,000,000	$199,755,208	$47,985,542	$151,769,666	$0	12.54	N/A	13.70	1.33
Grosvenor Silvery Lupine Fund, LLC	2014	Hedge Funds - Opportunistic	$300,000,000	$300,000,000	$357,260,000	$77,903,287	$279,356,713	$31,864,152	5.85	N/A	10.86	1.30
TOTAL			**$450,000,000**	**$450,000,000**	**$557,015,208**	**$125,888,829**	**$431,126,379**	**$31,864,152**	**7.74**		**12.10**	**1.31**

Index IRR represents the dollar-weighted returns calculated using the S&P 500 Index (Cap Wtd) assuming an index investment with the same cash flow timing. IRRs are shown only for investments with one year or more of cash flows and for which an accurate IRR could be calculated. Applicable IRRs are marked with 'N/M' for not material. Fund IRR is the annualized since-inception net internal rate for the indicated fund or composite. Fund Multiple is the since inception sum of distributions and valuation divided by paid in capital. Quartile data is based on information provided by Preqin.

Fund valuations shown above may differ from the traditional investment performance report due to the exclusion of assets held in cash. Valuation shown for Grosvenor Silvery Lupine Fund will differ from the traditional investment performance report, as the valuation reflected therein is not on a one-quarter lag due to the nature of this particular investment. Non-recallable return of capital distributions are included in Distribution - Gain/Income as they do not reduce the remaining fund commitment. Paid In Capital is adjusted for closing true-ups and closing fee remittances.

Alternative Investment Private Credit Fund Performance Listing

Fund Name	Vintage	Asset Class	Commitment	Paid In Capital	Distributions - Total	Distributions - Gain/Income	Distributions - ROC	Valuation	Fund IRR (%)	Quartile	Index IRR (%)	Fund Multiple
BlackRock Global Credit Opportunities Fund II LP	2022	Private Credit - Opportunistic Credit	$150,000,000	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	N/M	N/A	N/M	0.00
TOTAL			**$150,000,000**	**$0**	**$0**	**$0**	**$0**	**$0**	**0.00**		**0.00**	**0.00**

As of September 30, 2022

Alternative Investment Private Equity Fund Performance Listing

				As of 06/30/2022			Quarter To Date Ending 09/30/2022		
Fund Name	**Vintage**	**Asset Class**	**Commitment**	**Paid In Capital**	**Distributions - Total**	**Valuation**	**Paid In Capital**	**Distributions - Total**	**Valuation**
Cheyenne Capital Fund, LP	2003	Private Equity - Multi-Stage	$257,950,000	$625,727,426	$988,816,513	$111,555,576	$0	$0	$112,032,289 *
Access Venture Partners II, LP	2006	Private Equity - Venture	$10,000,000	$10,000,000	$17,245,700	$1,326,711	$0	$1,394,545	$808,203 *
Hamilton Lane Wyoming Nowood Fund, LP	2013	Private Equity - Multi-Stage	$200,000,000	$236,577,415	$206,907,510	$136,361,234	$0	$0	$136,361,234 *
Neuberger Berman Sauger Fund, LP	2013	Private Equity - Multi-Stage	$200,000,000	$139,200,000	$187,420,359	$173,546,124	$0	$7,000,000	$167,647,099 *
BlackRock Long Term Private Capital	2019	Private Equity - Buyout	$275,000,000	$274,222,721	$0	$420,960,844	$0	$0	$420,960,844 *
Valor Equity Partners V, LP	2020	Private Equity - Growth Equity	$50,000,000	$39,283,257	$0	$55,682,992	$5,527,982	$0	$60,944,515 *
GTCR Fund XIII, LP	2020	Private Equity - Buyout	$100,000,000	$24,860,000	$3,618,309	$32,439,310	$11,790,000	$0	$44,229,310 *
Veritas Capital Vantage Fund, LP	2021	Private Equity - Buyout	$40,000,000	$9,269,314	$0	$7,889,338	$2,868,311	$0	$10,444,894 *
Nautic Partners X	2021	Private Equity - Buyout	$60,000,000	$10,136,587	$0	$9,268,193	$5,521,798	$0	$14,193,155 *
StepStone VC Secondaries Fund V, LP	2021	Private Equity - Secondaries	$47,022,000	$18,808,800	$0	$20,621,723	$1,880,880	$0	$22,502,603 *
Accel-KKR Growth Capital Partners IV LP	2021	Private Equity - Growth Equity	$27,000,000	$1,513,561	$0	$1,085,567	$2,489,546	$0	$3,247,537 *
Veritas Capital Fund VIII LP	2022	Private Equity - Buyout	$50,000,000	$0	$0	$0	$454,313	$0	$0 *
Dragoneer Opportunities Fund VI, LP	2022	Private Equity - Growth Equity	$45,000,000	$5,659,556	$0	$4,168,001	$0	$0	$4,168,001 *
Ashbridge Secondaries Fund II LP	2022	Private Equity - Secondaries	$0	$0	$0	$0	$44,627,500	$0	$44,627,500 *
TOTAL			**$1,361,972,000**	**$1,395,258,637**	**$1,404,008,391**	**$974,905,613**	**$75,160,330**	**$8,394,545**	**$1,042,167,184**

Cheyenne Capital Fund valuations set forth herein could be materially different once underlying investments are realized. Market conditions at the time of exit could be substantially different than at the reporting period, resulting in valuations different than those represented above. Paid In Capital is adjusted for closing true-ups and closing fee remittances. Expense Contributions included in Paid In Capital and Income/Gain Distributions included in Distributions - Total are not reflected in preliminary valuations. All valuations shown include unrealized appreciation. Current quarter cash flows for Cheyenne Capital are unavailable.

As of September 30, 2022

Alternative Investment Private Real Estate Fund Performance Listing

Fund Name	Vintage	Asset Class	Commitment	As of 06/30/2022 Paid In Capital	As of 06/30/2022 Distributions - Total	As of 06/30/2022 Valuation	Quarter To Date Ending 09/30/2022 Paid In Capital	Quarter To Date Ending 09/30/2022 Distributions - Total	Quarter To Date Ending 09/30/2022 Valuation
TA Realty VIII	2006	Real Estate - Value Added	$15,000,000	$15,000,000	$14,904,443	$0	$0	$0	$0
Heitman Value Partners II	2007	Real Estate - Value Added	$10,000,000	$9,647,233	$14,158,891	$0	$0	$0	$0
Cornerstone Core Mortgage Fund I	2010	Real Estate - Value Added	$27,225,000	$25,235,654	$34,144,840	$0	$0	$0	$0
WestRiver RE Finance Fund	2010	Real Estate - Value Added	$75,000,000	$62,695,038	$102,287,718	$8,507,598	$0	$0	$8,498,384
M&G Real Estate Debt Fund III	2013	Real Estate - Value Added	$98,025,720	$124,016,541	$130,379,836	$1,915,373	$0	$0	$3,497,004 *
Northwood Real Estate Partners (Series IV)	2013	Real Estate - Opportunistic	$150,000,000	$219,439,859	$167,094,024	$200,240,919	$3,309,900	$16,760,609	$194,583,741 *
SC Core Fund	2016	Real Estate - Value Added	$100,000,000	$101,155,453	$13,732,494	$113,810,215	$194,002	$2,273,692	$113,815,933 *
Realterm Logistics Income Fund	2020	Real Estate - Value Added	$250,000,000	$250,000,000	$12,064,516	$340,525,402	$0	$2,163,630	$340,528,724 *
TOTAL			**$725,250,720**	**$807,189,778**	**$488,766,762**	**$664,999,507**	**$3,503,902**	**$21,197,931**	**$660,923,785**

M&G commitment is converted using the noon New York City Federal exchange rate on the date of the report, while M&G cash flows are converted on the date of the flow.

Paid In Capital is adjusted for closing true-ups and closing fee remittances. Expense Contributions included in Paid In Capital and Income/Gain Distributions included in Distributions - Total are not reflected in preliminary valuations. All valuations shown include unrealized appreciation.

RVK

Alternative Investment Diversified Hedge Funds Fund Performance Listing

				As of 06/30/2022			Quarter To Date Ending 09/30/2022			
Fund Name	Vintage	Asset Class	Commitment	Paid In Capital	Distributions - Total	Valuation	Paid In Capital	Distributions - Total	Valuation	
Grosvenor Global Recovery Fund, Ltd.	2009	Hedge Funds - Opportunistic	$150,000,000	$150,000,000	$199,755,208	$0	$0	$0	$0	
Grosvenor Silvery Lupine Fund, LLC	2014	Hedge Funds - Opportunistic	$300,000,000	$300,000,000	$357,260,000	$31,864,152	$0	$8,000,000	$24,751,664	*
TOTAL			**$450,000,000**	**$450,000,000**	**$557,015,208**	**$31,864,152**	**$0**	**$8,000,000**	**$24,751,664**	

Paid In Capital is adjusted for closing true-ups and closing fee remittances. Expense Contributions included in Paid In Capital and Income/Gain Distributions included in Distributions - Total are not reflected in preliminary valuations. All valuations shown include unrealized appreciation.

As of September 30, 2022

Alternative Investment Private Credit Fund Performance Listing

				As of 06/30/2022			Quarter To Date Ending 09/30/2022		
Fund Name	**Vintage**	**Asset Class**	**Commitment**	**Paid In Capital**	**Distributions - Total**	**Valuation**	**Paid In Capital**	**Distributions - Total**	**Valuation**
BlackRock Global Credit Opportunities Fund II LP	2022	Private Credit - Opportunistic Credit	$150,000,000	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0 *
TOTAL			**$150,000,000**	**$0**	**$0**	**$0**	**$0**	**$0**	**$0**

PORTLAND BOISE CHICAGO NEW YORK

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RVK

Memorandum

To	Sample Client
From	RVK, Inc.
Subject	Sample Private Credit Fund
Date	May 2019

Summary

The Sample Private Credit Fund consists of a series of investments backed by a home-buying assistance program active in a limited series of high-cost, US cities. The program contributes to the down payments of single-family homebuyers living in high cost areas, primarily across large cities in California. In exchange for this down payment assistance, Sample Private Credit Fund and its investors receive the eventual right to a share of any price appreciation experienced by the homebuyers' properties. Sample Private Credit Fund's investments are structured as a series of bespoke option contracts, with the homebuyers acting as their counterparties. Given the chosen structure of these options, the portfolio is effectively a series of levered, synthetic equity interests in a series of single family homes.

Given the early stage of this investment program, the structuring of Sample Private Credit Fund's investor allocations as a series of home equity options, and the direct link between the payoff profiles of these investments and underlying home price changes in areas that are currently experiencing fairly aggressive real estate valuations, this program is expected to incur a high risk/return profile relative to the other real estate investments made by the Endowment thus far.

Sample Private Credit Fund tentatively targets a 9-14% net internal rate of return. This return target is based on the housing price trends that Sample Private Credit Fund has analyzed in target metro areas from 1985-2015.

Overall, we believe that this investment presents a meaningful potential benefit to the Endowment through unlocking the possible future participation of the Sample Client

's employees in Sample Private Credit Fund's home buying assistance program. However, from an investment standpoint, this offering introduces several consequential investment, regulatory and operational risks of which we feel potential investors should be aware. In the following sections, we summarize what we believe to be the key potential benefits and risks to which this strategy would expose the Endowment if a decision to invest was made.

Competitive Advantages

Mission-Related Benefits: Participation in Sample Private Credit Fund's program will potentially allow Sample Client employees to benefit from Sample Private Credit Fund's home buying assistance program. Given the high costs of living in San Francisco relative to industry salary levels, this benefit would be likely to help the Sample Client improve employee retention and strengthen the organization. As such, we acknowledge that it is important for the Endowment to consider the mission-related aspects of this investment alongside its investment profile and goals. However, because Sample Private Credit Fund has not made specifics available as to which Sample Client employees, or how many, are likely to be eligible for Sample Private Credit Fund's down payment assistance over the term of this investment, we are unable to clearly quantify the possible mission-related benefits of this program.

Limited Portfolio-Level Downside Due to Size: Given the small size of the proposed commitment relative to the Endowment's overall size, this investment is unlikely to generate meaningful losses in even the most severe of circumstances.

High Potential Upside: Sample Private Credit Fund's system of providing a 10% down payment in exchange for an option on 25% of home price appreciation effectively levers the fund by 2.5X. As such, it offers investors the opportunity to participate in leveraged exposure to a housing market in a series of high growth areas. Thus far, Sample Private Credit Fund's exits have demonstrated this potential for substantial upside during strong real estate markets, earning a gross average return on investment (ROI) of approximately 21%. However, investors should keep in mind that the risk of this product is elevated, and as such, investment-level losses could be significant in a stressed real estate environment.

Key Risks

Cyclical Sensitivity: Sample Private Credit Fund's program will focus on single-family homes in real estate markets characterized by high current home prices and generally aggressive valuations as measured by regional capitalization rate (the ratio of net income to property price). In addition, Sample Private Credit Fund's investments are, by design, made up of levered exposure to any gains or losses that result from changes in the underlying property prices of Sample Private Credit Fund's homebuyers. As such, we believe this product will likely be quite sensitive to any broad-based changes in property prices that might result from a shift in the current real estate cycle. Given that real estate markets in many of Sample Private Credit Fund's chosen regions have experienced the greatest property price run-up in history over the last ten years and are generally facing the most aggressive capitalization rates ever measured at this time, we believe that a correction in home prices is both possible and plausible over the next few years. As such, there is a relatively high chance that Sample Private Credit Fund's 2019 investors could encounter cyclically-driven losses.

Lack of Diversification: With 92% of the current portfolio in California and 100% of the portfolio driven by the price appreciation/depreciation of single-family homes, this offering is characterized by very little diversification across property types or geographies. This lack of diversification is expected to contribute to the strategy's higher-risk profile, increasing the probability of both large gains and large losses.

Legal and Regulatory Risk: The Sample Private Credit Fund represents a new home-buying assistance program, and uses a new derivative/lending hybrid structure to extend down payment assistance to homebuyers. As with all investments backed by new types of financial derivatives, there is an increased potential for unexpected legal or regulatory repercussions to surface over the life of this fund compared to more established investment approaches. The extent of any potential repercussions are unknown, but could result in either unexpected losses or even the unexpected wind-down of the fund and its associated down payment assistance program. Based on our research, Sample Private Credit Fund appears to have taken the appropriate basic steps to clear its operations with the applicable legal and regulatory bodies in its chosen regions. However, the absence of a formal registration of the program with the SEC and the limited regulatory precedent associated with this specific type of investment structure both increase the regulatory uncertainty associated with this strategy.

New Team/Program: Sample Private Credit Fund's home-buying assistance program and investment team are both relatively new, having begun operation as a unit in 2016. As such, the team has less experience in making investments as a unit compared most of their peer strategies within private real estate. An investment in Sample Private Credit Fund will be subject to the same elevated level of organizational and operational risk that would accompany any other emerging strategy. Similarly, there is a track record of only three successful exits available by which to gage Sample Private Credit Fund's performance over a full deal cycle, compared to a more typical range of 50-250 past deal-level exits for many peer private real estate strategies. Sample Private Credit Fund has also not yet operated during a sustained period of high volatility within real estate. As such, the team and strategy's performance during stressed market environments is almost entirely untested.

Conflicts of Interest: Sample Private Credit Fund consistently receives payment for real estate brokerage referrals and services (Sample Private Credit Fund is a licensed real estate broker in California) related to this investment program's activity, which creates a potential conflict of interest with regard to homebuyer sourcing and broker selection. Fees earned by Sample Private Credit Fund's brokerage arm are not passed through as profits to this offering's investors.

Strategy

The strategy is executed through a series of partial down payments linked to bespoke option contracts created by Sample Private Credit Fund, which provides Sample Private Credit Fund investors with exposure to changes in the property prices of the underlying homebuyers that Sample Private Credit Fund assists. The rights to repayment associated with these options are termed "Real Estate Interests" by Sample Private Credit Fund.

More specifically, Sample Private Credit Fund currently supplies down payment assistance to each chosen homebuyer amounting to an average of 10% of their total appraised home price. In exchange for this down payment assistance, Sample Private Credit Fund gains the right to receive the full repayment of its initial down payment assistance, plus an average of 25% of each home's future change in price over a pre-determined period. The level of price appreciation/depreciation on which Sample Private Credit Fund's ending payoff is based is typically crystalized (and repayment made) when one of the following events occurs:

1) The homebuyer sells their home,
2) Sample Private Credit Fund's interest in the property is replaced by refinancing from a third party,
3) Sample Private Credit Fund's option is bought out by the property owner,
4) Sample Private Credit Fund exercises its option at the end of a pre-determined period (often 10 years).

However, it is important to note that the strategy is not limited to this specific 10%/25% structure, and Sample Private Credit Fund has the discretion to alter these parameters as desired. As such, the effective level of leverage to home price appreciation/depreciation that is experienced by the fund is subject to change, based on Sample Private Credit Fund's discretion. At the current time, Sample Private Credit Fund's 10% median down payment amount and 25% median average price appreciation share have resulted in an implicit leverage level of approximately 2.5X across the portfolio of 144 options that was provided to RVK for analysis.

As noted, a key feature of this strategy is the structure of all loan-level investments as options on future changes in home prices. Effectively, Sample Private Credit Fund's down payment assistance (which again averages about 10% of each home's total value and about half of each homebuyer's initial down payment) acts as the premium required to "purchase" each option, while each agreement entitles Sample Private Credit Fund to the right, but not the obligation, to receive an amount equal to:

1) An average of 25% of the home's price appreciation or depreciation, plus
2) The full amount of Sample Private Credit Fund's original down payment assistance, typically 10% of the home's total value

The above combination of payments represents each option's potential payoff at the end of the agreement. If this potential payoff amounts to less than $0, Sample Private Credit Fund will not exercise its option, and will instead forfeit the full amount of its initial down payment assistance.

In the following chart, we show Sample Private Credit Fund's current range of down payment assistance and share in home price appreciation, as well as the range of implied levels of leverage to future home price changes based on the current lineup of investments in Sample Private Credit Fund's portfolio:

	Down Payment Assistance (% of Total Home Value)	**Share of Price Appreciation/Depreciation (% of Total)**	**Option Implied Leverage[1]**
Median Value	10%	25%	2.50X
Maximum Value	20%	50%	2.54X
Minimum Value	4%	10%	2.47X

Source: Sample Private Credit Fund. Data is as of 3/31/2019

Importantly, while Sample Private Credit Fund's future gains are limited only by the potential level of future price appreciation, Sample Private Credit Fund's downside is limited to the amount of its initial down payment assistance – the strategy is not required to make any loans whole or inject additional margin if price depreciation occurs. As such, the payoff profile of each investment is asymmetric, similar to that of most options, with total downside limited to 100% of the value of Sample Private Credit Fund's initial down payment assistance in all cases (again, similar to an option premium). An example of a typical loan-level payoff profile is shown on the following charts, assuming a down payment of 10% of a property's total value, and a right to participate in 25% of the property's future appreciation/depreciation. Given the likelihood that we are in the later stages

[1] Implied leverage for each option is calculated on a deal by deal basis as property price appreciation share divided by down payment assistance portion (For example, 25%/10% = 2.5X).

of the current real estate market cycle, we view the limited downside of this investment profile to be a key feature of this investment. In general, we would consider a 2.5X levered exposure to primary market real estate with unlimited downside to be well beyond the bounds of the Endowment's risk tolerance.

Gross Investment Level Payoff Profile – As a % of Total Property Value



Gross Investment Level Payoff Profile – As a % of Initial Sample Fund Investment



Source: RVK

In practice, the quasi-equity structure used by Sample Private Credit Fund is in some ways similar to those used by home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) or reverse mortgages. However, unlike prior structures, Sample Private Credit Fund's contracts are intended to accommodate other potential down payment assistance, for which Sample Private Credit Fund has secured a conditional approval from the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). As such, while Sample Private Credit Fund's bespoke option structure has some legal and regulatory precedent, it is also in many ways the first of its kind, and subject to the associated elevated level of regulatory and legal risk that accompany all new financial structures.

Another important component of this strategy is what Sample Private Credit Fund requires of its underlying homebuyers. Typically, Sample Private Credit Fund's homebuyers are educators with at least two years of work experience, above-median income for their region, and a stable credit score. Homebuyers are typically seeking Sample Private Credit Fund's assistance to purchase their primary home. Thus far, Sample Private Credit Fund has limited its investments to the employees of a limited series of stable institutions in the educational sector, the great majority of which are located in California. Although Sample Private Credit Fund expects to expand its operations to encompass relationships with a wider range of employers in future, there are no plans to loosen its basic homebuyer criteria.

The Fund does not expect to use significant levels of leverage beyond that already inherent in its chosen option structure.

Investment Process

As noted, Sample Private Credit Fund's counterparties are new homeowners in targeted regions seeking assistance for the initial down payments on their primary residences. Most of the individuals in Sample Private Credit Fund's pool of counterparties are educators, and Sample Private Credit Fund draws them primarily from a network of key institutional relationships that the firm has maintained through a select group of employer partnerships. Employers partnering with Sample Private Credit Fund advertise its servicers to their employees, who then sign up for Sample Private Credit Fund's assistance via a link in the firm's website. As such, Sample Private Credit Fund's sourcing appears to be fairly reactive compared to that of most peer real estate strategies, in that it selects counterparties exclusively from a pool of homebuyers that reach out to it.

Sample Private Credit Fund selects counterparties from its signup pool based on several key metrics, including work experience, income, credit score, and level of household savings. Key features of the home that prospective counterparties wish to purchase are also important factors in Sample Private Credit Fund's screening process. Screenings incorporate several stages, including an initial screening call, a pre-approval process during which key metrics are evaluated and verified, and a screening and verification of the property that the homebuyer wishes to purchase. This phase of the process is a combination of in-house work undertaken by Sample Private Credit Fund and the collection of information from third parties, such as the FNMA and the homebuyer's prospective lending bank. As with other stages of the investment process, Sample Private Credit Fund's underwriting process leans more heavily on third party information than those of most peer strategies.

Key Screening Factors

Counterparty	Home
Employer	Approved Location
Income Level	Size
Months of Experience	Purchase Price
Credit Score	Purpose
Savings	Property Appraisal
Pre-Existing Debt	Inspection Report
Loan Application Forms	Seller Disclosures

Because Sample Private Credit Fund works with a limited number of real estate brokerage firms (from which it earns referral fees) and lenders (from which it does not earn referral fees), homebuyers seeking Sample Private Credit Fund's assistance are limited in their choice of each, and are typically matched to both a broker and a lender with Sample Private Credit Fund's help. Homebuyers that do not wish to work with Sample Private Credit Fund's chosen counterparties do not participate in the program, further limiting Sample Private Credit Fund's pool of potential homebuyers. During the loan origination process, Sample Private Credit Fund outsources most credit underwriting to its partner lenders, but will often actively help its chosen homebuyers in navigating the approval process, representing a significant source of added value unrelated to pure financial assistance.

Sample Private Credit Fund works with both its chosen homebuyers and its operational partners throughout the home selection and purchase process, and is actively involved in all stages, from property selection (where Sample Private Credit Fund pre-screens potential purchases to ensure an acceptable purchase price vs. comps) to closing (where Sample Private Credit Fund actively helps to coordinate the closing process). Upon closing, Sample Private Credit Fund will provide down payment assistance typically amounting to between 5-15% of the home's total purchase price, while the homebuyer directly contributes the remaining down payment required by their lender.

In terms of contract structure, typical option covenants found in Sample Private Credit Fund agreements are as follows:

1) Maximum Debt Level: limits the total amount of principal that the homebuyer may owe across all loans secured by the property.

2) Maintenance: Homebuyer must maintain the property at a reasonable level and repair any damage.

3) Insurance: Homebuyer must maintain standard property and casualty insurance.

4) Tax/Expense: Homebuyer must pay all taxes and expenses related to the property.

5) Occupancy and Use: Homebuyer must use the underlying property as a primary residence for at least one year.

6) Employment: Homebuyer must continue employment with their current institution for at least two years.

Ongoing property-level valuations are based on property price estimates from an underlying series of 3-5 third-party databases that track single-family properties, which is a method we generally support due to its straightforwardness and objectivity. However, in order to remain in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), Sample Private Credit Fund is also required to price each of their investments as options, which requires the incorporation of a Black-Scholes based option pricing framework and a meaningful related mark-up based on the implied volatility of each contract. Because these options are privately held, however, the strategy has no means by which to realize any immediate gains based on their investments' underlying levels of implied volatility. As such, the options-based valuation results in an inflated level of expected return that we believe is generally unrealistic. The team at Sample Private Credit Fund shares our views, and have compensated for this by applying a blanket 30% "haircut" to the options pricing driven valuations across their book. However, this is a very rough adjustment, and as such, we believe that some of the GAAP-driven valuations are likely to be meaningfully flawed. A more accurate (though GAAP incompatible) method would be to gage expected payoffs based on a simple average estimate of property prices by the third party databases which Sample Private Credit Fund uses. Consequently, we have used this second, simpler method to calculate our own performance estimates in our own quantitative analysis. However, it should be noted that Sample Private Credit Fund's methodology has thus far yielded results roughly similar to ours. This mitigates our concern about the fit of Sample Private Credit Fund's valuation approach, and gives us some confidence that the blanket haircut they have chosen to apply to their option price based valuations has likely been set at the correct level.

RVK vs Sample Private Credit Fund Calculations

Party	Gross ROI	Gross Multiple	Median Gain	Mean Gain
RVK	9.2%	1.09x	$3,750	$7,790
Sample Fund	8.6%	1.09x	$3,750	$7,301
RVK Difference	+7%	+1%	+0%	+7%

We would also note that, although Sample Private Credit Fund's derivation of property values from third-party pricing firms effectively removes any potential subjectivity or "massaging" of expected returns, it is also a more basic valuation approach than those used by most peer strategies, and has the potential to decrease their valuation accuracy.

Operationally, all strategy investments are structured via both an option agreement and a deed of trust, which is registered with local authorities. In event of counterparty failure, Sample Private Credit Fund reserves the right to take over the property through a subordinated lien, provided that it can satisfy the repayment of any senior mortgage holders. It should be noted that, in our view, the creation of these agreements through bespoke option contracts executed under local authorities (as opposed to through standardized option agreements executed via a central derivatives exchange) increases the level of counterparty risk and possibly legal risk to which Sample Private Credit Fund exposes its investors compared to other derivatives-oriented strategies. In the event of counterparty failure, a work-out has the potential to be complex, and its outcome uncertain.

Portfolio

In the following chart, we show the basic summary characteristics of Sample Private Credit Fund's current portfolio of 144 options, including basic deal-level metrics such as the return on investment (ROI) and multiple on invested capital (MOIC) to which Sample Private Credit Fund's underlying investments are currently marked. As is evident from these metrics, Sample Private Credit Fund's existing lineup of Real Estate Interests encompass a wide range of results, in line with the expected higher-volatility profile of this offering.

Summary of Key Characteristics

Metric	Total	Mean	Median	Max	Min
Beginning Property Value	$117,315,584	$798,065	$800,000	$1,745,000	$217,500
Down Payment	$12,373,281	$84,172	$82,500	$215,000	$21,750
Unrealized Gain (Loss)	$856,590	$7,259	$3,570	$158,500	-$13,416
Realized Gain (Loss)	$86,029	$28,676	$24,041	$53,500	$8,488
Sample Private Credit Fund Share of Property	N/A	27%	25%	50%	10%
Gross ROI	9.2%	8.4%	5.8%	76.9%	-16.1%
Gross Multiple	1.09x	1.08x	1.06x	1.77x	0.84x

Source: Sample Private Credit Fund. Data is as of 3/31/2019

As previously noted, the counterparties in whose homes Sample Private Credit Fund invests are individuals as opposed to commercial real estate operators. As such, the underlying properties on which Sample Private Credit Fund's returns are based are single-family residences, as opposed to commercial real estate. This represents a key difference from the properties in which most institutional real estate strategies invest.

Thus far, Sample Private Credit Fund's homebuyer base appears to be relatively stable, based on the metrics we analyzed. However, we would note that, although we do expect these stable homebuyer metrics to help mitigate risk, we would nonetheless expect a portfolio of single-family homes tied to the education industry in the high-cost areas where Sample Private Credit Fund operates to be cyclically sensitive. As such, in spite of these homebuyer metrics, we continue to consider this strategy to represent a higher-risk investment.

A summary of the current portfolio's homebuyer characteristics is included in the following chart:

FICO Score	
640-680	1% of Homebuyers
680-740	46% of Homebuyers
Above 740	53% of Homebuyers
Employment Tenure	
2+ Years' Experience with Current Employer	92% of Homebuyers
2+ Years' Experience with Current Industry	100% of Homebuyers
Less than 2 Years' Experience with Current Industry	0% of Homebuyers
Income Level	
Less than 20% Area Median Income (AMI)	30% of Homebuyers
Greater than 20% Area Median Income (AMI)	70% of Homebuyers

Source: Sample Private Credit Fund. Data is as of 5/8/2019.

A regional breakdown, by city, of Sample Private Credit Fund's highest concentration locations is shown in the chart below. As previously noted, there is significant regional concentration associated with this strategy, with 93% of the current portfolio allocated to a single state (California).



Source: Sample Private Credit Fund. Data is as of 3/31/2019.

In terms of vintage year diversification, at this stage the majority of capital is very recently deployed, limiting the visibility of the results this strategy is likely to achieve.



Source: Sample Private Credit Fund. Data is as of 3/31/2019. *The first investment was made on 12/13/2016.

Quantitative Analysis[2]

Given Sample Private Credit Fund's short tenure, we had limited results from which to draw conclusions during our quantitative review of the portfolio's investments. Specifically, Sample Private Credit Fund's track record includes only three realized deals. Thus far, those three realized investments have been roughly in line with the manager's original expectations in terms of ending return on investment, but we believe this sample size is too small to draw definitive conclusions.

Total Track Record Executive Summary

Sample Private Credit Fund	No. of Investments	Total Invested Capital	Allocation (%)	Gross ROI	Gross Multiple
Realized Investments	3	$416,200	3%	20.7%	1.21x
Unrealized Investments	144	$11,957,081	97%	8.7%	1.09x
Total	147	$12,373,281	100%	9.2%	1.09x

[2] All track record data has been provided by Sample Private Credit Fund. Number of Investments and Total Invested Capital include all investments in the track record. Gross ROI and Gross Multiple calculations exclude investments made in 2019 and one outlier investment that RVK considers to be mispriced. Sample Private Credit Fund has confirmed that this one outlier investment will likely be repriced next quarter. Data is as of 3/31/2019.

Broadly, quantitative results of the unrealized portfolio have exhibited the patterns we would have expected to encounter at this stage, with more seasoned deals generally experiencing higher expected multiples than newer investments due to ongoing property price appreciation, and gains from price appreciation present across all major cities and size categories on which the program has chosen to focus. The presence of gains across all categories could indicate that the program's design is sound in terms of geographic and property size selection. Again, however, with such a limited time horizon and sample size, we are extremely reluctant to draw any definitive conclusions from this analysis.

Analysis by Vintage Year

Vintage Year	No. of Investments	Total Invested Capital	Allocation (%)	Gross ROI	Gross Multiple
2016*	3	$479,000	4%	48.4%	1.48x
2017	15	$1,479,383	12%	20.4%	1.20x
2018	104	$8,447,328	68%	4.9%	1.05x
2019 (Q1)	25	$1,967,570	16%	N/A	N/A

* The first investment was made on 12/13/2016

Analysis by City (Top 10 by Invested Capital)

City	No. of Investments	Total Invested Capital	Allocation (%)	Gross ROI	Gross Multiple
San Jose, CA	18	$1,666,820	13%	3.9%	1.04x
Morgan Hill, CA	7	$626,222	5%	7.3%	1.07x
Redwood City, CA	5	$619,900	5%	8.2%	1.08x
Oakland, CA	9	$617,100	5%	14.0%	1.14x
San Francisco, CA	6	$588,800	5%	12.0%	1.12x
Santa Cruz, CA	5	$461,270	4%	7.5%	1.07x
Hayward, CA	5	$430,689	3%	3.6%	1.04x
Denver, CO	8	$365,871	3%	10.5%	1.10x
San Mateo, CA	3	$355,500	3%	10.3%	1.10x
Alameda, CA	4	$310,000	3%	3.3%	1.03x

Analysis by Beginning Property Value

Beginning Property Value ($k)	No. of Investments	Total Invested Capital	Allocation (%)	Gross ROI	Gross Multiple
0 to 500	22	$1,034,410	8%	12.3%	1.12x
500-650	25	$1,500,409	12%	6.8%	1.07x
650-800	30	$2,466,834	20%	4.2%	1.04x
800-950	37	$3,316,728	27%	6.2%	1.06x
950-1,100	15	$1,854,400	15%	25.1%	1.25x
1,100+	18	$2,200,500	18%	7.6%	1.08x

It should be noted that, in spite of our reservations around the less than ideal valuation conventions that Sample Private Credit Fund has been asked to follow in order to comply with GAAP, their exits thus far have been relatively close to their predicted payoffs. This further confirms that their choice of blanket haircut (30%) for their Black-Scholes driven option valuations has likely been likely set at or near the correct level.

Risk of Loss Analysis

Importantly, although there is a high level of risk and uncertainty surrounding Sample Private Credit Fund's program relative to other private real estate strategies, the Endowment's chosen sizing of this opportunity will, by definition, limit any potential losses to low absolute levels. Specifically, at the Endowment's stated expected commitment size of $1 million, even if the value of the entire investment in Sample Private Credit Fund were to be immediately reduced to $0 before any gains could be realized, the Endowment would lose only 37 basis points of value given its current size.

Maximum Risk of Loss Analysis	
Sample Client Endowment Size ($M)	273.4*
Sample Fund Program Size ($M)	1.0
Maximum Percentage Loss	**0.37%**

*As of 3/31/2019

To put this in further perspective, because Sample Private Credit Fund's program only participates in 25% of underlying property-level price appreciation/depreciation, this full 37 basis point loss would require:

1) A 100% "default rate" (rate of option counterparty failure) across the portfolio's underlying homeowners,

2) A universal decline in portfolio-level property prices of 40% or more assuming the program's current average level of implicit leverage (2.5X), or

3) Some equivalent combination thereof.

We view all three of these developments to be highly unlikely. Based on historical data, losses in even a severe real estate market downturn such as that which characterized the Great Financial Crisis would be slightly less than total, and would be more likely to fall along the lines the following scenario:

Downside Stress Test Analysis, Severe	
Sample Client Endowment Size ($M)	273.4
Sample Private Credit Fund Program Size ($M)	1.0
Loss From 25% Underlying Loan-Level "Defaults" ($M)	0.25
Loss From 25% Average Underlying Price Depreciation ($M)	0.63
Total Loss ($M)	0.88
Total Endowment Percentage Loss	**0.32%**

The previous scenario represents a drawdown of 88% of the investment's original value, but a total Endowment loss of only 0.32%.

Similarly, losses during a moderate real estate downturn would be more likely to fall along the general lines of the following parameters, barring any unexpected issues with the program's execution or capital deployment:

Downside Stress Test Analysis, Moderate	
Sample Client Endowment Size ($M)	273.4
Sample Private Credit Fund Program Size ($M)	1.0
Loss From 10% Underlying Loan-Level "Defaults" ($M)	0.10
Loss From 10% Average Underlying Price Depreciation ($M)	0.25
Total Loss ($M)	0.35
Total Endowment Percentage Loss	**0.13%**

The above scenario represents a drawdown of 35% of the investment's original value, but a total Endowment loss of only 0.13%.

Across all scenarios, the small size of the proposed investment limits the Endowment's overall losses to less than half a percent. As such, we view the proposed $1 million sizing as the strongest and most effective form of risk control associated with this levered, synthetic real estate equity strategy.

Team

Sample Private Credit Fund's core investment team is made up of only three individuals, which has, in our view, limited the organization's bandwidth and operational level of quality. However, given the strategy's near-total outsourcing of loan servicing and credit underwriting and the strategy's narrow geographic and homebuyer focus, we believe that the continued execution of this strategy with current staffing should be feasible. That being said, Sample Private Credit Fund's lack of direct underwriting of homebuyer/property quality and lighter operational infrastructure represent, in our view, a level of quality below that offered by many peer strategies in the private real estate investment space. Specifically, we would typically expect most peer strategies to perform the entirety of their credit and property underwriting in-house, as these elements are often key determinants of both counterparty failure rates and the extent of any associated losses. Sample Private Credit Fund's pricing estimates are likewise relatively simple cross-comparisons based on zip code and size, and rely heavily on third-party data from organizations such as Zillow and Redfin, compared to the detailed in-house and third-party appraisals utilized by peer strategies. Only a representative sample of 5-10% the portfolio will be regularly appraised in detail.

Sample Private Credit Fund's core team members include Name 1 - CEO, Name 2 - Head of Growth, and Name 3 – Head of Finance. The team has robust financial, entrepreneurial, and educational backgrounds that indicate a potential ability to both adapt to and correctly design new financial structures and investment programs. However, the backgrounds of senior professionals are relatively unrelated to real estate specifically, indicating a lack of real estate expertise that could limit any added value from homebuyer or property selection. The relative lack of focus on real estate is also likely to make it more difficult for the team to predict or adapt to a shift in the real estate cycle, should one occur during the life of this investment.

The broader Sample Private Credit Fund organization is made up of 19 full-time employees, and staffing is likely to expand alongside the program. Sample Private Credit Fund anticipates hiring additional employees to support underwriting, compliance, and customer support. We view current staffing as relatively thin, but functional to justify originating $100 million of real estate investments over 24 months. Given current staffing levels, we strongly support Sample Private

Credit Fund's decision to limit the fund to a small size.

Compatibility with Endowment Goals

According to the Sample Client's current Investment Policy Statement, the Endowment's primary investment goals are as follows:

1) Earn a long-term inflation adjusted return of at least 6% net of fees
2) Preserve capital
3) Limit volatility

In addition, with respect to alternative investments such as private real estate, "The purpose of investing in Alternative Investments is to enhance diversification and to increase long-term returns."

As a strategy utilizing a bespoke, private derivative structure and following a relatively high risk-return profile, we view Sample Private Credit Fund's offering to be compatible with some, but not all, of these primary investment goals. A summary of general compatibility and an explanation for our rankings follows:

Compatibility with Endowment Goals

Endowment Stated Investment Goal	Sample Private Credit Fund Compatibility
Inflation-Adjusted Net Returns of Over 6%	**High**
Capital Preservation	**Low**
Limited/Low Volatility	**Low**
Diversification	**Moderate**

Long-Term Returns: With a targeted net return of approximately 9%-14% that will be derived from price appreciation in prosperous, high-growth regions, we expect that Sample Private Credit Fund's program has the potential to generate long-term real returns well in excess of the Endowment's required 6% inflation-adjusted return level. As such, over the long-term it has the potential to be more effective in reaching the Endowment's return target than many lower-risk investment opportunities.

Capital Preservation: As a levered portfolio of home equity derivatives based on the price appreciation of underlying single-family properties, this investment would be vulnerable to immediate losses in the event of any level of price depreciation in the underlying single-family homes upon which its returns are based. Given the real estate market's current, late-cycle status, we view a downturn across real estate prices to be a very real possibility over the next few years.

Volatility: As a portfolio of highly levered home equity derivatives, this investment is unlikely to deliver the low levels of overall volatility targeted by the Endowment as per its most recent investment policy statement. This investment will carry a high level of risk alongside its high expected level of long-term returns.

Diversification: Given its targeted exposure to changes in single-family home prices across a limited number of cities, this investment does not represent broadly diversified exposure, and as such will increase the regional and sector level risks of the Endowment's private real estate portfolio. However, as a real estate investment, this program is likely to experience only partial correlation to the equity market exposure that represents the Endowment's most prominent market sensitivity at the total portfolio level. As such, it has the potential to provide some diversification from a total portfolio perspective.

Overall, Sample Private Credit Fund's offering is likely not a natural choice from an investment perspective, given the Endowment's major stated investment goals - particularly its requirements to preserve capital and limit volatility as much as possible within the context of reaching a relatively moderate (6% inflation-adjusted) return target. As such, the investment profile of this offering is significantly different from the various real estate investments thus far proposed by RVK. However, given the program's limited proposed maximum size of $1 million, we also believe that this investment would be extremely unlikely to prevent the Endowment from reaching its major long-term goals, even if it were to experience significant losses (please see our previous stress testing section for more detail). As such, if the Endowment chooses to pursue this investment due to the significant mission-related advantages that it has the potential to create for the Sample Client, we believe that this investment would not prevent the Endowment from reaching its long-term objectives at the proposed sizing of $1 million.

Mission

Given the uncertainty that currently surrounds the eligibility of Sample Client employees for home buying assistance from Sample Private Credit Fund and the key mission-related importance of this employee participation, we recommend that Sample Client require some form of employee participation assurance from Sample Private Credit Fund prior to (though contingent on) their investment in this program. Specifically, we recommend that Sample Client obtain this assurance from Sample Private Credit Fund in writing, if possible. Ideally, this assurance would include an estimate of the total number of Sample Client employees that Sample Private Credit Fund expects to be eligible for home buying assistance based on some form of established qualification criteria, barring any unforeseen issues, and a pledge to provide assistance to a set minimum number of Sample Client employees.

Terms

Program AUM	$100 million maximum
Minimum Investment	$1 million
Targeted Gross IRR	12-18%
Term	10 years starting from the date of initial closing. Optional GP extension of additional one-year periods with majority LP consent.
General Partner Commitment	Up to 10% ($5 million minimum)
Management Fee	0.25% of contributions, paid quarterly (approximately 1.00% per annum)
Preferred Return	8%
Incentive Fee	20% above the preferred return
Distribution Policy	Waterfall: 1. 100% to limited partners, until limited partners receive an amount equal to their total invested capital; 2. 100% to limited partners, until the limited partners receive an 8% preferred return; 3. Thereafter 20% to the general partner and 80% to limited partners.
Leverage	No leverage target. May use certain short-term loans to settle expenses (maximum 10%).

Given its status as the only strategy of its kind, terms for this investment are, as expected, fairly non-standard. However, many of the core terms roughly mirror those of a closed-end value-add real estate strategy, and they appear to be broadly reasonable within that context. We note the following areas of concern that surfaced during our terms review, which we recommend that the Endowment keep in mind and/or communicate to its legal counsel if the decision is made to pursue this investment:

- The term of the fund is longer than that of most peer strategies, at 10 years. The Endowment will need to consider whether this longer lock-up of capital is acceptable.
- There are relatively few enforceable investment guidelines applied to this offering, compared to most peer strategies in the private real estate space. Specifically, as expected, the guidelines lack the strength to enforce any meaningful diversification in this strategy. It should be noted that Sample Private Credit Fund does not attempt to present itself as a diversified real estate offering.
- There are no prohibitions against or restrictions governing the creation of successor funds, which could potentially compete with the current offering for deal-flow.
- The strategy's terms neither prohibit Sample Private Credit Fund's brokerage arm from earning brokerage commissions in connection to this strategy's underlying homebuyers, nor are the proceeds from brokerage fees passed on to investors in this offering in any capacity. As such, this agreement allows for potential conflicts of interest in sourcing and execution without requiring any related investor compensation.

As communicated earlier, we reiterate that RVK's initial terms review should not in any way be considered a substitute for a thorough review by qualified legal counsel.

Recommended Areas for Further Research

RVK recommends that the following areas of focus be part of any further, more detailed research conducted on this strategy, either by the client or, if hired to perform a full due diligence underwriting, by RVK:

- A full investigation into the specific historical scale of any additional sources of revenue enjoyed by Sample Private Credit Fund that are not passed on to the investor, such as the brokerage and sourcing fees referenced in this report.
- An investigation into whether the brokerage/sourcing fees generated by Sample Private Credit Fund's proprietary sourcing relationships act to make Sample Private Credit Fund's financing non-competitive to its borrowers, compared to the standard fee structures currently used within single-family property transactions.
- Further research on the terms and exit valuation of Sample Private Credit Fund's three realized investments.

- Further research into the use and frequency of the different property methods used by Sample Private Credit Fund. This would specifically include the appraisal procedures used by Sample Private Credit Fund in situations where deal exists are caused by borrower refinancing as opposed to property sales.
- Reference calls with Sample Private Credit Fund’s current and former borrowers.
- Reference calls with a subset of Sample Private Credit Fund’s chosen lenders and brokers.
- An on-site visit to Sample Private Credit Fund’s offices.

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Private Markets Diligence Report

Sample Distressed Debt Fund

April 2021

Executive Summary of the Investment Opportunity

Summary of Opportunity

The following is a review of Sample Distressed Debt Fund ("Sample Fund" or the "Fund"), a distressed debt strategy offered by Sample Distressed Debt Firm ("Sample Firm" or the "Firm").

Sample Fund is a distressed debt strategy that is designed to pursue deeply undervalued investment opportunities in the senior debt of distressed borrowers. Sample Firm will frequently pursue an active and hands-on approach by taking an aggressive leadership role in a corporate reorganization, gaining a meaningful level of influence over the company's management and board, and subsequently driving value creation with operational improvements. Over the past two decades, Sample Firm has been actively involved with over 150 distressed borrowers through participation on creditor committees or company boards. This "distressed-for-control" strategy often results in Sample Firm becoming the majority equity shareholder of a company following a restructuring, which has historically resulted in strong returns and top quartile fund series performance.

As a distressed debt strategy that primarily targets the restructuring of its borrowers as its central thesis, Fund V is expected to exhibit a high risk, high return profile relative to many other types of private credit. However, Sample Firm's emphasis on accessing distressed opportunities through senior debt and actively driving the outcomes of many company restructurings through the implementation of significant operational improvements is expected to result in an added level of both value-add and risk control relative to more passive distressed debt focused peers. Additionally, Sample Firm has developed an expertise in distressed investing across both North America and Europe, which allows the team to evaluate relative value across multiple geographies and exploit opportunities in jurisdictions that its peers often overlook. Furthermore, Sample Firm focuses on mid-sized borrowers with an enterprise value of $1.5 billion or less that operate in the middle market, a market segment in which Sample Firm has developed a meaningful competitive advantage in sourcing. As such, we believe the strategy's pipeline will remain fertile across many different market environments, as it has for past iterations of the fund series.

The strategy is led by an especially seasoned team, as the five senior investors who captain the investment team command an average of 25 years of experience in distressed debt investing and have been at Sample Firm for an average of more than 15 years. As a Firm, Sample Firm has deployed over $30 billion across more than 400 distressed debt investments since 2001, including $5 billion since the beginning of 2020. The Firm has 128 employees, inclusive of 49 investment professionals, across two main offices; Greenwich, Connecticut and London, England with satellite offices in Tokyo, New York City, Madrid, and Dubai.

This Fund is the fifth iteration of this strategy within the fund series, as seen in the Fund Series Summary table in Figure 1. We believe that the performance represented by this fund series may be as consistently strong as an investor can reasonably expect to find in the volatile distressed debt space across multiple market cycles. Fund V will target a net internal rate of return (IRR) of 15% and a net multiple on invested capital (MOIC) of 2.0x.

Figure 1: Fund Series Summary (As of 12/31/2020)

Fund	Vintage	Committed Capital ($M)	Net IRR	Net Multiple	Net IRR Quartile	Net Multiple Quartile	Custom Index IRR
Fund I	2008	$325	15.0%	1.91x	3rd	2nd	11.9%
Fund II	2010	$909	13.7%	1.82x	2nd	1st	5.9%
Fund III	2013	$1,272	13.1%	1.81x	1st	1st	5.0%
Fund IV	2017	$2,411	23.9%	1.29x	1st	1st	9.5%
Total		**$4,910**	**14.7%**	**1.58x**			**6.8%**

Performance data has been calculated by RVK with cash flows provided by the manager. The fund series has been compared against the Private Credit Distressed Debt peer group provided by Preqin and uses the most up-to-date data as of 3/2021. Custom Index IRR represents the IRR calculated using the 50% Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate High Yield Index/50% Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index assuming an index investment with the same cash flow timing.

RVK's Scope of Work

RVK's review of this offering included:

- Several virtual meetings with Sample Firm's Founder & CIO, US and Europe investment team leaders, and other senior investment professionals
- Virtual attendance of an internal Sample Firm team meeting with the European investment team
- A qualitative assessment of the general partner, the investment strategy, and the investment process
- An evaluation of the current market environment and expected opportunity set
- An in-depth quantitative review of Sample Firm's portfolio and track record, focused on position-level performance, attribution, performance sensitivity, and risk of capital loss
- Reference calls to one current and one former limited partner, two current portfolio company executives, and a peer investment manager operating within distressed debt
- An evaluation of the Fund's terms from an investment perspective
- An evaluation of Sample Firm's operational capabilities and systems

RVK's due diligence process traditionally incorporates an extensive on-site visit to each manager's office. Because no on-site due diligence visits were allowed during our diligence of Sample Firm as determined by applicable social distancing and quarantine mandates, RVK conducted all necessary meetings via video conference. We believe that our due diligence capabilities have not been compromised by the use of virtual meetings, as we were able to receive and review all necessary data and documents virtually, and have consequently not been forced to abbreviate our traditional research. Additionally, RVK maintained an existing familiarity with

Sample Firm prior to the onset of the pandemic, and as such, has previously met with Sample Firm in person at RVK's offices prior to our diligence of Fund V. In summary, we are fully confident in our ability to evaluate this strategy through our virtual due diligence process without compromising the depth, comprehensiveness, or quality of our work.

ROLE IN THE PORTFOLIO

Within a portfolio context, this Fund is expected to provide a high level of absolute return, potentially helping to raise the long-term absolute returns attainable by an investor's total portfolio. In past periods of economic stress, the inefficient and intensely cyclical distressed debt opportunity set has afforded some of the most compelling risk-adjusted returns available to institutional investors, provided that those investors have a tolerance for the high credit risk and low liquidity that distressed debt investing entails. As such, we believe that an investment in Fund V has the potential to augment a diversified portfolio of private market assets, and to aid in reaching many investors' long-term return targets. However, given the illiquid and relatively high risk profile of this strategy, we do not view it to be appropriate for investors attempting to reserve liquidity or limit the risk of all private markets' allocations to low levels.

Compared to the "traditional" distressed debt landscape, much of which is made up of passive, trading-oriented distressed debt strategies, we believe Sample Firm's profile represents a more fertile opportunity set, stronger potential downside protection, and a more favorable risk-return trade-off. Furthermore, Sample Firm's appetite for mid-sized or smaller investment opportunities and a high level of active involvement in its chosen investments make it a potential diversifier for established private markets portfolios skewed toward a focus on traditional distressed debt. We expect Sample Firm's position-level overlap with most other distressed debt funds to be relatively limited, and for Fund V's overall profile to remain meaningfully distinct from those of other distressed debt investments over the course of the Fund's life. For ease of reference, we have visually mapped these basic elements of Sample Firms investment profile versus that of a traditional distressed debt strategy in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Sample Firm Profile versus Traditional Distressed Debt



Source: RVK

Summary of Merits & Issues to Consider

The key points of consideration related to this strategy from an investment perspective are discussed in detail below and on the following pages:

Merits

Significant Experience and Tenure: Sample Firm has invested over $30 billion across more than 400 distressed debt transactions since 2001, making it one of the most experienced investment managers currently operating in the industry. The platform is captained by a group of senior investors who have an average of more than 25 years in the industry and 15 years at Sample Firm. The Firm also has a long tenure in both US and European distressed markets, as Sample Firm initially established its European investment team in London in 2004. We believe this level of experience can lead to a skill advantage within its peer group in all aspects of the investment process, particularly with regard to originating compelling investment opportunities and conducting thorough underwriting. For example, Sample Firm has developed an extensive sourcing network over the past two decades that includes active relationships with over 60 global banks, which we believe has led to a meaningful advantage in origination ability and a consistently strong investment pipeline. Recreating Sample Firm's professional network would be extremely difficult for new distressed debt players, and the barriers to entry in the middle market (Sample Firm's primary chosen market segment) are especially material due to the inefficient nature of building up control positions in mid-sized borrowers and the need for direct sourcing capabilities. In addition, while conducting due diligence on its targeted investments, Sample Firm is frequently able to rely on its extensive proprietary industry research, which has been developed over decades of experience investing in the same industries. We believe this has resulted in more accurate analysis and more rigorous underwriting throughout Sample Firm's investment process than would be possible for a less experienced investment manager.

Value Creation Ability: Sample Firm's approach typically represents a higher level of active involvement than that of many peers, particularly with regard to the team's ability to exert significant influence over its borrowers' restructuring processes and to create value through operational improvements. We believe that this distressed-for-control skillset developed by Sample Firm over the past two decades, which includes active involvement with more than 150 borrowers, is fairly unique within its peer group. For instance, many private equity investors tend to avoid adversarial involvement within opportunities where absolute control is not guaranteed, and other passive distressed debt investors often lack the operational expertise to add value through the life of an investment. Therefore, we believe there are a select group of distressed debt investors with this particular skillset. Following several in-depth investment case studies with the investment team, RVK believes that Sample Firm's active involvement and value creation ability is among the best in the industry. This skillset has consistently resulted in strong investment outcomes for borrowers in which Sample Firm has successfully taken control of following a restructuring and implemented Sample Firm's value creation plan. For example, the nine current portfolio companies in which Sample Firm is the controlling equity shareholder experienced a combined EBITDA growth of nearly 30% in 2020, despite the significant pandemic-driven market disruption. In contrast, the EBITDA of companies in the S&P 500 and Russell 2000, which represent large and small-cap public companies respectively, experienced annual EBITDA declines of 20% to 50% during 2020. Furthermore, Sample Firm's operationally intensive approach has translated into strong performance for the strategy's track record, as Sample Firm's nine control portfolio companies, which are some of the largest positions in the Sample Firm fund series, have a combined asset-level gross multiple on invested capital of nearly 2.2x.

Strong Track Record Performance: The fund series has achieved a net IRR and net multiple on invested capital of approximately 15% and 1.6x, respectively, as seen earlier in Figure 1. We believe that the performance represented by this fund series may be as consistently strong as an investor can generally expect to find in the distressed debt space across a full market cycle. Additionally, the fund series has demonstrated strong relative performance compared to its distressed debt peer group, with top quartile net IRR performance across the previous two funds in the fund series and top quartile net multiple performance across the previous three funds. In addition to strong fund-level net performance, the track record's asset-level gross performance has also been compelling, with an aggregated gross multiple of 1.4x across the 416 investments. Moreover, Sample Firm's emphasis on senior debt and active implementation of downside protection across its investments have contributed to a Win/Loss Ratio of 78%. This Ratio is above our expectations for a distressed debt strategy and is significantly higher than those of the majority of distressed strategies reviewed by RVK, which typically exhibit Win/Loss Ratios in the range of 60% to 75%. Finally, we believe Fund V has the potential to outperform prior funds in the strategy series, as Sample Firm has recently decided to greatly deemphasize investments in the energy and shipping industry, the two industry sub-verticals that have had the most meaningful negative impact on historical performance thus far.

Issues to Consider

Competition within Distressed Debt: The distressed debt market has been characterized by extremely high levels of dry powder over the past several years, including a record $86 billion as of March 2021 according to Preqin. This is more than double the amount of distressed debt dry powder that preceded the Global Financial Crisis in 2007. Furthermore, there are currently 70 distressed debt funds seeking to raise more than $60 billion of capital as of March 2021. This level of crowding will likely lower the return premium available to all market participants in distressed debt.

> *Mitigation Factors: Sample Firm is able to avoid much of the overcrowding within distressed debt markets by focusing on mid-sized borrowers in the middle market with enterprise values of less than $1.5 billion. The middle market is often characterized by reduced competition and less market efficiency since it generally requires direct origination capabilities in order to successfully build up meaningful position sizes. Sample Firm has been operating in this market segment for two decades, which in RVK's view, has resulted in a substantial proprietary sourcing network that is a major competitive advantage in origination ability. As such, we believe Sample Firm's target market, tenure, and established sourcing network enable Sample Firm to resist many of the negative effects of overcrowding that have impacted the broader distressed debt industry.*

Increased Fund Size: Sample Firm is targeting a fundraising amount of $4 billion with a hard cap of $5 billion for Fund V, which represents a 40% to 75% increase from the $2.85 billion of total capital that was committed to Fund IV in 2017. As such, Sample Firm will be forced to invest a greater quantity of capital during the four year investment period. As in all cases where fund sizes increase sharply versus past iterations, this incurs a risk of deterioration in both investment selectivity and underwriting quality. The decision to increase the size of Fund V coincides with the recent growth in the Firm's assets under management (AUM), which have doubled over the past four years.

> *Mitigation Factors: We believe the magnitude and breadth of the post-pandemic distressed debt cycle has the potential to offer investors the most compelling opportunity set since the Global Financial Crisis. Specifically, the current default rate of below investment grade borrowers in the US is at its highest level since 2010, and is predicted to reach 9% by the fall of 2021. In addition, the levels of leverage accessed by US corporate borrowers has been steadily growing over the past several years. As such, we believe the combination of a potentially elevated default rate and inflated leverage levels may contribute to a total volume of distressed debt that would provide investors with a deep opportunity set, strong pricing power, and the opportunity for a high degree of investment selectivity. Sample Firm has successfully capitalized on this compelling market environment thus far, investing over $4 billion during 2020 and over $1 billion during the first few months of 2021. Furthermore, Sample Firm has increased the size of its investment team by nearly 50% since launching the prior fund in this fund series, which has allowed the team to maintain its rigorous investment process throughout the Firm's*

recent record deployment. As such, we believe the fund size remains within a range that should allow the team to preserve its differentiated focus and underwriting standards.

Elevated Senior Investor Turnover: Over the past five years, Sample Firm has experienced a relatively high level of turnover amongst senior investment professionals. A total of nine Managing Directors have left the Firm since 2016, which equates to about two departures annually from a group of Managing Directors that currently includes sixteen investment professionals. As with all investment firms, turnover among senior investors may impair an investment manager's level of skill throughout the investment process, and could be an indication of mismanagement, a misalignment of compensation incentives, or any other persistent firm-related issues that cause ongoing employee turnover.

Mitigation Factors: All nine departures were relatively mutual between Sample Firm and former employees, and none of the employees were fired abruptly or left to begin their own competing strategies. Many of the former senior investors at Sample Firm had traditional trading-oriented backgrounds, and were an awkward fit with Sample Firm's shift to an aggressive and frequently adversarial distressed-for-control strategy. Furthermore, we believe Sample Firm's compensation structure creates an adequate alignment of compensation incentives with investment team members, as the Firm shares approximately 15% of the strategy's incentive fees with senior investors. In addition, Sample Firm's five investment team leaders have been providing consistent leadership for many years, as they have each been at the Firm for over a decade. Finally, the strategy's performance has remained in the top quartile of its peer group for the past ten years. As such, with Sample Firm's stable team leadership and strong strategy performance, RVK remains confident in the investment team's ability to execute the stated strategy despite the relatively high amount of turnover among senior investment professionals.

Summary of Key Terms

Fund	Sample Distressed Debt Fund
Target Fund Size	$4 billion target with a hard cap of $5 billion (excluding the General Partner commitment)
Minimum Investment	$10 million
General Partner Commitment	At least $80 million
Target Return	15% net IRR, 2.0x net multiple
Investment Period	4 years following the final close, subject to one 6-month extension at the discretion of the General Partner
Harvest Period	3 years following the Investment Period, subject to a 1-year extension at the discretion of the General Partner and one additional 1-year extension with majority Limited Partner consent
Management Fee	Management Fee Phases: 1. Investment Period phase one: 0.875% annually on commitments, until 50% of the capital has been called; 2. Investment Period phase two: Following 50% of capital called, 1.75% annually on commitments; 3. During the Harvest Period: 1.75% annually on invested capital less distributions. * First close Management Fee discount of 0.10%.
Preferred Return	8%
Incentive Fee	20%
Distribution Policy	Waterfall: 1. 100% to Limited Partners, until Limited Partners receive an amount equal to their total invested capital; 2. 100% to Limited Partners, until Limited Partners receive an 8% preferred return; 3. 100% to the General Partner, until the General Partner receives 20% of cumulative distributions; 4. Thereafter, 80% to Limited Partners and 20% to the General Partner.
Leverage	No targeted fund-level leverage beyond a short-term subscription facility up to 20% of the Fund’s aggregate commitments
Key Person Event	Employee A or at least three of Employee B, Employee C, Employee D, and Employee E

Firm Background

Sample Distressed Debt Firm, LLC (“Sample Firm”, the “Firm”, or the “General Partner”) is an employee-owned, global investment management firm that specializes in distressed debt through restructurings, event-driven deals, special situations, and trading-oriented opportunities. Sample Firm was founded by Employee A, who spent a decade investing in distressed debt at several large investment banks and Sample Investment Manager, a top-tier investment management firm, prior to launching Sample Firm in 2001. Employee A continues to lead the Firm today as its Chief Investment Officer (CIO). As of February 2021, Sample Firm has $10.9 billion in assets under management (AUM) across a variety of distressed debt vehicle types. The majority of the AUM is invested in the Firm’s flagship fund series, the Sample Firm Fund Series, which is currently in its fifth iteration. The Firm’s 128 employees are primarily located in Sample Firm’s main offices of Greenwich, Connecticut and London, England; with satellite offices in Tokyo, New York City, Madrid, and Dubai. See Figure 3 for an overview of the Sample Firm platform.

Figure 3: Platform Overview

		Firm AUM
Established Presence	▪ Redacted	Redacted
Global Operations	▪ 128-person team – 49 investment professionals, with offices in US, Europe and Japan	
Distressed Focus	▪ Restructurings, event-driven deals, special situations and trading-oriented opportunities ▪ Full skill set: sourcing, financial restructuring and operational	
European Pioneer	▪ One of the earlier entrants in the European market with London office founded in 2004 ▪ Redacted	

Source: Sample Firm. As of 2/2021.

Sample Firm has been an active participant in distressed debt for two decades, and has invested more than $30 billion in over 450 distressed debt transactions since 2001. The Sample Firm platform has grown consistently since the fund series was launched in 2011, and the Firm’s assets under management (AUM) have doubled over the past four years as seen in Figure 4. We believe the high deal flow volume and large scale demonstrated by Sample Firm has historically provided superior visibility of trends in distressed markets across the globe. Additionally, the breadth of the platform’s sourcing network, which includes active relationships with over 100 counterparties, has resulted in a competitive advantage compared to many of its peers while originating investment opportunities. Furthermore, the 49-person investment team, which is dedicated to distressed debt, is one of the largest in the industry and facilitates Sample Firm’s active and hands-on investment approach. In RVK’s view, Sample Firm is part of an elite peer group of global distressed debt platforms operating today due to the Firm’s long, multi-decade tenure in the space, the significant volume of deal flow over the Firm’s history, and the size of the Firm’s dedicated investment team.

Figure 4: Platform Growth



Source: Sample Firm. Number of Core Investments is cumulative since the beginning of the fund series and is composed of all investments greater than $10 million in invested capital. All data is as of 12/31/2020.

FIRM OWNERSHIP AND COMPENSATION

Sample Firm is 100% owned by its employees, and Employee A is the controlling equity owner with 76% of the Firm's ownership. The firm's ownership allocation has been illustrated in Figure 5. Since founding the Firm two decades ago, Employee A has gradually diluted his ownership position in order to expand the breadth of the Firm's owners and incentivize the senior members of the team through equity ownership. Currently, nine senior professionals of the Firm, including six senior members of the investment team and three senior operation professionals, compose 24% of the Firm's ownership. In a recent discussion with RVK, Employee A stated that he plans to continue expanding the ownership group with the addition of several senior members of the team, and the ownership group could increase to approximately 13 employees over the next three to five years. RVK believes this is a positive step for Sample Firm to take in order to better retain top performers, continue to motivate the investment team, and further improve the alignment of interest of senior investment professionals with the strategy's investors. Finally, Employee A stated that he plans to continue his role as CIO for at least ten more years, and will begin considering the succession plan for his ownership and investment responsibilities at that time. As such, the Firm's current ownership structure is expected to remain stable, entirely employee-owned, and spread across senior team members for the foreseeable future.

Figure 5: Firm Ownership



Source: Sample Firm. As of 2/2021. The ownership allocation of the nine senior professionals has been aggregated. While the exact allocation breakout of the 24% was not disclosed by Sample Firm, RVK was informed that the allocations among the nine employees was approximately equal.

Sample Firm employees are compensated with a combination of salary and a discretionary bonus. Unlike some peer strategies, which may pay employees based entirely on their own individual or department's productivity, all Sample Firm employees are compensated based on the performance of the strategy and Firm as a whole. Sample Firm believes that this compensation model fosters a greater team environment, and limits team members or departments from competing against each other for increased compensation. In addition, outside of the 10 owners of the Firm, there is a group of approximately 25 other senior professionals who are compensated through a share of the Fund's incentive fees. Specifically, Sample Firm plans to share approximately 15% of Fund V's incentive fees with this group of senior professionals. Incentive fees will be paid out over several years near the end of the Fund's life, creating an alignment of interest amongst team members that will last the full duration of the Fund. In our view, sharing approximately 15% of its incentive fees with senior employees is relatively in line with many of its peers in the industry, where a 20% earnings-sharing policy is fairly standard. In summary, we believe that the Firm's compensation structure provides an alignment of interest amongst team members that is appropriate and matches RVK's expectations for a high-quality investment manager.

Investor Base

Sample Firm's investor base is diverse, encompassing many underlying investors, and skews toward larger institutional investors such as Public and Corporate Pensions, as seen in Figure 6. Additionally, the General Partner currently represents 4% of the strategy's total AUM. Sample Firm and its principles have committed $230 million to prior funds in the fund series and will commit at least $80 million to Fund V, which is 2% of the Fund's $4 billion target size. We view this as a sufficient level of Firm commitment in order to align incentives with investors, and it is within the range of many of its peers within private credit, which typically commit between 1% and 5% to their funds.

Figure 6: Platform Investor Base



Source: Sample Firm. Data as of 12/2020. Includes the strategy fund series.

Investment Team

Sample Firm currently employs 49 investment professionals that are spread relatively evenly between the Firm's main offices in the US and Europe (Greenwich and London). The investment team, which is illustrated in Figure 7, has been split into three pillars, including 8 sourcing professionals, 32 investing and restructuring professionals, and 9 operational improvement professionals. Additionally, the sourcing team is supported by an Advisory Council of nine members that includes former senior industry officials who now spend a portion of their time with Sample Firm. These individuals have held some of the most senior positions in global banks, investment managers, and other major financial institutions, and bring both an exceptional level of experience and large professional networks to the Firm. Each Advisory Council member typically dedicates at least one day a week to Sample Firm. Furthermore, Sample Firm's operational improvement team partners with nine Portfolio Chairs, who represent Sample Firm as board members of a current portfolio company. These executives, many of whom were former CEOs in their respective industries, have been hand-picked to serve as Portfolio Chairs on behalf of Sample Firm due to their prior operational experience and successful industry track record. Each Portfolio Chair member typically dedicates two days a week to Sample Firm, further supporting Sample Firm's operational improvement capabilities and expertise.

Figure 7: Sample Distressed Debt Firm Team



Source: Sample Firm. As of 3/2021.

The strategy is captained by a highly experienced group of senior investors, as the 16 managing directors across the three pillars have an average tenure of nine years at the Firm and over two decades of average industry experience. This senior investment team demonstrates a level of experience and tenure within distressed debt that is among the best within its peer group, and we believe this augmented level of experience across the senior team has historically translated into a higher level of skill in sourcing, deal execution, and value creation through portfolio company operational improvement. Ultimately, this experience has translated into a corresponding return advantage for the Sample Firm fund series, which has demonstrated consistent top quartile performance compared to its peer group. The strategy's key investment team members are listed below in Figure 8, and their full biographies can be found in the upcoming Biographies of Key Personnel section.

Figure 8: Key Investment Team Members

Name	Title	Years at Firm	Years in Industry	Primary Role
Employee A	Founder & CIO	20	31	Firm and Portfolio Management
Employee C	Managing Director	14	28	Global Head of Sourcing
Employee E	Managing Director	12	16	Co-Head of the North America Investment Team
Employee B	Managing Director	15	16	Co-Head of the European Investment Team

Employee D	Managing Director	17	36	Co-Head of the European Investment Team

Source: Sample Firm, RVK. The full biographies of each key investment professional can be found in the Biographies of Key Personnel section later in this report.

As illustrated in Figure 9, Sample Firm's investment team has grown by nearly 50%, from 34 to 49 investment professionals, since launching the prior fund in 2016. In our view, an active and hands-on investing approach such as Sample Firm's requires a significant level of resources in order to successfully restructure and drive operational improvement in distressed businesses. As such, we are encouraged by this recent team growth and believe it will bolster Sample Firm's ability to source and underwrite new investment opportunities at its increased targeted scale while simultaneously allowing it to provide greater attention and care to its current portfolio companies. It is also worth noting that in a discussion with RVK, Employee A plans to continue growing the investment team this year with the addition of several junior investment professionals to focus on distressed real estate investing. At the end of 2020, Sample Firm hired Employee F as the new Head of Real Estate for the Firm, and Employee A would like to further expand the team under Employee F. While distressed real estate has historically been only a small portion of the strategy, approximately 10% of invested capital, Sample Firm believes the upcoming market opportunity set could produce an abundance of opportunities in this space. As such, with the potential of 15% to 20% of Fund V invested in distressed real estate, RVK supports the decision to further fortify this team. More broadly, Sample Firm's expectation of an increased level of distress across US real estate markets matches RVK's overall market expectations, and RVK believes that a real-estate focused staff augmentation is an appropriate reaction to what is likely to be a robust opportunity set for distressed investors over the course of the next fund cycle.

Figure 9: Investment Team Growth



Source: Sample Firm, RVK. As of 12/31/2020.

Staff Turnover

Sample Firm has experienced a relatively high amount of turnover amongst senior investment professionals (including Managing Director level and above) in the past five years. In particular, Sample Firm has struggled to maintain a Co-Head of the US investment team alongside Employee E. As illustrated in Figure 10, nine senior investors have departed Sample Firm since 2016, including the Head of the US Investment team in 2016, the Co-Head of the US Investment Team in 2019, and the following Co-Head of the US Investment Team in November 2020. In total, this equates to about two departures annually from a group of senior investment professionals that currently includes 16 members. In light of the elevated volume of senior investor departures, RVK discussed the circumstances surrounding all nine former employees with Sample Firm in detail. The primary reason for each departure has been listed in the following table.

Figure 10: Senior Investment Professional Turnover – Last Five Years

Name	Hire Date	Departure Date	Title	Position	Primary Reason for Departure
	1/2019	11/2020	Managing Director	Co-Head, US Team	Mutual departure. Currently looking for a new role with institutional investors.
	11/2008	9/2020	Managing Director	Real Estate	Did not want to move family from London to the US. Currently an operating partner for RE firm.
	4/2014	12/2019	Managing Director	Co-Head, US Team	Mutual departure due to differences in investing style. Currently at a peer firm.
	12/2005	5/2019	Managing Director	Europe Team	Mutual departure from Sample Firm due to general underperformance.
Redacted	4/2004	12/2018	Operating Managing Director	Co-Head, Europe Team	Retirement
	9/2007	12/2017	Managing Director	Europe Team	Mutual departure from Sample Firm due to general underperformance.
	7/2015	11/2016	Operating Managing Director	US Team	Departed to work directly with Sample Firm portfolio company.
	6/2003	8/2016	Managing Director	Head, US Team	Mutual departure due to Sample Firm's strategy shift. Currently at a peer firm.
	9/2004	5/2016	Managing Director	US Team	Departed after Sample Firm replaced his role with a new position.

Source: Sample Firm, RVK. Represents all senior investment professionals at the Managing Director level or above to depart the Firm since December 2015. Turnover data as of 12/31/2020.

RVK had an in-depth discussion with Employee A about the team's turnover issues in order to ensure that there were no "red flags", such as mismanagement, a misalignment of compensation incentives, or any other persistent firm-related issues that may cause ongoing and detrimental levels of employee turnover. Importantly, all nine departures were relatively mutual between Sample Firm and former employees, and none of the employees were fired abruptly or left to begin their own competing strategy. Many of the departures listed in the table can be attributed to Sample Firm's gradual strategy shift over the past decade from passive distressed debt trading to an active distressed-for-control strategy. Many of the former senior investors at Sample Firm had distressed debt trading backgrounds and were an awkward fit with Sample Firm's shift to an aggressive and frequently adversarial distressed strategy seeking control equity positions through restructurings. As such, Sample Firm mutually agreed with many of these senior investors that a parting would be beneficial for both parties. As mentioned earlier, Sample Firm has admittedly struggled to fill the position of Co-Head of the US investment team alongside Employee E, and the position is currently vacant. Sample Firm has attempted to bring in talented investment professionals from a variety of investment backgrounds outside the Firm to fill this position over the past five years, though none have meshed well with the team's investment style or performed at a level consistent with the admittedly high standards set by Employee A. At this stage, Sample Firm plans to eventually promote internally for this position rather than seek outside talent, and has broadly shifted its focus to continue developing the talented investment professionals on the current team.

In RVK's view, some level of turnover among senior investors within any strategy that has been operating for two decades is normal, especially in cases where a strategy shifts over time to reward a different set of investment skills. While Sample Firm has clearly suffered from some "growing pains" as a result of this gradual shift in strategy, RVK remains confident in the investment team's ability to execute the stated strategy despite the relatively high amount of turnover among senior investment professionals. Specifically, the group of key investment team leaders, listed earlier in Figure 8, has been stable for many years, as they have each been at the Firm for over a decade. Furthermore, Employee A plans to remain actively involved in the strategy and continue leading the investment team for the foreseeable future. In addition, and as mentioned earlier, the senior investors who lead this strategy are well-resourced, supported by a large investment team that has growth in size by approximately 50% since the prior fund was launched. Finally, in spite of the ongoing turnover among Sample Firm's senior investors, the strategy's performance has remained in the top quartile of its peer group for the past three funds in the strategy series.

MARKET OVERVIEW

Given the extent of the recent, pandemic-driven economic disruption, as well as the highly levered state of many corporate borrowers, it appears likely that a large and sustained distressed debt cycle has begun to emerge. In past periods of significant economic or financial stress, the inefficient and intensely cyclical distressed debt opportunity set has afforded some of the most compelling risk-adjusted returns available to institutional investors, provided that those investors have a tolerance for the high credit risk and low liquidity that distressed debt investing entails. As such, we believe that a near-term investment targeting distressed debt has the potential to significantly augment the returns of a diversified portfolio, and to aid in reaching many investors' long-term return targets.

Unlike the last major distressed debt cycle, which was largely sparked by the financial crisis of 2008, we expect the current/coming distressed debt cycle to be spurred not by an overextension of leverage in the global banking system, but by a significant, widespread, and economically driven disruption to the earnings of a large number of corporate borrowers. This disruption, driven primarily by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on a wide range of economic activity, has had a rapid and severe negative impact on the global economy. For ease of reference, Figure 11 illustrates a drastic decline of the gross domestic product (GDP) for both the US and Europe in 2020, down approximately 2.5% and 5%, respectively, compared to the same time period last year.

Figure 11: Real Gross Domestic Product – Annual Percent Change



Source: Eurostat, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Seasonally adjusted. EU Real GDP represents the 27 countries in the European Union. Data as of 12/31/2020.

Trends in the default and bankruptcy of borrowers that make up most distressed debt opportunity sets are typically cyclical, with some recessionary economic environments giving rise to large waves of corporate or even municipal and sovereign defaults, while more benign economic environments may be characterized by very little default activity. As such, the opportunity set for distressed debt investing is similarly cyclical, with some periods presenting fertile opportunity sets, and others presenting would-be distressed debt investors with relatively little compensation in exchange for absorbing the risk of a distressed borrower. To illustrate, Figure 12 shows the trends in US high yield corporate bond defaults over the past 20 years. In the past two recessions, the Dotcom Bubble of 2000-2001 and Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008-2009, the annual default rates of high yield corporate bonds reached over 10% and 11%, respectively. The current default rate, at 6.6% as of January 2021, is at its highest level since 2010 and is expected to reach 9% by the fall of 2021, according to S&P Global Ratings Research. Additionally, the overall size of the US credit market is estimated to have more than doubled in the past decade. Therefore, in RVK's view, the combination of a historically elevated default rate paired with the large volume of debt currently outstanding is expected to contribute to a total volume of distressed debt that could dwarf that of many prior market cycles. Furthermore, the expected scale of defaults would provide distressed debt investors with a deep opportunity set, strong pricing power, and the opportunity for a high degree of investment selectivity even if the coming wave of defaulted debt were to fall meaningfully short of these predictions.

Figure 12: Annual US Corporate Speculative-Grade Default Rate



Source: S&P Global Ratings Research. Data as of 12/31/2020. Default projection is as of 2/1/2021.

We expect the magnitude and breadth of the coming distressed debt cycle to be augmented by the steadily growing level of leverage accessed by US corporate borrowers over the past several years. In many cases, the availability of easily accessible, low-rate borrowing in the US has resulted in aggressively levered corporate balance sheets that are dependent on robust, uninterrupted earnings growth and the continued availability of low cost leverage to sustain themselves. As a concrete example of this overall trend, Figure 13 illustrates the growth over time of leverage across private, upper-middle market borrowers, which has increased by approximately 20% in the 7 years from 2013 to 2020 and is currently hovering around all-time highs. Although this example is specific to one subset of the US corporate credit market, it should be noted that the trend pictured in the following Figure is broadly similar to those found in other sectors of US credit, such as high yield bonds and bank loans.

Figure 13: Leverage Multiples of Upper-Middle Market Borrowers



Source: Sample Data Provider. Includes companies with revenue of less than $500 million and total loan deal size of $101-$500 million. Data is as of 12/31/2020.

While we expect the pandemic-driven economic disruption to impact a large number of companies globally, early indications point to an uneven recovery depending on several factors, including a company's sector and capital structure size, respectively. We have used the distressed ratio, which is defined as the percentage of issuers within a dataset with credit spreads above 10%, as a helpful measure to summarize the financial health of companies within a particular group. For example, of the 19 sectors tracked by S&P Global Ratings as of December 2020, only 8 sectors' distress ratios are above pre-pandemic levels. This indicates that the financial health of companies within a majority of sectors may have actually improved since the pandemic, while a smaller subset of sectors continues to face pandemic-driven headwinds. These distressed sectors include media & entertainment, metals & mining, and oil & gas, among five others. This trend can be examined further by analyzing distressed ratios of companies of various capital structure sizes. As illustrated in Figure 14, the distressed ratio for companies with a capital structure size of greater than $2 billion has improved since the beginning of 2020; in contrast, the distressed ratio has further deteriorated for companies with a capital structure of $2 billion or less during the same time period. These metrics point to a greater opportunity set for distressed debt investors who focus on mid-sized companies, while the opportunity in large-cap companies may be diminished. Therefore, the most compelling market segment for distressed investors in the near term may be companies with capital structures under $2 billion in size that operate within sectors facing pandemic headwinds. In RVK's view, strategies like Sample Firm, which have demonstrated expertise and a strong track record investing in these segments, will have a deeper opportunity set to source compelling investment opportunities in the present market environment.

Figure 14: Distressed Ratio by Size of Capital Structure



Source: Manager A, Manager B. Data as of 10/2020. Distress ratio is defined as the number of issues with option-adjusted spreads above 1,000 basis points divided by the total number of issues.

It should also be noted that the distressed debt investment community has responded to the opportunity set by raising a similarly unprecedented amount of capital, as illustrated in Figure 15. The amount of distressed debt dry powder is currently at an all-time high of $86 billion according to Preqin as of March 2021, which is more than double the amount of distressed debt dry powder that preceded the Global Financial Crisis. The number of distressed debt funds that have launched each vintage year over the past decade has typically been between 20 and 30, indicating a consistent number of distressed debt strategies have entered the market. Additionally, and perhaps the most incriminating fundraising statistic with regard to the levels of market participation, there are currently 70 distressed debt funds seeking to raise nearly $60 billion of capital as of March 2021. As such, we believe the distressed debt landscape is expected to be highly competitive in the near term, with a large amount of strategies competing with each other. In RVK's view, Sample Firm's long tenure in its chosen market segments has resulted in a substantial proprietary sourcing network, which will be a major differentiator in sourcing capability in this competitive market environment.

Figure 15: Distressed Debt Dry Powder and Fundraising



Source: Preqin. Data is as of 2/2021.

A distressed debt investment is typically expected to earn annualized net returns of around 15-20% during robust distressed cycles, though off-cycle returns are often expected to be much lower. As illustrated in Figure 16, the performance of distressed debt investments is characterized by especially high levels of dispersion, with the investment results experienced by skilled and unskilled distressed debt strategies often dramatically differing from each other. The average difference between the top and bottom performing quartile distressed debt funds (represented by the blue and green bars in the following illustration) has been over 11% on average since 2006, including as high as 18% in vintage year 2011 and early indications of more than 25% in 2017, the most recent vintage year with available data. As a result of this high dispersion of performance among distressed debt funds, we believe that manager selection plays an especially important role in this asset class – this is not a space where investors can broadly expect great success with a simple “beta trade”. Specifically, we strongly recommend that investors target distressed debt strategies that are run by investment teams with significant experience, command enough scale to access appropriate resources, and demonstrate a strong track record of past investments based on realized deals, among several other defining characteristics. We believe that the fund series represents one such option, and that these features have resulted in consistent top quartile performance within its peer group.

Figure 16: Distressed Debt Vintage Year Performance



Source: Preqin. Data represented by the Private Debt - Distressed Debt peer group. Data is most up-to-date as of 2/2021.

Peer Comparison

Figure 17 compares Sample Firm to three other distressed debt fund series which RVK considers to represent “top-tier”, institutional quality distressed debt strategies. Compared to Sample Firm, however, some of the peer strategies listed below may be more representative of a “typical” distressed debt strategy available to institutional investors, with a focus on more substantial transaction sizes within larger capital structures and less active involvement with portfolio companies. In contrast, Sample Firm typically invests in the debt of mid-sized capital structures in which the team can drive operational improvement through taking control of a company following a restructuring. Like the other strategies in this peer group, Sample Firm benefits from significant experience and tenure in the distressed debt space, is supported a large and well-resourced investment team, and has historically achieved competitive risk-adjusted returns.

Figure 17: Peer Strategy Comparison

General Partner	Sample Distressed Debt Firm	Sample Firm B	Sample Firm C	Sample Firm D
Year Established	Redacted			
Headquarters				
Strategy AUM ($B)				
Investment Profs				
Typical Fee & Carry (Hurdle)	1.75% & 20% (8% Hurdle)	1.6% & 20% (8% Hurdle)	1.5% & 20% (8% Hurdle)	1.75% & 20% (8% Hurdle)
Geography	US and Europe	Global	US and Europe	Global
Strategy Focus	Public and Private Corp – Mid Cap	Multiple Public and Private Markets	Public and Private Corp – Large Cap	Corp, Real Estate, Government Debt
Typical Position Size	$30 - $200M	$150M - $200M	$250M - $500M	$25 - $75M
Capital Structure	Typically, Senior	Typically, Senior	Across Cap Structure	Typically, Senior

Target Net IRR	15-20%	15-20%	10-15%	15-20%
Peer Fund Performance (Net IRR and Multiple) as of 12/31/2020				
1995		Fund I ($671M) 10.2%, 1.9x		
1996				
1997		Fund II ($1.6B) 8.5%, 1.5x		
1998				
1999		Fund III ($2.1B) 11.9%,1.5x		
2000				
2001		Fund IV ($2.1B) 28.1%, 1.7x		
2002		Fund IVB ($1.3B) 47.3%, 1.8x		
2003				
2004		Fund V ($1.2B) 14.1%, 1.7x		
2005		Fund VI ($1.8B) 8.8%, 1.6x		
2006				
2007		Fund VII ($3.6B) 7.3%, 1.4x		
2008	Fund I ($325M) 15.0%, 1.9x	Fund VIIB ($10.9B) 16.5%, 1.7x		Fund I ($332M) 20.6%, 2.1x
2009		Fund VIII ($4.5B) 9.0%, 1.5x	Fund I ($3.3B) 9.2%, 1.3x	
2010	Fund II ($903M) 13.7%, 1.8x			Fund II ($525M) 6.9%, 1.3x
2011		Fund VIIIB ($2.7B) 5.6%, 1.3x		
2012				
2013	Fund III ($1.3B) 13.1%, 1.8x	Fund IX ($2.7B) 3.2%, 1.2x		
2014			Fund II ($5.1B) -1.4%, 1.0x	Fund III ($1.3B) 10.2%, 1.5x
2015		Fund X ($3.2B) 8.3% 1.3x		
2016				
2017	Fund IV ($2.4B) 23.9%, 1.3x			Fund IV ($1.2B) 9.0%, 1.2x
2018		Fund XB ($8.6B) 11.6%, 1.1x		
2019			Fund III ($7.3B) 2.2%, 1.0x	
2020		Fund XI ($11.6B) N/M, 1.1x		Fund V ($3.0B) N/M, 1.4x
2021	Fund V ($4B Target)			

Source: Sample Distressed Debt Firm, Sample Firm B, Sample Firm C, Sample Firm D. Firm information is most recent available but may vary between firms. All performance shown is net of fees and is as of 12/31/2020.

Investment Strategy

Sample Distressed Debt Fund is a distressed debt strategy that is designed to pursue deeply undervalued investment opportunities, and in many cases, drive value creation through active involvement in the corporate reorganizations and operational improvement of their targeted companies. Sample Firm has a long tenure investing in both US and European distressed markets, and has developed the necessary origination network and expertise to invest in mid-sized companies or smaller, rather than focusing on only the largest distressed opportunities in public debt markets. As such, Sample Firm has established a more "all-weather" profile than many of its peers, with the ability to seek the best relative value across a range of distressed market geographies and sizes. Additionally, Sample Firm typically invests in senior debt, indicating a relatively defensive approach that has resulted in a greater historical Win/Loss Ratio among its chosen investments compared to many of its peers. A summary of the strategy's key investment themes is illustrated in the following Figure 18.

Figure 18: Investment Strategy Key Themes



Source: Sample Firm

Since its founding in 2001, Sample Firm has remained consistent in its overall strategy of pursuing undervalued investment opportunities, but the strategy's operational emphasis and targeted level of liquidity has evolved over time. In the Firm's early years, this strategy was primarily oriented around passive trading opportunities in which Sample Firm would purchase bonds or loans that it believed to be undervalued and wait for mean reversion or market price appreciation in order to generate returns. This trading-oriented approach currently resembles that of many investors within the distressed debt space. However, over the past decade, Sample Firm has gradually shifted its focus to an active and hands-on approach in which returns are primarily generated by taking an aggressive leadership role in a corporate reorganization, gaining a meaningful level of influence over the company's management and board, and subsequently driving value creation with operational improvements. Sample Firm's tendency to focus on reorganization opportunities, rather than simply buying distressed assets that have experienced recent price depreciation, acts to reduce the investment's market risk (beta) or valuation risk and to generate a consistent source of value creation that is likely to be less vulnerable to overcrowding than the many passive distressed debt offerings raising capital at this time. Instead of relying on broad market price appreciation or a reversion to the mean in its chosen asset prices to generate returns, Sample Firm seeks to take on process and operational risk, in which the team can actively and concretely increase the value of its chosen assets during the reorganization through its deep experience and restructuring skill. This strategy, which is typically described as "distressed-for-control", often results in the investor becoming the majority equity shareholder of a company.

This gradual shift in Sample Firm's strategy is best illustrated in Figure 19, which shows the increase in the cumulative number of portfolio companies in which Sample Firm has acquired a control equity position. Sample Firm currently owns nine companies that employ nearly 14,000 people. In RVK's view, Sample Firm has demonstrated skill in executing this distressed-for-control strategy, as evidenced by the strong performance of its control equity positions. Specifically, the nine portfolio companies owned by Sample Firm experienced a combined EBITDA growth of nearly 30% in 2020, despite the significant pandemic-driven market disruption.

Figure 19: Sample Firm Control Equity Positions



Source: RVK, Sample Firm. Data is cumulative across the Firm and is as of 12/31/2020.

The typical deal characteristics of an Sample Firm investment are highlighted in Figure 20. Sample Firm generally makes investments of $10 to $150 million in size, initially within the senior portion of a borrower's capital structure. These investments are distressed, usually purchased at discounts of 40% to 50% of face value, and often face an upcoming reorganization. Sample Firm frequently seeks board representation as part of its participation in a reorganization process, as it is often the largest holder of debt within a capital structure tranche and seeks a commanding role on its creditor committees. Sample Firm's borrowers are typically distressed public or private businesses that primarily operate within the US or Western Europe, but could also include distressed real estate entities as well. As such, the typical types of collateral backing Sample Firm's debt are corporate assets and cash flows or real estate properties. Within Sample Firm's corporate investments, Sample Firm will often invest in mid-sized businesses or smaller with an enterprise value (EV) of less than $1.5 billion. The typical time horizon for an Sample Firm investment is two to four years, but the strategy's allowable range of investment time horizons is extremely broad, from only a few months for a trading oriented opportunity to over a decade in a control equity position.

Figure 20: Typical Deal Characteristics

Deal Metric	Typical Range
Investment Size	\$10 – \$150 Million
Capital Structure Location	Primarily senior debt and post-reorganizational equity
Purchase Price Discount	40% – 50%
Expected Event	Company reorganization or bankruptcy
Sample Firm Board Representation	Following a reorganization
Borrower Industry Profile	A focus on asset-heavy, old-economy businesses
Borrower Geography	United States or Western Europe
Borrower Ownership	Private equity sponsor or publicly traded
Collateral Type	Distressed corporate assets and cash flows
Borrower Size	Mid-cap, small-cap, or private upper middle-market
Borrower Enterprise Value	Less than \$1.5 billion in market value
Investment Time Horizon	Two to four years

Source: RVK, Sample Firm.

In our view, there are several characteristics that differentiate this strategy's design and chosen focus compared to its peers within the distressed debt space, and indicate its ongoing potential to deliver superior risk-adjusted relative value. Each differentiator is described in detail below and on the following pages.

Seek Positions of Influence: In approximately 80% of its targeted investments, as seen in Figure 21, Sample Firm takes an active role in restructuring negotiations in order to influence the outcome of its chosen investments and ultimately increase their value. Sample Firm has extensive experience with this approach, and has taken an active role in more than 150 distressed transactions over the past two decades. Sample Firm frequently wields a significant amount of influence over its borrowers, as Sample Firm is often among the largest creditors within its borrowers' capital structures in terms of allocation sizes. For example, for the top ten investments in Fund III, which represents approximately 50% of the Fund's invested capital, Sample Firm has influence in all ten (such as participation on a creditor committee), has the right to a board position in eight, and has equity control in five. Sample Firm is able to gain positions of influence by taking large positions within its borrowers' capital structures (Sample Firm is typically the one of the largest debt holders), and by frequently taking leadership positions on the creditor committees with which it is involved. Positions of influence typically need to be assembled over time from multiple sellers, and Sample Firm takes an aggressive and sometimes adversarial approach during this process, regularly building up its position by directly souring debt from other members of the creditor committee. Many traditional lenders that participate in creditor committees do not have the ability or desire to take an active role in a reorganization, and are therefore willing to sell their positions to Sample Firm at a discount. For example, in an investment case study with RVK, Sample Firm described proactively reaching out to a hedge fund within the creditor committee of one of its portfolio companies in order to purchase the hedge fund's debt position. This hedge fund was facing pandemic-driven liquidity constraints at the time and did not have experience in corporate reorganizations. As such, Sample Firm was able to purchase the hedge fund's debt position at a steep discount of approximately 30% of face value, and thereby increasing Sample

Firm's own position within the borrower's capital structure. In summary, RVK believe Sample Firm's experience in seeking positions of influence and expertise in taking control of a reorganization process are key differentiators for this strategy among its peer group, and will ultimately lead to enhanced returns for investors.

Figure 21: Fund Series Transaction Role



Source: Sample Firm, RVK. Data as of 12/31/2020.

Focus on Senior Debt: The majority of Sample Firm's investments begin in the senior portion of the capital structure, exhibiting a relatively defensive approach to distressed debt investing compared to that of some peer strategies. This has been illustrated below in Figure 22, which shows the strategy's asset type focus across the fund series. While the strategy's gradual shift to place a greater emphasis on distressed-for-control investments over the past decade has resulted in more exposure to post-reorganizational equity in the recent funds, the majority of assets continues to be senior in the capital structure, and senior debt is the preferred investment entry point. Meanwhile, Sample Firm's peers tend to invest more aggressively in junior portions of the capital structure such as subordinate debt, which typically results in greater losses in downside scenarios and can also lead to less control during restructuring and bankruptcy processes. Historically, Sample Firm's approach to distressed investing from a risk management perspective has resulted in a relatively high Win/Loss Ratio (or "batting average") for the strategy fund series of 78%, as discussed in greater detail in the upcoming Capital Risk of Loss section.

Figure 22: Fund Series Asset Type



Source: Sample Firm, RVK. Data as of 12/31/2020.

Mid-Sized Borrowers: As seen in Figure 23, Sample Firm seeks investment opportunities with mid-sized borrowers (companies with an enterprise values of less than $1.5 billion in market value) in over 70% of its targeted investments. As a result, the strategy will typically avoid distressed investment opportunities with large-cap companies with bonds or loans that trade in highly efficient public markets. These companies have many financing options available to them, and building up a position size large enough to exert control during a reorganization can require a tremendous amount of capital due to the size of a large-cap company's capital structure. In contrast, sourcing investment opportunities in smaller markets tends to be less transparent, and building up a meaningful position size in a mid-sized borrower requires strong direct origination capabilities. For example, Sample Firm typically executes over 20 transactions on average over the course of a few years for each of its largest positions, and the majority of these transactions are sourced directly. As such, the middle market exhibits a significant barrier to entry for investors who are new entrants to the space or have not built a substantial direct origination network. In our view, Sample Firm is one of the few platforms that has developed the necessary network to effectively execute a distressed-for-control strategy in both the US and European middle market. Finally, we believe that Sample Firm's expertise within the middle market is especially well-suited for the current market environment. As we highlighted earlier in the Market Overview section and illustrated in Figure 14, the distressed ratios among companies with larger capital structures has greatly diminished in recent months, and we believe that the opportunity set in mid-sized companies or smaller is more compelling.

Figure 23: Fund Series Borrower Size Profile



Source: Sample Firm, RVK. Data as of 12/31/2020. Mid-Sized Borrowers is defined as an enterprise value of less than $1.5 billion in market value.

Geographic Expertise: Unlike many of its peers who specialize in a single geographic region, Sample Firm has developed an expertise in distressed investing across both North America and Europe. As illustrated in Figure 24, approximately half of the strategy's investments have been outside North America, primarily within Western European countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain, among others. Sample Firm's track record in Europe has been strong, with an average gross multiple of nearly 1.4x. This flexible approach has resulted in a more consistently successful deployment of capital than is typical for distressed debt, an asset class with an opportunity set that can often be unpredictable and heavily cyclical. Sample Firm's European team, which has been in London since 2004 and includes approximately 23 investment professionals, speaks 14 different languages (in addition to English), augmenting the team's ability to source investment opportunities directly in multiple local jurisdictions. Furthermore, the distressed markets of Europe and North America tend to operate on different cycles, and each may offer strong relative value for differing periods of time. As such, we believe Sample Firm has a superior ability to evaluate relative value across multiple geographies and exploit opportunities in jurisdictions that its peers often overlook due to a high level of legal complexity or a lack of regional experience. The track record's performance across geographies can be found in the upcoming Attribution Analysis section and is illustrated in Figure 40.

Figure 24: Fund Series Geographic Profile



Source: Sample Firm, RVK. Data as of 12/31/2020.

Portfolio Exposure

Fund V is expected to be invested across approximately 80 to 120 positions over the life of the Fund, with the majority of the portfolio invested in the top 20 to 40 "core" positions. While most investment sizes are expected be in the range of $10 million to $150 million, Sample Firm tends to build up outsized positions within its highest conviction investments and within portfolio companies that it seeks a controlling equity position following a reorganization event. For example, Sample Firm has invested approximately $512 million in the largest single position of Fund IV, a power company called Sample Portfolio Company A. Sample Firm currently owns 64% of the equity of Sample Portfolio Company A after successfully guiding the company through a reorganization. This position represents approximately 13% of Fund IV's total invested capital as of 12/31/2020. While large investments representing over 5% of a portfolio's invested capital may lead to concentration risk and a greater level of performance sensitivity, Sample Firm has historically excelled in its largest investments. Specifically, across the 10 investments of greater than $150 million in the strategy's historical track record, Sample Firm's average gross multiple is nearly 1.7x. Additionally, the Sample Portfolio Company A investment has generated nearly $330 million in total profit for Fund IV, and it currently has a gross multiple of 1.6x. In RVK's view, these results are a positive indication of Sample Firm's accuracy in selecting its highest conviction investments.

As mentioned earlier, Fund V is expected to be primarily invested in the distressed debt of corporate borrowers. Sample Firm tends to focus on companies with significant assets on their balance sheets that operate within industries that are part of the "old economy", referring to industries that have not changed significantly despite advances in technology. Specifically, Sample Firm has historically invested heavily within infrastructure, power, industrial, and packaging businesses, as illustrated in Figure 25. Sample Firm's historical performance has been consistently strong across these particular chosen market segments, with an average gross multiple of 1.5x. However, within the energy and shipping industries, which account for a combined 12% of the strategy's historical invested capital, Sample Firm has suffered heavy losses as a result of oil price volatility and a global oversupply of shipping vessels. Importantly, Sample Firm has de-emphasized these industries from the strategy in recent years, and energy and shipping are not expected to be a meaningful part of the strategy for Fund V. Finally, Sample Firm expects real estate, which has recently become a greater area of focus for the Firm, to be a more meaningful allocation of up to 20% of Fund V. As mentioned earlier, Sample Firm recently hired a new Head of Real Estate and has plans to expand the real estate team further in 2021. Sample Firm's historical performance across its 60 prior real estate investments has been in line with the total portfolio, with an average gross multiple 1.3x. This trend, along with the performance of all industries listed in Figure 25, can be found in the upcoming Attribution Analysis section of this Report and illustrated in Figure 38.

Figure 25: Fund Series Industry Diversification



Source: Sample Firm, RVK. "Other" includes a total of 11 industries that make up 2% or less and includes Air Transportation, Chemicals, and Healthcare, among other industries. Data as of 12/31/2020.

INVESTMENT PROCESS

Sample Firm's investment process exemplifies several distinct competitive advantages, including an extensive sourcing network that includes over 100 counterparty relationships across the globe, a rigorous underwriting process that is further bolstered by a well-resourced and experienced team, and a thoughtfully-designed operational improvement framework that has historically resulted in successful value creation. Following multiple investment case studies with Sample Firm's US and European investment teams, it is RVK's opinion that Sample Firm's sourcing breadth, underwriting proficiency, reorganization skill, and operational improvement capabilities represent a top-tier level of expertise within the distressed debt industry. A summary of Sample Firm's investment process has been illustrated in Figure 26, and each phase of the process is discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

Figure 26: Investment Process Overview



Source: Sample Firm

Sourcing

As highlighted in the earlier Strategy section of this Report, approximately 70% of Sample Firm's investments are in distressed opportunities with mid-sized companies or smaller. This market segment is typically characterized by less liquidity and a relatively inefficient marketplace compared to larger public markets. Both patience and direct sourcing relationships are required in order to build up meaningful position sizes within mid-sized companies. For example, among the top 20 investments in Fund III, Sample Firm executed over 20 secondary transactions over the course of 25 months on average in order to reach its desired position sizes. Importantly, nearly 60% of these transactions were sourced directly, in which Sample Firm had a personal relationship with the selling counterparty. This trend was even more prevalent in Europe, where Sample Firm sourced nearly 75% of these transactions directly. RVK believes this strong origination platform is a key competitive advantage and a meaningful barrier to entry for new participants seeking deeply undervalued investment opportunities in this market segment. We believe Sample Firm's large originations team, which includes eight dedicated investment professionals and is supported by nine Advisory Council members, has successfully built a substantial proprietary sourcing network over the past two decades. This sourcing network includes relationships with over 100 counterparties, and is composed of the sourcing channels illustrated in the following Figure 27.

Figure 27: Primary Sourcing Channels

Redacted

Source: Sample Firm

The foundation of the sourcing platform is a large network of commercial banks, which includes maintained relationships with approximately 60 banks globally. Several members of Sample Firm’s Advisory Council were former senior executives at some of the largest banks in the world, including a former board member of German Bank X in Germany and a former executive committee member of Spanish Bank Y in Spain. Sample Firm leverages the professional networks of its Advisory Council members to build relationships with both senior and junior ranking employees at these institutions in order to increase its origination volume. Additionally, Sample Firm has developed a steady sourcing network with other asset managers, including CLO managers and direct lending managers. Sample Firm’s Advisory Council includes former senior members from some of the largest asset managers in the world, including a former Senior Managing Direct of Firm X and a former Partner of Firm Y. Asset managers were a key sourcing channel for Sample Firm in the months immediately following the outbreak of the pandemic, as almost 60% of Sample Firm’s direct purchases between March and September 2020 came from asset managers. Many of these counterparties were facing pandemic-driven liquidity constraints, often becoming forced sellers to opportunistic buyers such as Sample Firm. Moreover, as we highlighted in the earlier Market Overview section and illustrated in Figure 13, the leverage across private, middle market borrowers is currently hovering around all-time highs. As such, we believe Sample Firm’s established sourcing network with asset managers, many of whom are lenders to these highly-levered middle market borrowers, may contribute to an increase in deal flow volume for Sample Firm should these borrowers experience distress.

Once a potential investment opportunity has been identified, it will be discussed during the daily team meeting. RVK was detailed access into Sample Firm’s internal process, including the opportunity to observe a recent team meeting with the European investment team (RVK is the first consultant to join an internal Sample Firm team meeting). While we are unable to share investment-specific details that were discussed during the meeting, broadly speaking, the format and caliber of the process was in line with our relatively high expectations and the strategy’s stated goals. For instance, Sample Firm team members exchanged updates on "high priority" investments and explored various strategies in order to increase its allocation within these positions by leveraging longstanding sourcing relationships.

Sample Firm's pipeline typically includes approximately 20 to 40 high priority potential investment opportunities each in the US and Europe that the team is evaluating. However, given the current market environment in which many businesses are facing a pandemic-driven disruption in earnings, Sample Firm's pipeline is extremely robust compared to its historical norm. For instance, the US pipeline currently includes 46 investment opportunities representing $128 billion in total debt. Furthermore, Sample Firm has already deployed $1.2 billion of capital in the first few months of 2021, demonstrating a level of activity unmatched by many of its peers. We believe this robust pipeline and recent actionable deal volume indicate the breadth of Sample Firm's sourcing capabilities and demonstrate the size of this strategy's current opportunity set. Pipeline opportunities are heavily scrutinized for relative value, involving factors such as investment size, purchase price, and industry, among other factors that we highlighted earlier in the Strategy section. The most important of these factors is the evaluation of Sample Firm's ability to take a leadership role in an upcoming reorganization, and if an opportunity exists for Sample Firm to create value through its active involvement. These screening criteria differentiates Sample Firm from many of its peer strategies, which may simply purchase a distressed asset once it has depreciated in price sufficiently to reach a particular price point. In contrast, Sample Firm focuses on investments that are not only priced attractively – Sample Firm's typical entry point is priced at a discount of 40% to 50% of face value – but also exhibit upcoming catalysts and opportunities for value creation.

Underwriting and Due Diligence

As expected from a top-tier distressed-for-control strategy, Sample Firm's underwriting approach is rigorous, employing a fundamental, bottom-up approach similar to that of a high-quality private equity strategy. This analysis can sometimes begin a year before a reorganization takes place, and generally begins several months before Sample Firm makes its initial investment. Sample Firm benefits from its large and well-resourced investment team during the underwriting process, allowing it to develop proprietary research on not only company specifics, but also industry drivers and trends.

To continue the example of Sample Portfolio Company A, the Firm's largest investment, Sample Firm's underwriting approach included the following: mapping out virtually the entire US power industry to identify which power plants may face distress, conducting a detailed asset-by-asset analysis on each of the over 30 different Sample Portfolio Company A power plants, and engaging with industry experts such as bankers, power executives, and consultants to begin formulating a value creation plan. Overall, we believe Sample Firm's level of industry and company-specific underwriting is especially thorough, and could perhaps only be achieved with a large and well-resourced investment team. Additionally, given the Firm's longstanding networks and tenure in many of its chosen industries (including the power industry), Sample Firm is often able to rely upon its own proprietary research from similar current or former investments. Regarding Sample Portfolio Company A, for instance, Sample Firm had already owned power plants in all five of

Sample Portfolio Company A's geographic markets, providing the investment team with insight into the valuation of Sample Portfolio Company A's assets and a more accurate representation of their cash-flow generation ability. In RVK's view, this level of understanding could not have been achieved by a newcomer distressed debt strategy or a Firm that lacked the resources and established business networks of Sample Firm.

Active Involvement and Value Creation

Following its underwriting process, Sample Firm will begin to build up a position within a borrower's capital structure. As we have mentioned earlier, this will typically require more than 20 total transactions over the course of several months. As the position size grows and if a reorganization is imminent, Sample Firm will be actively involved within the creditor committee and with the company's management and board. Sample Firm, along with its restructuring legal counsel, will frequently develop its own reorganization plan, which will often involve an out-of-court restructuring. It is during this crucial period of time that Sample Firm's deep restructuring experience and skill typically creates value. To demonstrate this through another example, Sample Firm recently lead the restructuring for Sample Portfolio Company B, a leading US manufacturer of residential roof drainage and a large portfolio company within Fund IV. Following several months of underwriting the company's position and developing a value creation plan with its operations team, Sample Firm built a substantial position within Sample Portfolio Company B's junior debt tranche at an average discount of over 70% of face value. While Sample Firm will most often enter a capital structure through the purchase of senior debt, it believed that it could influence the outcome of the reorganization from the junior debt position in this situation by directly negotiating with the senior debt holders. Over the course of three months, Sample Firm was able to arrange with the senior debt holders for Sample Firm to take 100% equity ownership of the business through a comprehensive, out-of-court restructuring plan that eliminated the junior debt and old equity. By executing this plan outside of court, Sample Firm helped Sample Portfolio Company B avoid tens of millions of dollars of bankruptcy expenses, address its upcoming senior debt maturity, and maintain its relationships with key customers. Sample Portfolio Company B emerged from the restructuring with a much stronger balance sheet and removed almost $400 million of debt with Sample Firm as its sole equity owner. In our view, this investment case study demonstrates a well-formulated reorganization plan that was executed effectively. We believe this reorganization may have been impossible for a peer strategy that lacked the same level or negotiation ability and legal expertise.

Long before a potential reorganization takes place, however, Sample Firm will already be actively involved with a company's operations if Sample Firm is pursuing an influence or control position. During this time, the investment team is typically working with Sample Firm's dedicated operating team, which includes nine professionals who were recruited by Sample Firm based on deep operational skills and significant investing experience. Most of these team members came from mainstream private equity firms or top-tier strategy or turnaround consultants. Additionally, this team is supported by Sample Firm's group of nine Portfolio Chairs, who in each case are proven industry executives (typically former CEOs) that spend multiple days each week working with Sample Firm portfolio companies. These high-profile business advisors are experts in their respective fields, and can bring significant industry experience to help guide a reorganized business through operational improvements. We believe that the combination of Sample Firm's dedicated operations team and network of business advisors demonstrates an exceptional level of operational "fire power", and in our view, is a differentiator to many of its peers in the industry.

The Sample Firm investment team, operating team, and business advisors typically begin formulating an operational improvement plan at a very early stage – as soon as Sample Firm decides that an opportunity will involve a control or influence approach. While each operational improvement plan involves idiosyncratic challenges, Sample Firm will draw upon its "playbook" as a tool to determine how it approaches operational improvement with each company. Sample Firm's approach will frequently include the following strategies: the replacement of the management team and several board members with a talented group that has been hand-selected by Sample Firm, the realignment of the compensation incentives of the new management team and board members with the success of the company, working with the new management team to cut costs, cleaning up the company's balance sheet through the sale of non-core assets, and securing long-term contracts with key customers, among many other operational improvement strategies. A summary of these principal operational improvements has been illustrated in the following Figure 28.

Figure 28: Operational Improvement Steps Summary

1. Put in place the right foundations	2. Set direction and ambition	3. Deliver
- Talented management - Strong Board of Directors - Incentives – aligned & rewarding - Reporting – delivering insight to the journey - Efficient capital structure	- Ambitious strategy and plans (1 & 3 year plans) - Clear exit strategy & roadmap - 'Spotting' – seeking opportunities and gaps - Prioritize – deliver clarity to the business	- Resource sufficiently and create clear roles & responsibilities - Develop tight tracking -Key Performance Indicators -Program office -180 day, 3-year planning processes

Source: Sample Firm

Sample Firm's skill and expertise in operational improvement are perhaps best illustrated through a case study. RVK recently walked through the operational improvement plan for Sample Portfolio Company C, a Norwegian off-shore drilling company and a large portfolio company within Fund IV. Sample Firm initially began engaging with industry consultants a year before the reorganization took place, and identified the new CEO and Chairman six months before taking over the company's equity in a debt-for-equity restructuring. Immediately after taking over the company's equity, Sample Firm installed its new board members and management team, and began executing a series of contracts with key customers that it had already negotiated prior to taking control of the company. Following these steps, Sample Firm initiated its operations plan to reduce overhead costs, which resulted in a $10 million reduction in annualized costs. While the volatility of oil prices has recently depressed the market value of Sample Portfolio Company C and the position is currently marked as an unrealized loss, Sample Firm has successfully executed several aspects of its value creation plan, and the company is projected to increase

EBITDA substantially in 2021. This investment, though it represents one of the firm's losses at current marks, serves as a good illustration of the risk control impact of Sample Firm's active approach to portfolio company operations, as it stands in stark contrast to a series of more passive investments in off-shore drillers across Sample Firm's peer group which have generated outsized realized losses and, in some cases, been significantly detrimental to the fund series in which they were included. In spite of comparable exposure to a volatile investment space, Sample Firm's multiple sources of value-add has thus far limited the losses they are likely to take and protected the return profile of their overall portfolio.

Overall, we believe the forethought of Sample Firm's operational improvement plans has directly led to more successful restructurings, as evidenced in the fund series' long-term track record. Furthermore, the design and execution of Sample Firm's operational improvement plans have proven to be especially additive in 2020, in the context of the global pandemic. Specifically, of the nine total portfolio companies in which Sample Firm is the majority equity shareholder, six have had flat or positive EBITDA during 2020, and the overall increase in EBITDA of Sample Firm's nine portfolio companies was nearly 30%. In contrast, the EBITDA of companies in the S&P 500 and Russell 2000, which represent large and small-cap public companies, were down approximately 20% and 47% during 2020, respectively.

Portfolio Monitoring

The strategy's monitoring is a joint effort between members from the investment team at an individual investment level and Sample Firm's Chief Investment Officer (CIO) and risk management team at a portfolio level. From the investment team, the team member who leads the underwriting and deal execution of an investment will remain actively involved in the day-to-day monitoring process. Sample Firm's large investment team of 32 investment professionals allows each individual to monitor only approximately four to five accounts each, and as such, a significant amount of time can be spent with each portfolio company. At the portfolio level, the portfolio is primarily monitored by the CIO, Employee A, and Sample Firm's risk management team of three professionals, which is led by Sample Firm's Chief Risk Officer, Employee G. Since many of the Fund's positions are mark-to-market, the portfolio is monitored on a daily basis, and the risk management team will update the investment team of any material developments in real time. Additionally, the Employee G and Employee A meet each Wednesday to review the portfolio in greater detail by analyzing the portfolio's most recent Risk Report. Sample Firm uses this internally-generated report as a tool for understanding the portfolio's key risks within the broader market, as well as individual investment-level performance. RVK was able to view a recent weekly Risk Report through a virtual screen share, and found it to be robust and appropriately detailed, with over 50 pages of analysis. In summary, Sample Firm's portfolio monitoring and overall risk management philosophy are in line with our expectations for a high-quality distressed debt strategy.

Realization of Investments

Sample Firm may opportunistically trade around short-term market volatility, such as the credit dislocation market opportunity in March and April of 2020, though the Firm will generally not trade entirely into or out of a core position based on short-term market fluctuations. Sample Firm will typically begin exiting a position following a reorganization event, though if the team believes that there is additional value to be created following the event, including the near-term growth of a newly reorganized and appropriately levered business, Sample Firm may wait to fully exit its equity position in order to further increase its value. For example, it is common for Sample Firm to receive re-instated debt and equity securities following a reorganization. In such circumstances, Sample Firm may sell the restructured debt first in order to recycle capital back into the Fund, while holding the equity position throughout the duration of implementation for Sample Firm's full operational improvement plan.

The typical hold period of Sample Firm's core positions is two to four years; however, Sample Firm has held some equity positions for longer than a decade in cases that it believes further value can be created or an attractive exit possibility is still on the horizon. This can be a potential concern for investors who expect all capital to be returned in a timely manner within the Fund's stated term and further increases the potential illiquidity of this fund series relative to other investment options, making it most appropriate for investors with a consistently high tolerance for illiquid investments. For example, approximately 13% of Fund I and 32% of Fund II are still unrealized as of December 2020. However, Sample Firm has historically performed extremely well across its longest held positions. The gross multiple of the 19 remaining unrealized or partially realized positions in Fund I and II is nearly 1.9x. As such, while Sample Firm has held equity positions longer than originally anticipated in several cases, these investments tend to generate especially strong absolute performance over the long term.

Pandemic Impact on Investment Process

The effects of the pandemic and subsequent stay-at-home orders have only had a minor impact on Sample Firm's investment process, and the Sample Firm's investment professionals believe they have been able to perform all of their core tasks without sacrificing the quality of their underwriting. Given the Firm's established presence in both the US and Europe, Sample Firm has operated on a global scale for over 15 years and frequently conducts virtual meetings between offices for both regularly scheduled internal meetings and ad hoc discussions. As a result of the Firm's robust pre-existing virtual infrastructure, there was no major interruption to the regular cadence of Sample Firm's daily trading calls, weekly investment-team meetings, and monthly operating meetings. Furthermore, in an environment where all market participants have been affected by the pandemic, we believe Sample Firm's large existing network of business counterparties will help it maintain a sufficiently high-quality investment process and level of knowledge concerning its chosen investments. In contrast, we have greater concerns about the large number of "newcomer" distressed debt strategies with more limited experience in their chosen spaces. Without a longstanding network or well-tested investment process to fall back on, we believe that less experienced strategies may be disproportionately impacted by the pandemic-related restrictions on travel and face-to-face interaction.

Performance and Track Record Analysis

The following section reviews Sample Firm's fund series performance and the track record of its underlying portfolio investments. Fund performance data has been calculated by RVK with cash flows provided by Sample Firm, and underlying portfolio investment performance has been provided by Sample Firm. All data within this section is as of 12/31/2020.

The performance of Sample Firm's fund series track record has been illustrated in the following Figure 29.

Sample Firm delivered strong absolute performance during the last major market correction in the years of 2008-2010, with a 15% net IRR and 1.9x net multiple for Fund I. Given the current economic disruption resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, which has the potential to be the most robust distressed opportunity set since the 2008-2010 period, we believe Fund I's performance is especially relevant today, as Fund V has the potential to achieve similarly strong absolute performance in the event that it faces a deep and sustained distressed opportunity set.

The performance of the fund series during market environments with sustained levels of economic growth, such as the time period following the recovery from the Great Financial Crisis, was lower from an absolute return standpoint but even more impressive from a relative basis compared to Sample Firm's peer group. Both Fund II and III ranked in the first quartile on a net multiple basis compared to peer strategies. As such, if a meaningful level of forward-looking corporate distress fails to materialize during Fund V's life, we believe the Fund's performance has the potential to outperform that of many peers, potentially placing in the first quartile within its distressed debt peer group. Finally, the early performance of Fund IV, which has been heavily invested over the course of the pandemic, is off to an especially strong start, with a net IRR of nearly 24% and a net multiple of nearly 1.3x.

Figure 29: Fund Series Performance (As of 12/31/2020)

Fund	Vintage Year	Net DPI	Net RVPI	Net TVPI	Net IRR	Net IRR Quartile	Net TVPI Quartile
Fund I	2008	1.66x	0.25x	1.91x	15.0%	3rd	2nd
Fund II	2010	1.24x	0.59x	1.82x	13.7%	2nd	1st
Fund III	2013	0.57x	1.24x	1.81x	13.1%	1st	1st
Fund IV	2017	0.00x	1.28x	1.29x	23.9%	1st	1st
Total		**0.54x**	**1.04x**	**1.58x**	**14.7%**		

Performance data has been calculated by RVK with cash flows provided by the manager. The fund series has been compared against the Private Credit Distressed Debt peer group provided by Preqin and uses the most up-to-date data as of 3/2021.

We believe that the performance represented by this fund series, with a total net IRR and net multiple of nearly 15% and 1.6x, respectively, may be as consistently strong as an investor can expect to find in the distressed debt space across a full market cycle. Furthermore, with back-to-back funds placing in the top quartile of its peer group in terms of both net IRR and net multiple, Sample Firm's relative performance has improved over time, and currently represents one of the most consistent top quartile placements in the distressed debt landscape. We believe this continued augmentation to relative performance is an indication that the strategy's refinement and gradual shift to a focus on distressed-for-control has yielded benefits for investors, and we believe that Sample Firm's investment skill has the potential to continue leading to top quartile performance across future funds.

The net cash flows for the fund series are listed below in Figure 30. Fund I and Fund II, which currently have $88 million and $552 million of unrealized capital, respectively, have both required harvest period extensions. Sample Firm is the controlling equity shareholder for a few remaining portfolio companies in each Fund that have performed well, but Sample Firm expects to seek profitable exits in the relative near term. Sample Firm anticipates distributing the remaining capital back to investors from Fund I and II over the next two years. Fund III is currently in the middle of its harvest period, and Fund IV is 85% called and nearing the end of its investment period in April 2022.

Figure 30: Fund Series Net Cash Flows (As of 12/31/2020)

Fund	Vintage Year	No. of Investments	Committed Capital ($M)	Paid In ($M)	Distributed ($M)	Unrealized ($M)	Total Value ($M)
Fund I	2008	125	$325	$360	$598	$88	$687
Fund II	2010	118	$903	$939	$1,162	$552	$1,714
Fund III	2013	84	$1,272	$1,175	$669	$1,454	$2,123
Fund IV	2017	89	$2,411	$2,039	$10	$2,610	$2,620
Total		**416**	**$4,910**	**$4,513**	**$2,439**	**$4,704**	**$7,143**

Public Market Equivalent (PME) Analysis

An investment in a private markets fund offers unique challenges when measuring performance relative to public asset classes. Specifically, private market investors make an upfront commitment to a blind pool of capital that is called down gradually over the fund's investment period. The resulting irregular stream of cash flows necessitate the use of internal rate of return (IRR) as the primary performance measure, which is difficult to compare to the time-weighted return (TWR) methodology used in public markets. The primary goal of a public market equivalent (PME) analysis is to alleviate this problem by translating a public markets index return into an IRR calculation by replicating the cash flows of a private markets fund. As a result, the IRR calculated in a PME analysis allows investors to directly compare the performance of a private markets strategy with the opportunity cost of investing in a comparable public markets benchmark assuming the same timing of cash flows. In our PME analysis, shown in Figure 31, we have chosen a custom benchmark that represents the opportunity cost of simultaneously investing in both high yield bond and leveraged loan markets, which are common non-investment-grade credit alternatives to the private credit asset class. The Custom Index represented in the following table is composed of 50% Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate High Yield Index and 50% Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index, and the resulting IRR calculation of this Custom Index represents an investment with the same cash flows of the corresponding fund.

As illustrated below, the strategy series has enjoyed consistent meaningful outperformance over the Custom Index. The track record's net IRR is 14.7% compared to the Custom Index IRR of 6.8% over the same time period, indicating a premium of approximately 8% over the life of the fund series. Furthermore, Fund IV, which was heavily invested heading into the pandemic, is currently outperforming the Custom Index by nearly 15%. As such, we believe that this strategy's track record indicates strong superior performance over public fixed income markets across the full market cycle. However, it should be reiterated that this increased return comes at the cost of elevated risk and illiquidity. As such, a significant long-term premium over public market proxies is RVK's baseline expectation for a well-managed distressed debt strategy.

Figure 31: Fund Series Public Market Equivalent (PME) Analysis (As of 12/31/2020)

Fund	Vintage	Fund Net IRR	Custom Index IRR
Fund I	2008	15.0%	11.9%
Fund II	2010	13.7%	5.9%
Fund III	2013	13.1%	5.0%
Fund IV	2017	23.9%	9.5%
Total		**14.7%**	**6.8%**

Fund Net IRR has been calculated by RVK with cash flows provided by the manager. Custom Index IRR represents the IRR calculated using the 50% Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate High Yield Index/50% Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index assuming an index investment with the same cash flow timing.

Performance by Fund

The asset-level gross multiple (or TVPI) across the 416 total investments in Sample Firm's track record is 1.43x. The asset-level gross multiple of the first four funds in the fund series is 1.50x, 1.49x, 1.58x, and 1.26x, respectively. The performance of the top 30 investments of each fund, which broadly represents each fund's "core" investments, has been illustrated in the following figures.

Figure 32: Fund I Gross Performance – Top 30 Investments (As of 12/31/2020)

Investment	Invested Capital ($M)	Distributions ($M)	Residual Value ($M)	Gross DPI	Gross RVPI	Gross TVPI	Gross IRR
	$81.9	$141.0	$73.4	1.72x	0.90x	2.62x	33.9%
	$39.4	$22.1	$1.6	0.56x	0.04x	0.60x	-15.6%
	$29.7	$37.1	$0.0	1.25x	0.00x	1.25x	4.7%
	$28.3	$38.4	$0.0	1.36x	0.00x	1.36x	9.7%
	$25.9	$63.8	$1.2	2.46x	0.05x	2.51x	19.1%
	$25.0	$28.4	$0.0	1.14x	0.00x	1.14x	22.4%
	$25.0	$34.7	$8.5	1.39x	0.34x	1.73x	13.2%
	$24.6	$41.1	$0.0	1.67x	0.00x	1.67x	18.7%
Redacted	$23.9	$10.4	$0.0	0.44x	0.00x	0.44x	-27.2%
	$23.5	$20.1	$11.3	0.86x	0.48x	1.34x	7.1%
	$22.8	$31.0	$0.0	1.36x	0.00x	1.36x	18.5%
	$21.6	$29.5	$0.0	1.37x	0.00x	1.37x	21.4%
	$18.1	$21.2	$0.0	1.17x	0.00x	1.17x	7.7%
	$17.8	$19.4	$0.0	1.09x	0.00x	1.09x	9.1%
	$16.7	$31.3	$0.0	1.87x	0.00x	1.87x	27.2%
	$16.1	$46.7	$0.0	2.90x	0.00x	2.90x	29.1%
	$15.9	$27.0	$0.0	1.70x	0.00x	1.70x	37.1%

	$15.6	$19.8	$0.0	1.27x	0.00x	1.27x	15.1%
	$15.3	$22.0	$0.0	1.44x	0.00x	1.44x	111.0%
	$15.2	$19.4	$0.0	1.28x	0.00x	1.28x	24.1%
	$15.1	$19.0	$0.0	1.26x	0.00x	1.26x	104.2%
	$14.9	$15.1	$0.0	1.01x	0.00x	1.01x	3.4%
	$14.3	$23.4	$0.0	1.64x	0.00x	1.64x	44.8%
Redacted	$13.9	$25.0	$0.0	1.80x	0.00x	1.80x	15.8%
	$13.8	$27.8	$0.0	2.01x	0.00x	2.01x	92.0%
	$13.0	$16.0	$0.0	1.23x	0.00x	1.23x	32.1%
	$12.4	$3.6	$0.0	0.29x	0.00x	0.29x	-72.9%
	$11.5	$16.8	$0.0	1.46x	0.00x	1.46x	37.5%
	$11.2	$13.9	$0.0	1.24x	0.00x	1.24x	40.5%
	$11.1	$16.6	$0.0	1.50x	0.00x	1.50x	446.2%

Figure 33: Fund II Gross Performance – Top 30 Investments (As of 12/31/2020)

Investment	Invested Capital ($M)	Distributions ($M)	Residual Value ($M)	Gross DPI	Gross RVPI	Gross TVPI	Gross IRR
	$149.1	$191.4	$345.8	1.28x	2.32x	3.60x	47.4%
	$105.3	$165.7	$89.5	1.57x	0.85x	2.42x	32.2%
	$100.9	$149.2	$0.3	1.48x	0.00x	1.48x	99.5%
	$93.8	$74.1	$119.2	0.79x	1.27x	2.06x	19.3%
	$79.4	$58.3	$45.0	0.73x	0.57x	1.30x	7.2%
	$79.3	$134.0	$0.0	1.69x	0.00x	1.69x	38.4%
	$77.9	$12.4	$19.5	0.16x	0.25x	0.41x	-15.4%
	$69.6	$146.5	$0.0	2.10x	0.00x	2.10x	99.6%
	$69.4	$96.4	$0.0	1.39x	0.00x	1.39x	16.6%
	$64.6	$76.7	$0.0	1.19x	0.00x	1.19x	21.1%
	$62.6	$62.9	$0.0	1.00x	0.00x	1.00x	0.6%
	$59.2	$73.3	$0.0	1.24x	0.00x	1.24x	18.7%
	$58.7	$6.3	$0.0	0.11x	0.00x	0.11x	-63.3%
Redacted	$57.5	$44.9	$34.0	0.78x	0.59x	1.37x	7.0%
	$46.8	$87.2	$0.0	1.86x	0.00x	1.86x	27.9%
	$45.9	$33.7	$0.0	0.73x	0.00x	0.73x	-22.9%
	$41.7	$41.1	$0.0	0.99x	0.00x	0.99x	-1.7%
	$40.2	$57.8	$0.0	1.44x	0.00x	1.44x	11.7%
	$37.6	$13.0	$33.6	0.35x	0.89x	1.24x	4.5%
	$36.8	$80.4	$0.0	2.18x	0.00x	2.18x	50.6%
	$36.8	$77.4	$0.0	2.10x	0.00x	2.10x	20.3%
	$35.6	$45.9	$0.2	1.29x	0.01x	1.29x	9.4%
	$34.9	$39.0	$0.0	1.12x	0.00x	1.12x	6.7%
	$28.4	$3.7	$9.6	0.13x	0.34x	0.47x	-11.4%
	$26.5	$2.1	$0.0	0.08x	0.00x	0.08x	-67.2%
	$26.2	$59.8	$0.0	2.28x	0.00x	2.28x	19.0%
	$25.2	$10.1	$0.0	0.40x	0.00x	0.40x	-31.9%

Redacted	$25.2	$29.4	$0.0	1.17x	0.00x	1.17x	55.9%
	$25.1	$31.7	$0.0	1.26x	0.00x	1.26x	19.7%
	$24.9	$32.3	$0.0	1.30x	0.00x	1.30x	152.0%

Figure 34: Fund III Gross Performance – Top 30 Investments (As of 12/31/2020)

Investment	Invested Capital ($M)	Distributions ($M)	Residual Value ($M)	Gross DPI	Gross RVPI	Gross TVPI	Gross IRR
Redacted	$197.5	$42.3	$291.6	0.21x	1.48x	1.69x	18.1%
	$165.4	$21.3	$218.9	0.13x	1.32x	1.45x	10.0%
	$158.4	$553.1	$0.0	3.49x	0.00x	3.49x	68.9%
	$152.4	$82.5	$366.5	0.54x	2.40x	2.95x	40.7%
	$145.8	$18.0	$287.9	0.12x	1.97x	2.10x	23.3%
	$103.1	$7.4	$0.0	0.07x	0.00x	0.07x	-75.5%
	$100.8	$131.4	$0.0	1.30x	0.00x	1.30x	16.8%
	$95.9	$158.5	$0.0	1.65x	0.00x	1.65x	22.2%
	$88.0	$117.2	$0.0	1.33x	0.00x	1.33x	44.5%
	$73.9	$24.0	$185.3	0.32x	2.51x	2.83x	31.0%
	$62.4	$46.4	$16.9	0.74x	0.27x	1.01x	0.6%
	$60.3	$8.2	$16.8	0.14x	0.28x	0.41x	-15.0%
	$59.9	$53.2	$20.6	0.89x	0.34x	1.23x	10.7%
	$59.1	$68.4	$58.6	1.16x	0.99x	2.15x	22.5%
	$56.9	$83.5	$31.5	1.47x	0.55x	2.02x	41.7%
	$56.8	$58.6	$0.0	1.03x	0.00x	1.03x	4.1%
	$56.6	$1.8	$9.8	0.03x	0.17x	0.20x	-28.9%
	$51.9	$62.1	$4.9	1.20x	0.09x	1.29x	35.9%
	$51.3	$0.0	$47.3	0.00x	0.92x	0.92x	-3.5%
	$46.8	$19.0	$1.7	0.41x	0.04x	0.44x	-39.0%
	$43.9	$77.3	$0.0	1.76x	0.00x	1.76x	50.6%
	$40.3	$20.8	$0.0	0.52x	0.00x	0.52x	-30.4%
	$40.3	$48.3	$8.3	1.20x	0.21x	1.40x	23.0%
	$40.2	$19.7	$0.0	0.49x	0.00x	0.49x	-24.9%
	$40.0	$0.0	$0.0	0.00x	0.00x	0.00x	-88.2%
	$38.8	$19.7	$49.8	0.51x	1.28x	1.79x	19.5%
	$33.3	$3.4	$0.0	0.10x	0.00x	0.10x	-69.2%
	$31.8	$30.7	$0.0	0.97x	0.00x	0.97x	-1.2%
	$30.8	$20.6	$15.6	0.67x	0.51x	1.18x	3.5%
	$30.2	$101.5	$0.0	3.36x	0.00x	3.36x	72.8%

Figure 35: Fund IV Gross Performance – Top 30 Investments (As of 12/31/2020)

Investment	Invested Capital ($M)	Distributions ($M)	Residual Value ($M)	Gross DPI	Gross RVPI	Gross TVPI	Gross IRR
Redacted	$454.6	$479.8	$243.4	1.06x	0.54x	1.59x	40.1%
	$330.4	$77.1	$318.5	0.23x	0.96x	1.20x	49.9%
	$167.7	$3.0	$173.4	0.02x	1.03x	1.05x	2.8%

Redacted

$156.3	$27.9	$208.0	0.18x	1.33x	1.51x	222.5%
$151.1	$14.4	$39.2	0.10x	0.26x	0.35x	-46.2%
$150.5	$15.7	$197.4	0.10x	1.31x	1.42x	16.5%
$125.4	$0.0	$134.7	0.00x	1.07x	1.07x	39.7%
$124.5	$0.0	$137.9	0.00x	1.11x	1.11x	54.5%
$123.7	$0.0	$133.0	0.00x	1.08x	1.08x	22.0%
$121.7	$0.0	$131.2	0.00x	1.08x	1.08x	NM
$100.4	$0.2	$0.0	0.00x	0.00x	0.00x	-96.9%
$99.9	$6.6	$0.0	0.07x	0.00x	0.07x	-81.6%
$88.1	$0.6	$189.1	0.01x	2.15x	2.15x	79.0%
$86.1	$7.3	$102.4	0.08x	1.19x	1.27x	95.3%
$73.9	$5.2	$84.0	0.07x	1.14x	1.21x	11.2%
$72.2	$0.0	$85.8	0.00x	1.19x	1.19x	62.7%
$60.9	$4.9	$72.3	0.08x	1.19x	1.27x	53.2%
$49.0	$6.2	$54.6	0.13x	1.11x	1.24x	47.8%
$45.1	$42.4	$0.0	0.94x	0.00x	0.94x	-8.2%
$44.6	$0.0	$132.6	0.00x	2.97x	2.97x	78.4%
$41.4	$7.7	$300.9	0.19x	7.27x	7.45x	89.4%
$41.3	$1.6	$47.2	0.04x	1.14x	1.18x	42.1%
$39.1	$0.0	$38.7	0.00x	0.99x	0.99x	NM
$37.9	$50.3	$0.0	1.33x	0.00x	1.33x	79.4%
$37.8	$46.7	$7.1	1.24x	0.19x	1.42x	38.5%
$36.6	$14.3	$23.6	0.39x	0.64x	1.04x	13.7%
$36.2	$0.0	$32.0	0.00x	0.88x	0.88x	-5.2%
$35.3	$15.8	$22.0	0.45x	0.62x	1.07x	39.2%
$30.9	$17.7	$32.8	0.57x	1.06x	1.63x	165.7%
$30.2	$1.0	$40.7	0.03x	1.35x	1.38x	34.8%

Figure 36: Sample Firm Hedge Fund – Comparative Performance (As of 12/31/2020)

	1 Year	5 Years	10 Years	15 Years	2010	2009	Since Incep. (9/2002)
Sample Firm Hedge Fund	**9.2%**	**7.7%**	**5.0%**	**5.7%**	**13.2%**	**19.2%**	**8.8%**
HFRI ED Distr'd Restructuring Index	12.2%	6.8%	4.5%	4.8%	12.1%	28.1%	7.1%
Difference	-3.0%	0.9%	0.5%	0.9%	1.1%	-8.9%	1.7%
50% HY / 50% Bank Loans Index	4.9%	6.9%	5.6%	6.0%	12.5%	51.5%	6.8%
Difference	4.3%	0.8%	-0.6%	-0.3%	0.7%	-32.3%	2.0%
S&P 500 Index	18.4%	15.2%	13.9%	9.9%	15.1%	26.5%	10.2%
Difference	-9.2%	-7.5%	-8.9%	-4.2%	-1.9%	-7.3%	-1.4%

Source: Sample Distressed Debt Firm, RVK. Data as of 12/31/2020. Sample Firm Hedge Fund performance is net of fees. The HFRI ED Distr'd Restructuring Index is the HFRI Event Driven Distressed Restructuring Index. The 50% HY / 50% Bank Loans Index is represented by the 50% Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate High Yield Index/50% Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index.

The performance of Sample Firm's open-ended hedge fund, which was launched at the Firm's inception in 2002 and currently manages approximately $1.7 billion in assets, is illustrated above in Figure 36. This fund employs a slightly different strategy than the flagship closed-end fund series by investing in a greater proportion of trading-oriented opportunities and running a hedge program to manage tail risk. While the strategy's profile is not identical to Fund V, we are encouraged by the fund's outperformance over its peer group of nearly 2% since inception, as measured by the HFRI Event Driven Distressed Restructuring Index. This indicates that Sample Firm has consistently outperformed its peer group in both its evergreen and closed-end strategies over a full market cycle. However, we believe that investors with sufficient tolerance for illiquidity and risk are likely to capture significantly stronger long-term performance through the closed-end fund series.

Attribution Analysis

The following section analyzes the asset-level gross performance of Sample Firm's underlying investments broken out by various attribution characteristics. The focus of our analysis is on the gross multiple (TVPI or Total Value to Paid in Capital), as we believe this performance metric is an overall superior indication of long-term wealth generation.

As illustrated in Figure 37, over 90% of Sample Firm's track record has either already been realized, or is partially realized and in the process of exiting, allowing for a robust evaluation of what this strategy series can achieve. As noted earlier in this report, the average gross multiple of Sample Firm's realized and partially realized investments is compelling relative to those of most peers, at 1.26x and 1.57x, respectively.

Figure 37: Attribution – Realized / Unrealized

Realized / Unrealized	Count	Invested Capital ($M)	% of Invested Capital	Avg Gross DPI	Avg Gross RVPI	Avg Gross TVPI
Unrealized	30	$881.0	9%	0.00x	1.16x	1.16x
Partially Realized	70	$4,587.3	49%	0.57x	1.00x	1.57x
Realized	316	$3,860.5	41%	1.26x	0.00x	1.26x

Sample Firm's track record has been attractive across most industries, with the notable exceptions of energy and shipping, as seen in the following Figure 38. Excluding these two industries, Sample Firm's average gross multiple rises to approximately 1.4x. However, among energy and shipping investments specifically, which account for approximately 12% of the track record's invested capital, the average gross multiple has only reached a disappointing 0.63x. Analyzing this trend further, nearly 80% of the 49 total energy and shipping investments in the track record have resulted in a loss, and seven out of Sample Firm's ten worst losses in its track record history are from these two industries. Given this level of loss, it is worth noting that there have been many distressed debt investors that have been "burned" in energy or shipping investments over the past several years, with unexpected volatility in oil prices and shipping demand resulting in depressed market price valuations. RVK is aware of several other top-tier distressed debt strategies that have also struggled investing in the energy and shipping industries. As such, we view this return pattern as an endemic issue across the distressed debt landscape, as opposed to being entirely unique to Sample Firm.

That being said, in light of this poor performance, RVK had an in-depth discussion with Sample Firm's senior investors about the pipeline and forward deployment expectations in these underperforming industries, in which we sought to gauge the level of exposure to these historical problem sectors that RVK clients would likely face. Importantly, Sample Firm has greatly deemphasized energy and shipping investment opportunities over the past few years, and these industries are not expected to be a meaningful portion of Fund V. Specifically, there has been only one shipping investment in the strategy since 2016, and one energy investment since 2018. Furthermore, there are currently no shipping investments and only a few energy investments that the team is evaluating in its investment pipeline. We strongly support Sample Firm's decision to de-emphasize these industry verticals from its strategy, and believe this may lead to fewer strategy losses moving forward, as discussed in detail in the upcoming Capital Risk of Loss section and illustrated in Figure 47. Additionally, with fewer dollars invested in energy and shipping, a greater proportion of Fund V's capital will be invested in industries in which Sample Firm has demonstrated skill and achieved attractive historical performance.

Figure 38: Attribution – Industry / Asset

Industry / Asset	Count	Invested Capital ($M)	% of Invested Capital	Avg Gross DPI	Avg Gross RVPI	Avg Gross TVPI
Infrastructure	37	$1,280.1	14%	1.07x	0.42x	1.49x
Liquidations	39	$980.9	11%	1.17x	0.15x	1.32x
Real Estate	60	$930.5	10%	1.12x	0.19x	1.31x
Power	19	$783.8	8%	1.18x	0.11x	1.28x
Energy	19	$713.8	8%	0.44x	0.12x	0.57x
Industrial	17	$697.1	7%	1.24x	0.19x	1.43x
Packaging	11	$663.6	7%	1.16x	0.81x	1.97x
Consumer Discretionary	29	$613.0	7%	1.06x	0.19x	1.25x
Shipping	20	$395.5	4%	0.67x	0.03x	0.69x
Building Products	5	$351.6	4%	0.36x	1.32x	1.68x
Manufacturing	20	$319.9	3%	1.29x	0.15x	1.44x
Housing	31	$258.7	3%	1.41x	0.08x	1.49x
Gaming/Leisure	17	$249.8	3%	1.08x	0.14x	1.22x
Media/Telecom	25	$234.5	3%	1.15x	0.06x	1.22x
Other	67	$856.0	9%	0.90x	0.51x	1.40x

"Other" includes a total of 11 industries that make up 2% or less of invested capital and includes Air Transportation, Chemicals, and Healthcare, among other industries. Data as of 12/31/2020.

The track record's performance by vintage year has been illustrated in Figure 39 and demonstrates strong performance across most years, including an average gross multiple of 1.30x or greater in eight of the past thirteen vintage years. The only poor vintage year performance is currently 2018. The nine investments from 2018 have an average gross multiple of 0.91x, which is largely due to two energy investments that have resulted in outsized losses. As mentioned earlier, Sample Firm's track record in energy has been especially poor, though energy is not expected to be a meaningful proportion of Sample Firm's strategy focus moving forward.

Figure 39: Attribution – Vintage Year

Vintage Year	Count	Invested Capital ($M)	% of Invested Capital	Avg Gross DPI	Avg Gross RVPI	Avg Gross TVPI
2008	4	$30.2	0%	1.36x	0.00x	1.36x
2009	51	$464.5	5%	1.40x	0.02x	1.42x
2010	42	$330.6	4%	1.32x	0.00x	1.32x
2011	79	$947.0	10%	1.30x	0.12x	1.42x
2012	18	$475.7	5%	1.37x	0.00x	1.37x
2013	37	$918.3	10%	1.11x	0.08x	1.20x
2014	51	$1,194.6	13%	1.08x	0.13x	1.20x
2015	23	$767.9	8%	0.79x	0.36x	1.14x
2016	16	$406.2	4%	1.05x	0.88x	1.93x
2017	19	$1,412.9	15%	0.62x	0.78x	1.40x
2018	9	$343.5	4%	0.59x	0.32x	0.91x
2019	13	$254.3	3%	0.63x	0.77x	1.40x
2020	54	$1,783.1	19%	0.45x	0.65x	1.10x

The track record's performance by region and country is illustrated in Figure 40. Sample Firm has demonstrated stable performance across both North America and Europe, with a slightly higher average gross multiple across its European investments, indicating that the prominence of European investments in this strategy series is likely justified. Additionally, performance has been strong across most countries as well, with the exception Norway, which has experienced a few losses (all shipping and energy investments). Fund V's primary geographic focus will be the United States and Western Europe, regions in which Sample Firm has demonstrated historical average gross multiples that are typically in the range of 1.2x to 1.5x.

Figure 40: Attribution – Region

Region	Count	Invested Capital ($M)	% of Invested Capital	Avg Gross DPI	Avg Gross RVPI	Avg Gross TVPI
North America	205	$4,758.0	51%	1.06x	0.17x	1.24x
Europe	171	$4,319.1	46%	1.02x	0.38x	1.39x
Rest of World	40	$251.7	3%	1.19x	0.13x	1.32x
Country	**Count**	**Invested Capital ($M)**	**% of Invested Capital**	**Avg Gross DPI**	**Avg Gross RVPI**	**Avg Gross TVPI**
United States	207	$4,803.3	51%	1.04x	0.19x	1.23x
United Kingdom	51	$994.7	11%	1.12x	0.41x	1.53x
Germany	34	$755.8	8%	1.22x	0.34x	1.56x
Spain	21	$680.4	7%	0.74x	0.38x	1.12x
Switzerland	5	$466.8	5%	1.07x	0.41x	1.48x
Poland	5	$354.3	4%	0.49x	1.17x	1.67x
France	11	$306.3	3%	1.02x	0.20x	1.21x
Portugal	6	$204.3	2%	0.42x	1.43x	1.85x
Norway	5	$176.1	2%	0.57x	0.25x	0.82x
Japan	23	$148.6	2%	1.62x	0.00x	1.62x
Other	48	$438.2	5%	1.01x	0.12x	1.13x

"Other" includes 14 total countries with less than 1% of invested capital, including Austria, Ireland, and Italy, among others.

Finally, Sample Firm's track record has been analyzed by invested capital amount. Performance is relatively constant across all investment sizes. Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 41, the performance of the "massive" investments, which we have defined as all investment sizes greater than $150 million, is especially compelling, with an average gross multiple of 1.67x. Many of these portfolio companies represent Sample Firm's highest conviction opportunities in which a sizable investment is built up over time with Sample Firm typically taking a control portion of equity following a restructuring. As such, we believe these results are an authentic indication that Sample Firm's restructuring skill and ability to manage portfolio companies has led to outsized absolute returns. Importantly, this breakdown also demonstrates a lack of dependence on small investment sizes for outsized returns – a crucial pattern for a fund series that continues to increase in scale.

Figure 41: Attribution – Invested Capital Amount

Invested Capital Amount	Count	Invested Capital ($M)	% of Invested Capital	Avg Gross DPI	Avg Gross RVPI	Avg Gross TVPI
Micro (<$10M)	228	$732.9	8%	1.19x	0.10x	1.28x
Small ($10M - $30M)	101	$1,726.1	19%	1.04x	0.23x	1.27x
Medium ($30M - $50M)	36	$1,376.8	15%	0.81x	0.62x	1.43x
Large ($50-$150M)	41	$3,408.7	37%	0.71x	0.64x	1.34x
Massive (>$150M)	10	$2,084.3	22%	0.61x	1.06x	1.67x

Sensitivity Analysis

A sensitivity analysis was performed on Sample Firm's track record to determine the strategy's consistency of return and the relative impact of key portfolio investments; in other words, to what degree did the best and worst performing investments change the results of the fund series' long-term performance. Investments were ranked by contribution to each fund's profit and loss. Cash flows and performance for the top and bottom one, three, and five investments were then removed, with the resulting change to each fund's weighted average gross multiple recorded. The results from this process are shown in the following figures.

The results suggest the fund series is highly sensitive to its best performing investments, while only moderately sensitive to its worst performing investments. The weighted average gross multiples of the fund series decline by approximately 0.2x to 0.4x by removing the top five investments; however, gross multiples are still positive and in the approximate range of 1.2x to 1.3x for the first three funds and over 1.0x for Fund IV. Despite this level of upside sensitivity demonstrated by the track record, this is within our expectations for a distressed-for-control strategy, which are typically expected to generate substantial value creation through a handful of large control investments. We would expect this effect to be especially strong for strategy series such as this one, where extensive operational improvements are typically part of the manager's core thesis for its largest holdings. It is, however, encouraging to uncover significantly more limited downside sensitivity, as this is likely indicative that the risk control processes applied to the strategy series have historically been effective.

Figure 42: Fund I Sensitivity Analysis (As of 12/31/2020)

Performance Excluding	Number of Investments	Weighted Average Gross TVPI	Difference
No Exclusions	125	1.50x	-
Excluding Highest	124	1.40x	-0.10x
Excluding 3 Highest	122	1.34x	-0.16x
Excluding 5 Highest	120	1.30x	-0.20x
Excluding Lowest	124	1.54x	0.04x
Excluding 3 Lowest	122	1.58x	0.08x
Excluding 5 Lowest	120	1.59x	0.09x

Figure 43: Fund II Sensitivity Analysis (As of 12/31/2020)

Performance Excluding	Number of Investments	Weighted Average Gross TVPI	Difference
No Exclusions	118	1.49x	-
Excluding Highest	117	1.33x	-0.16x
Excluding 3 Highest	115	1.24x	-0.25x
Excluding 5 Highest	113	1.18x	-0.31x
Excluding Lowest	117	1.52x	0.03x
Excluding 3 Lowest	115	1.58x	0.09x
Excluding 5 Lowest	113	1.61x	0.12x

Figure 44: Fund III Sensitivity Analysis (As of 12/31/2020)

Performance Excluding	Number of Investments	Weighted Average Gross TVPI	Difference
No Exclusions	84	1.58x	-
Excluding Highest	83	1.45x	-0.13x
Excluding 3 Highest	81	1.30x	-0.28x
Excluding 5 Highest	79	1.19x	-0.39x
Excluding Lowest	83	1.64x	0.06x
Excluding 3 Lowest	81	1.70x	0.12x
Excluding 5 Lowest	79	1.75x	0.17x

Figure 45: Fund IV Sensitivity Analysis (As of 12/31/2020)

Performance Excluding	Number of Investments	Weighted Average Gross TVPI	Difference
No Exclusions	89	1.26x	-
Excluding Highest	88	1.21x	-0.05x
Excluding 3 Highest	86	1.09x	-0.17x
Excluding 5 Highest	84	1.03x	-0.23x
Excluding Lowest	88	1.29x	0.03x
Excluding 3 Lowest	86	1.38x	0.12x
Excluding 5 Lowest	84	1.39x	0.13x

Capital Risk of Loss Analysis

Investing in private markets inherently involves less control over capital flows than public markets; as such, any private investment strategy should be carefully evaluated for its effectiveness in avoiding the long-term loss of capital. In the following analysis, data has been aggregated by fund for investments with a gross multiple of below 1.0x in order to calculate the Win/Loss Ratio and Total Loss Ratio of the track record. The Win/Loss Ratio (frequently referred to as the "batting average" of a strategy series), is the number of past investments with a gross multiple of above 1.0x divided by the total number of past investments. The Total Loss Ratio is the total percentage of the strategy's invested capital that is either currently held at a loss but is unrealized, or has already been realized as a loss.

As illustrated in Figure 46, the strategy's Total Loss Ratio is 10%; in line with our expectations for a distressed debt strategy, in which Total Loss Ratios of 10% or higher are typical and indicative of generally elevated risk relative to strategies focused on more stable borrowers. However, this Total Loss Ratio falls below that expected of most private equity buyout strategies, which typically produce Total Loss Ratios of 10% to 15%. Additionally, the strategy's Win/Loss Ratio is 78%, which is above our expectations for a distressed debt strategy and is higher than those of the majority of distressed strategies reviewed by RVK, which typically exhibit Win/Loss Ratios in the range of 60% to 75%. As we highlighted earlier, we believe this high Win/Loss Ratio is the result of a greater than average degree of accuracy and strategy conservatism through a focus on senior debt within an asset class that often involves significant credit risk and volatility, as well as the risk control offered by Sample Firm's multiple sources of added value at the level of portfolio company operations.

Figure 46: Capital Risk of Loss (As of 12/31/2020)

Fund	Vintage Year	Win/Loss Ratio	% of Invested Capital Held Below Cost	Total Loss Ratio
Fund I	2008	87%	10%	4.7%
Fund II	2010	79%	18%	9.1%
Fund III	2013	65%	25%	14.2%
Fund IV	2017	78%	16%	9.0%
Total		78%	18%	10.0%

As mentioned earlier, this strategy has suffered heavy losses within two industries in particular: shipping and energy. Since Sample Firm has greatly deemphasized these two industries from the strategy moving forward and neither industry is expected to be a meaningful portion of Fund V, we have supplemented this report with a Capital Risk of Loss analysis for the track record excluding all investments within these two industries. The results of this analysis have been illustrated in Figure 47 below. The strategy's Win/Loss Ratio increases modestly from 78% to 84%, while the Total Loss Ratio is significantly reduced from 10% to nearly 3%. We believe that these results may indicate the potential for improved loss rates for the fund series moving forward now that Sample Firm has deemphasized energy and shipping investments from Fund V.

Figure 47: Capital Risk of Loss – Excluding Energy and Shipping (As of 12/31/2020)

Fund	Vintage Year	Win/Loss Ratio	% of Invested Capital Held Below Cost	Total Loss Ratio
Fund I	2008	89%	9%	3.9%
Fund II	2010	84%	12%	5.2%
Fund III	2013	79%	13%	4.2%
Fund IV	2017	81%	7%	0.8%
Total		84%	10%	3.1%

Excludes all track record investments in the energy and shipping industry.

Reference Calls

RVK engaged in reference calls with one current and one former limited partner (LP), the executive management from two current portfolio companies, and a distressed debt investment manager that has invested alongside Sample Firm. In summary, Sample Firm's reference calls were favorable, introducing no new concerns and consistently emphasizing Sample Firm's high degree of investment sophistication, heavy level of active involvement with its control investments, and collaborative mentality with both portfolio company executive partners as well as LPs. The prominent feedback and major themes that emerged from our reference calls with each party are described in detail below.

The former and current LPs with whom RVK conducted reference calls with have been Sample Firm investors since 2017 and 2011, respectively.

Former LP

- The former LP is an investor in Fund IV, but has decided to not re-up for Fund V due to a newly established governance policy to reduce portfolio-level risk by putting high-risk strategies on hold indefinitely (including distressed debt). Importantly, there were no concerns with the Sample Firm strategy or team that inhibited a re-up for Fund V.
- The former LP, who is an investor in several other distressed debt strategies as well, believes Sample Firm is one of the top-tier distressed debt firms in its peer group, especially with regards to its distressed-for-control capabilities.
- The former LP was highly complementary of Sample Firm's investor relations efforts, citing detailed reporting, informative quarterly letters and update calls, and proactive investor correspondence as the primary reasons that Sample Firm is a useful general partner to work with.

Current LP

- The current LP has been an investor with Sample Firm for a decade, and continues to believe that it is one of the best distressed debt offerings within its peer group due to the strategy's gradually improving absolute performance over the past 10 years.
- While there have been no "red flags" over the past decade, the current LP is monitoring Sample Firm's recent staff turnover and pace of exits. However, the LP maintains strong overall confidence in the senior investment team despite the recent turnover.

The executive management of two current Sample Firm portfolio companies with which RVK conducted reference calls with have been working closely with Sample Firm since 2017 and 2019, respectively. One individual is portfolio company A's current CEO while the other individual is portfolio company B's former CEO and current executive chairman (company names redacted).

Company A

- Sample Firm played a pivotal role in the company reorganization process, including working through legal settlements and formulating company strategy. While many distressed debt firms have been difficult to work with during the reorganization, Sample Firm was a true partner and successfully built trust with the company's management team.

- Sample Firm's model for operational improvement was highly effective; including hiring CEOs with operational backgrounds, recruiting board members with industry experience, and aligning the compensation of executives with the company's performance.

- Following the company's successful reorganization, Sample Firm is the majority equity shareholder and remains actively involved in company operations and oversight, including monthly attendance at company board meetings.

Company B

- Sample Firm was instrumental during the company's reorganization on both the operational and financial side. Sample Firm's deep knowledge of the company and industry is impressive, and helped the company avoid common pitfalls during the reorganization.

- Sample Firm was "incredibly supportive and helpful" during the reorganization. This executive would be comfortable working with Sample Firm again because they have been "great partners".

- Sample Firm is the majority equity shareholder and is highly involved with oversight, including weekly check-in calls and monthly board meetings. It is not uncommon for Sample Firm to spend several hours with the company on consecutive days to assist with financing solutions.

The distressed debt firm used as a reference check has a long tenure investing in the industry, and in RVK's view, is one of the most well-respected market participants within its peer group. This firm has invested alongside Sample Firm on a few occasions.

Peer Distressed Debt Investment Manager

- Since it is frequently seeking control equity positions, Sample Firm typically does not work closely with other investment firms in the creditor group, preferring to work directly with the company management team or board to formulate a restructuring plan. As such, this firm does not work closely with Sample Firm despite its relatively similar strategy profile.

- In this firm's view, Sample Firm tends to have a more aggressive restructuring strategy than its peers, and may not always "play nice" with other investment firms in a creditor group or steering committee.

- This firm believes Sample Firm is extremely capable in its distressed activity within Europe specifically, calling this geographic region Sample Firm’s “bread and butter”.

BIOGRAPHIES OF KEY PERSONNEL

Employee A – Founder and CIO

Redacted

Employee C – Managing Director and Global Head of Sourcing

Redacted

Employee E – Managing Director and Co-Head of the North America Investment Team

Redacted

Employee B – Managing Director and Co-Head of European Investment Team

Redacted

Employee D – Managing Director and Co-Head of European Investment Team

Redacted

SUMMARY OF FUND TERMS

RVK has conducted a basic review of the Fund's terms and documentation, resulting in the following key observations of which we believe prospective investors should be made aware. As always, we recommend that prospective investors use these key observations in conjunction with a complete documentation review conducted by authorized legal counsel.

Fees – Fund V's fees are toward the top of the typical spectrum for distressed debt strategies. We regard Fund V's management fee of 1.75% to be slightly above average for this type of product, where best practice fees are regularly around 1.5%. Furthermore, management fees are charged on committed capital as opposed to invested capital, which we believe does not represent a best practice fee structure. However, the management fee structure includes three phases, in which fees are discounted until more than 50% of the Fund's capital has been called. While this structure will reduce fees paid at the beginning of the Fund's life, it will still result in a greater amount of total fees paid over the Fund's life relative to peers that only charge management fees on invested capital. Sample Firm's fee offset policy is another mitigating factor, in which transaction fees, break-up fees, and monitoring fees paid by Sample Firm's borrower companies will serve to offset the management fees of the Fund, a policy that represents current industry best practices.

Fund Life – Fund V's stated fund life of seven years is near the average term for distressed debt funds. However, it is important to note that the terms of past iterations of funds in this fund series have been longer than initially advertised, as Funds I and II have had multiple harvest period extensions. As we highlighted earlier, the remaining investments held in these funds are primarily equity positions in portfolio companies in which Sample Firm has restructured and been actively involved in throughout their life, and the returns across these investments are meaningfully higher than the track record's average. Therefore, while investors need to be aware that Fund V's term may ultimately be longer than the stated seven years due to the use of multiple extensions in the past, Sample Firm has historically demonstrated accuracy and skill with its long-held positions, which has subsequently driven top quartile performance in the fund series. Finally, it is worth reiterating that as with most distressed debt investments, we believe this product is likely inappropriate for investors with a low tolerance for illiquid investments.

Fund-Level Leverage – Sample Firm will employ no leverage beyond borrowing through a short-term credit facility that is intended for numerous small cash movements and to smooth the capital calls it requests of its investors. This short-term credit facility is may be up to 20% of the Fund's aggregate commitments, which is within the bounds of market standards for a distressed debt fund. We believe this lack of material leverage is likely to mitigate any losses faced by the strategy in the event of a major credit correction or economic downturn. Furthermore, by using a short-term credit facility rather than keeping extra cash on hand from investors, the Fund will experience reduced cash drag, thereby increasing its performance potential. In general, given the expectation of a high overall credit risk profile, RVK generally does not advocate the use of long-term leverage among strategies focused on distressed debt investing.

Fund Expenses – Given the outsized impact that expenses often have on returns in the distressed debt space, where research and litigation related expenses often run especially high, it is worth noting that, while we are supportive of the presence of the $4.5 million organizational expense cap, this treatment of Fund expenses falls short of industry best practices. In particular, a best practices expense policy would cap the maximum amount of not only organizational but also operating expenses that could be charged to limited partners. Operating expenses can include some of the highest-cost expense categories for a distressed debt strategy, such as those tied to investment-related research and litigation activities. As such, we strongly prefer that these be encompassed by the expense caps used by distressed debt offerings. However, one mitigating factor to this best practice shortfall is the fact that the annual operating expense rate of the prior fund in the fund series has been confined to approximately 0.4% of committed capital, compared to annual expense rates of greater than 1% for many peers of Sample Firm's approximate size. The Agreement's language limiting which expense types may be charged to investors was also relatively thorough and appropriate.

Investment Guidelines – We view the investment guidelines currently listed in the Limited Partnership Agreement to be generally within market standard, including geographic and single issuer limitations, among others. However, we recommend that the informal strategy parameters already followed by Sample Firm be outlined more completely in the Fund's Agreement. Specifically, no official investment guidelines regarding maximum exposures to single industries or maximum exposures to non-senior debt were present, in spite of the fact that Sample Firm has informal guidelines relating to these portfolio construction dimensions in place. As such, there are no official prohibitions preventing the strategy from pursuing extreme levels of increased risk or "style drift" relative to prior funds with regards to industry diversification or non-senior debt exposure. RVK has requested that Sample Firm formalize these investment guidelines in the Limited Partnership Agreement.

Allocation Policy – Sample Firm's Allocation Policy is generally favorable for this fund series and limits potential overlap with Sample Firm's other strategies, including the hedge fund (Sample Firm Hedge Fund) and the recently raised dislocation fund (Sample Firm Dislocation Fund). Specifically, Fund V and the dislocation fund will receive priority over the hedge fund for all investments that are determined to be illiquid, which is the primary investment type for Fund V. The dislocation fund is a closed-end fund that was raised in mid-2020 in response to the opportunity created by the pandemic. This fund has a relatively short investment period of two years and is already expected to be 70% called by the first close of Fund V; as such, this fund is not expected to materially detract from the opportunity set available to Fund V. Additionally, Fund V will receive its pro rata allocation of all investments that are determined to be liquid, though these investments are not expected to be a meaningful part of Fund V's strategy. The allocation policy has typically resulted in an average level of historical overlap of less than 60% between the fund series and the hedge fund. This, in turn, limits the possibility of a negative impact from any large-scale hedge fund redemptions that take place during Fund V's lifetime, as such redemptions may have the potential to force the sale of investments held in common between the hedge fund and Fund V. In summary, we view Sample Firm's favorable Allocation Policy for Fund V to be a necessary element in allowing RVK to recommend this strategy to our clients.

CONSULTING AGREEMENT

FOR SANTA BARBARA COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM

PROFESSIONAL INVESTMENT CONSULTANT SERVICES

This Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into as of the Effective Date as defined herein, by and between SANTA BARBARA COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, a public employees' retirement system organized under the laws of California, ("SBCERS") and R.V. Kuhns & Associates, Inc. d/b/a RVK, Inc., a corporation incorporated under the laws of Oregon ("CONSULTANT").

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, SBCERS requires expert consulting services to assist the Board of Retirement of SBCERS ("Board") in prudently diversifying and investing the assets of the retirement system; and

WHEREAS, CONSULTANT has submitted a proposal to provide investment consulting services to SBCERS and CONSULTANT represents that it has the experience, licenses, qualifications, staff and expertise to perform said services in a professional and competent manner; and

WHEREAS, the Board selected CONSULTANT to serve as SBCERS' Investment Consultant on a non-exclusive basis, subject to satisfactory negotiation of the terms and conditions of this Agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, it is mutually agreed by and between SBCERS and CONSULTANT that CONSULTANT shall provide the services to SBCERS on the terms and conditions set forth herein.

ARTICLE 1 - SCOPE OF WORK AND PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES

1.1 CONSULTANT agrees to furnish the services set forth in Exhibit A, Scope of Services, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference and any other services to which the parties agree in writing (collectively, the "Services"). Services shall include all documents, materials, reports, manuals, plans, and specifications related to the Services. In the event of any changes affecting the scope of the Services resulting from new findings, unanticipated conditions, or other conflicts or discrepancies, CONSULTANT shall promptly notify SBCERS in writing of the identified changes and advise SBCERS of the recommended solution. Work shall not be performed on such changes without SBCERS' prior written authorization.

1.2 The Services shall be completed and submitted in accordance with SBCERS' standards specified, and according to the schedule listed, in Exhibit A. The completion dates specified herein may be modified by mutual agreement between SBCERS and CONSULTANT provided that SBCERS' notifies CONSULTANT of modified completion dates in writing. CONSULTANT agrees to diligently perform the services to be provided under this Agreement. In the performance of this Agreement, time is of the essence.

1.3 As of the Effective Date and continuing through the Term (as hereinafter defined), CONSULTANT represents, warrants and agrees as follows:

(a) It is duly organized and in good standing in all jurisdictions in which it conducts its business.

(b) It has the professional skills and expertise necessary to perform the services to be performed under this Agreement and will provide SBCERS with expert advice and recommendations concerning the prudent administration and investment of the assets of the retirement system.

(c) It has all the appropriate licenses and professional certifications necessary to perform the services and shall maintain them during the term of this Agreement.

(d) It will perform the Services in accordance with the highest standards of skill and expertise prevailing in the business and profession of providing investment consulting services to public employee pension funds in the United States.

(e) It acknowledges that SBCERS is relying upon the professional skill and expertise of CONSULTANT to do and perform the Services.

(f) Acceptance by SBCERS of the Services shall not operate as a release of CONSULTANT from its professional responsibility for the Services.

During the Term, CONSULTANT shall promptly notify SBCERS in the event that any of the representations, warranties or agreements made in this Paragraph 1.3 ceases to be true and correct.

1.4 CONSULTANT is an independent contractor and not an employee of SBCERS. CONSULTANT expressly warrants that it will not represent to any third party for any reason that it is an employee of SBCERS.

1.5 CONSULTANT agrees to maintain in confidence and not disclose to any person or entity, without SBCERS' prior written consent, any confidential information, knowledge or data relating to the services, processes, or operations of SBCERS, including without limitation investment, financial, accounting, member and statistical information pertaining to SBCERS. CONSULTANT further agrees to maintain in confidence and not to disclose to any person or entity, any data, information, technology, or material developed or obtained by CONSULTANT on behalf of SBCERS during the Term of this Agreement.

1.6 The originals of all computations, drawings, designs, graphics, studies, reports, manuals, photographs, videotapes, data, computer files, and other documents prepared or caused to be prepared by CONSULTANT or others acting on its behalf in connection with performing the Services (collectively, "Documents") shall be delivered to and shall become the exclusive property of SBCERS. To the extent necessary, CONSULTANT hereby conveys a non-exclusive, irrevocable license to SBCERS in perpetuity to utilize the Documents for SBCERS' use, at its own risk. CONSULTANT may retain and use copies of such Documents, with written approval of SBCERS or as otherwise required by applicable law or regulation.

1.7 At all times during the Term of this Agreement, as herein defined, the Services shall be performed under the direct supervision of Marcia Beard and Matthias Bauer (the "Primary Consultants"). It is understood that no substitution for the Primary Consultants will be permitted without the express prior written consent of SBCERS, upon action of its Board of Retirement.

ARTICLE 2 - COMPENSATION

2.1 For the performance of the Services, SBCERS agrees to pay CONSULTANT the fees set forth in Exhibit B, attached hereto and incorporated herein.

2.2 In addition to the compensation provided for in Exhibit B, SBCERS agrees to reimburse CONSULTANT for reasonable expenses that CONSULTANT may incur as a result of extraordinary services required in the event of third party lawsuits involving SBCERS or affiliated persons or entities, and involving no allegations of wrongdoing by CONSULTANT, where CONSULTANT is required to respond to subpoenas or provide deposition or other legally required testimony. Such obligation to reimburse CONSULTANT shall not extend to CONSULTANT'S provision of assistance to SBCERS in responding to Public Records Act requests involving information in the possession of CONSULTANT, which assistance is deemed to be within the scope of Services for which compensation is paid as set forth in Exhibit B. CONSULTANT shall provide sufficient detail on its invoices, including copies of all receipts and underlying invoices, of expenses requested for reimbursement under this section. The detail should enable SBCERS to accurately assess and charge expenses to the appropriate account or the entity requesting the information.

ARTICLE 3 – TERM AND EFFECTIVE DATE

3.1 Unless sooner terminated in accordance with this Agreement, the term of this Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date, as defined herein, and continue through and including the date that is the fifth anniversary of the Effective Date ("Initial Term") and any extensions thereof. The Initial Term may be extended by the parties by mutual agreement, for not more than two successive twelve (12) month periods following the end of the Initial Term (any such successive twelve month period together with the Initial Term, the "Term").

3.2 This Agreement shall be effective as of June 1, 2021 ("Effective Date").

ARTICLE 4 - TERMINATION

4.1 This Agreement may be terminated by SBCERS for Cause upon one-day's written notice to CONSULTANT. "Cause" means: (a) CONSULTANT's breach of a material term of this Agreement or tortious conduct in connection with the performance the Services; (b) any intentional or grossly negligent misconduct by CONSULTANT in connection with the performance of the Services, its obligations under this Agreement, or otherwise; (c) the failure by either Primary Consultant to directly supervise the Services performed under this Agreement as set forth in Paragraph 1.7; and (d) any action is taken against CONSULTANT by any state or federal regulatory agency alleging violations of applicable law or any material claim by a third party arising out of the conduct of CONSULTANT's business. Prior to termination for reasons other than tortious conduct, intentional or grossly negligent misconduct or pending regulatory action, SBCERS shall provide CONSULTANT with 10 days' notice of its intent to terminate and the opportunity to cure deficiencies prior to the exercise of such notice.

This Agreement may be terminated by SBCERS without cause for any reason upon 30 days written notice to CONSULTANT. Prior to terminating the Agreement without cause, SBCERS shall endeavor informally to resolve any issue or dispute with CONSULTANT.

4.2 If this Agreement is terminated CONSULTANT shall be entitled to compensation for Services satisfactorily performed to the effective date of termination; provided however, that SBCERS may condition payment of such compensation upon CONSULTANT's delivery to SBCERS of any and all Documents provided to CONSULTANT or prepared by or on behalf of CONSULTANT for SBCERS in connection with this Agreement. Payment by SBCERS for the Services satisfactorily performed to the effective date of termination shall be the sole and exclusive remedy to which CONSULTANT is entitled in the event of termination of the Agreement and CONSULTANT shall be entitled to no other compensation or damages and expressly waives the same.

4.3 This Agreement may be terminated by CONSULTANT upon 30 days written notice to SBCERS only in the event of substantial failure by SBCERS to fulfill its material obligations under this Agreement through no fault of the CONSULTANT. Prior to terminating the Agreement, CONSULTANT shall provide SBCERS with the opportunity to cure any such substantial failures and shall also endeavor informally to resolve any issue or dispute with SBCERS. Following termination and upon request, CONSULTANT agrees to cooperate with SBCERS in arranging a satisfactory transition of investment consulting services to another consultant.

4.4 If this Agreement is terminated, payment to CONSULTANT for Services rendered shall be in proportion to the percentage of work that SBCERS judges satisfactorily performed up to the effective date of termination.

ARTICLE 5 - INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE

5.1 Indemnification

CONSULTANT expressly agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless SBCERS and its Board members, officers, directors, agents and employees, from and against any and all loss, liability, expense, claims, demands, suits, and damages, including attorneys' fees, arising out of or resulting from the negligent or intentional acts, errors or omissions, violation of applicable law, willful misconduct, breach of this Agreement, or any failure to perform in accordance with the standard required of a fiduciary as provided herein, in the operation and/or performance under this Agreement, by CONSULTANT and anyone acting on its behalf.

5.2 Insurance Requirements

Prior to the Effective Date, CONSULTANT shall have obtained, and thereafter shall maintain during the Term of this Agreement, and for so long thereafter as claims may be brought for acts or omissions occurring during the Term of this Agreement, all the insurance required in this Par. 5.2, and shall submit certificates for review and approval by SBCERS not less than annually. Each certificate of insurance shall list SBCERS as an additional insured and a loss payee under the policy. CONSULTANT shall not commence work until such insurance has been reviewed and approved by SBCERS. The certificates shall be on forms provided by SBCERS.

Acceptance of any such certificate shall not relieve CONSULTANT of any of the insurance requirements, nor limit the liability of CONSULTANT. CONSULTANT'S LIABILITY UNDER PARAGRAPH 5.1 IS NOT LIMITED TO THE POLICY LIMITS OF ANY INSURANCE COVERAGE. SBCERS reserves the right to require CONSULTANT to provide insurance policies for review by SBCERS.

(a) Workers' Compensation Insurance

As of the Effective Date, CONSULTANT has in place and shall maintain during the Term of this Agreement and as extended, Workers' Compensation Insurance, providing coverage for all of its employees and others acting on its behalf working in connection with performing the Services. In lieu of evidence of Workers' Compensation Insurance, SBCERS will accept a Self-Insured Certificate from the State of California.

(b) Commercial General Liability Insurance

As of the Effective Date, CONSULTANT has in place and shall and maintain during the Term of this Agreement and as extended, Automobile and General Liability Insurance providing coverage for all of its employees and others acting on its behalf working in connection with performing the Services. The amounts of such insurance coverage shall not be less than $1,000,000/Occurrence, Bodily Injury, Property Damage – Automobile, $1,000,000/Occurrence, Bodily Injury, Property Damage - General Liability.

(c) Professional Liability Insurance

As of the Effective Date, CONSULTANT has in place and shall and maintain during the Term of this Agreement and as extended, professional liability insurance (Errors and Omissions) with a minimum of $5,000,000 of liability coverage. A deductible may be acceptable upon approval of the SBCERS. The policy shall provide 30 days advance written notice to SBCERS for cancellation or reduction in coverage.

ARTICLE 6 - NOTICES

6.1 Any notice which SBCERS may desire or is required at any time to give or serve CONSULTANT shall be delivered personally, or be sent by express delivery or United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to 1211 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 900, Portland, Oregon 97204 Attn: CEO, or at such other address as shall have been last furnished in writing by CONSULTANT to SBCERS.

Any notice which CONSULTANT may desire or is required at any time to give or serve upon SBCERS shall be delivered personally, or be sent by express delivery or United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement System, 130 Robin Hill Road, Suite 100, Goleta, CA 93117 Attn: CEO, or at such other address as shall have been last furnished in writing by SBCERS to CONSULTANT.

Such personal delivery, express delivery or mailing in such manner shall constitute a good, sufficient and lawful notice and service thereof in all such cases. Notice and service shall be deemed effective (a) in the case of personal delivery or express delivery, upon actual receipt, (b) in the case of United States mail, on the fifth day after deposited with the US Postal Service.

ARTICLE 7 – LEGAL COMPLIANCE

7.1 CONSULTANT agrees that it is a fiduciary to SBCERS and will, to the extent applicable, perform all of its duties under this Agreement in accordance with the fiduciary standards as are applied to members of SBCERS' Board pursuant to Article XVI sec. 17 of the California Constitution and Section 31595 of the California Government Code.

7.2 CONSULTANT agrees that it will perform Services subject to and in furtherance of SBCERS' Investment Policies and Guidelines, as amended from time to time. SBCERS represents that it provided or caused to be provided to CONSULTANT, on or prior to the Effective Date, a copy of the SBCERS' Investment Policies and Guidelines and covenants that, during the Term, it shall promptly provide or cause to be provided to CONSULTANT a copy of any modification thereto.

7.3 During the Term, CONSULTANT agrees to observe and comply with all applicable Santa Barbara County, State of California and federal laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and policies now in effect or hereinafter enacted or issued, each of which are hereby made a part hereof and incorporated herein by reference.

7.4 CONSULTANT has read and is aware of the provisions of Section 1090 et seq. and Section 87100 et seq. of the California Government Code relating to conflict of interest of public officers and employees. Consultant agrees that it is unaware of any financial or economic interest or any public officer or employee of SBCERS relating to this Agreement. It is further understood and agreed that if such a financial interest does exist at the inception of this Agreement, it shall constitute "cause" for termination of this Agreement. CONSULTANT and its officers, agents and employees shall comply with the requirements of Government Code Section 87100 et seq. during the term of this Agreement and understands, acknowledges and agrees that CONSULTANT's staff providing services pursuant to this Agreement are required to file and shall timely file annual statements of economic interest pursuant to California law and SBCERS' Conflict of Interest Code.

7.5 CONSULTANT agrees that all of its directors, officers, employees and agents who provide services with respect to SBCERS shall comply with applicable federal, state and SBCERS' Conflict of Interest Code disclosure requirements. SBCERS represents that it has provided or has caused to be provided to CONSULTANT a copy of the Conflict of Interest Code on or prior to the Effective Date and covenants that it shall, during the Term, promptly provide or cause to be provided to CONSULTANT a copy of any modification thereto. CONSULTANT shall promptly notify SBCERS in writing of any known violation of the SBCERS' Conflict of Interest Code.

7.6 CONSULTANT shall not directly or indirectly receive any direct or indirect compensation in connection with its recommendations or advice made to SBCERS and shall promptly disclose in writing to SBCERS any investment or economic interest of CONSULTANT, or any of its officers, directors, agents or employees or affiliates, that may be enhanced by the recommendations or advice made to SBCERS in connection with the Services.

7.7 CONSULTANT agrees to disclose to SBCERS as soon as possible after becoming aware of: (a) any action, including investigations (other than routine examinations), initiated by any state or federal regulatory agency alleging violations of applicable law; (b) any material claim by any third party arising out of the conduct of CONSULTANT's business; and (c) any material change of circumstances affecting the CONSULTANT's business or operations.

7.8 No Pending Claims or Investigations. As of the date hereof, there are no pending claims, litigation or acts or omissions provided to third parties or any investigations ongoing now or in the last five years, regarding Securities and Exchanges Commission, the Internal Revenue Service or the California Franchise Board or any regulatory authorities regarding the CONSULTANT's professional work except what is disclosed on Schedule 7.8 and CONSULTANT agrees to update the Schedule promptly should the Schedule change in any way.

ARTICLE 8 – MISCELLANEOUS

8.1 This Agreement represents the entire understanding of SBCERS and CONSULTANT as to those matters contained herein. No prior oral or written understanding shall be of any force or effect with respect to those matters covered hereunder.

8.2 This Agreement is binding on the successors and assigns of the parties hereto. This Agreement is personal to the parties hereto and the Services to be provided are unique. Neither party may assign, transfer or otherwise substitute its interest in this Agreement or any of its obligations hereunder except with the parties' mutual written consent, which consent may be withheld for any reason whatsoever.

8.3 If any part of this Agreement is declared by a final decision of a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction to be unlawful, invalid or beyond the authority of either party to enter into or carry out, such decision shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this Agreement, which shall continue in full force and effect, provided that the remainder of this Agreement can be interpreted to give effect to the intentions of the parties.

8.4 Multiple counterparts of this Agreement may be executed by the parties but together they shall constitute one agreement.

8.5 This Agreement shall be deemed to have been entered into and performed in Santa Barbara County, California. All matters relating to this Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of California, without regard to conflict of law principals. In the event of any dispute between the parties, any legal action commenced in any forum shall be brought only in the California state courts located in and for Santa Barbara County, and the parties hereby consent to personal and subject matter jurisdiction in, and the proper venue of those courts.

8.6 SBCERS' waiver of the performance of any covenant, condition, obligation, representation, warranty or promise in this agreement shall not invalidate this Agreement or be deemed a waiver of any other covenant, condition, obligation, representation, warranty or promise. SBCERS' waiver of the time for performing any act or condition hereunder does not constitute a waiver of the act or condition itself.

8.7 There shall be no discrimination against any person or group of persons, on account of race, color, religion, creed, national origin, ancestry, gender, age, marital status, disability, or sexual orientation in the performance of this Agreement. CONSULTANT shall not establish or permit any such practice(s) of discrimination with reference to the Agreement or the performance of any Services. CONSULTANT's violation of this section shall be deemed to be a material breach of this Agreement.

8.8 CONSULTANT affirms that it does not have any financial interest or conflict of interest that would prevent CONSULTANT from providing unbiased, impartial service to SBCERS under this Agreement.

8.9 This Agreement may be modified or amended only in a writing signed by both parties, specifically referring to this Agreement.

8.10 During the term of this Agreement and for a period of one year after termination, SBCERS, on its own behalf or in the service or on behalf others, will not directly or indirectly solicit in any capacity, or directly or indirectly offer to employ or retain in any capacity, any personnel of CONSULTANT without first receiving permission from CONSULTANT, except pursuant to general advertisements or solicitations that are not directed at CONSULTANT's personnel. Such provision shall not prevent SBCERS from retaining the services of a third party consultant firm as part of a public request for proposal process which firm may have retained the services of a former CONSULTANT employee within the relevant time period without any involvement or participation of SBCERS.

8.11 The provisions of Paragraphs 1.5, 1.6, 4.4, 5.1, 6.1, 8.3, 8.5, 8.6, 8.10 and this 8.11 shall survive termination of this Agreement for whatever reason.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto each herewith subscribe the same in duplicate.

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM	**RVK, Inc.**
Dated: June 29, 2021	Dated: ______________________
By: Gregory Levin	By: ______________________
Its: ______________________	Its: ______________________

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto each herewith subscribe the same in duplicate.

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM

Dated: ______________________

By: ______________________

Its: ______________________

RVK, Inc.

Dated: 6/25/2021

By: Rebecca A. Gratsinger

Its: CEO

EXHIBIT A

SCOPE OF SERVICES

1. Investment Policy and Asset Allocation

a) Conduct an annual comprehensive review and analysis of investment policies, objectives, asset allocation and portfolio structure, and recommend changes, if appropriate. Outline work to be performed on this task in an annual strategic plan and work with SBCERS Staff on any necessary update SBCERS' investment policies and guidelines.
b) Work with SBCERS Staff and Actuary to conduct an Asset Liability study of the fund at least every three years, including recommending methodologies, assumptions, asset classes for consideration, and alternative asset allocations, taking into account actuary assumptions and funding status.
c) With guidance from the Board, develop an appropriate investment management structure for SBCERS and each asset class that considers the role of active versus passive strategies and investment management styles under different market conditions. Outline work to be performed on this task in an annual strategic plan.
d) Analyze the investment characteristics of available asset classes and the risk/return potential of alternative asset mix policies, and recommend changes where appropriate.
e) Advise on effective risk-based approaches to asset allocation (e.g. risk budgeting or value at risk) and further advise on how best to transition to a risk-based asset allocation approach for the Fund over time.
f) Provide advice and recommendations on various other investment policy issues including, but not limited to: cash flow, currency management, derivatives, rebalancing, use of soft dollars, securities lending, proxy voting, etc. Outline work to be performed on this task in annual strategic plan.

2. Investment Manager Search, Selection and Review:

a) Provide advice and recommendations on investment manager allocation and structure, manager mandates and performance benchmarks.
b) Provide ongoing monitoring and oversight of investment managers and their organizational risk to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, investment policies and manager mandates. Have periodic discussions with managers on investment performance and organizational issues (such as changes in ownership, staff, new products, etc.).

c) Advise on manager retention/termination and assist in developing a formal manager review process.
d) Conduct investment manager search and selection services, and due diligence reviews and make recommendations as necessary.
e) Assist SBCERS Staff with negotiating appropriate investment management fees including monitoring and evaluating manager trading and transaction costs.
f) Provide recommendations for retention or replacement of investment managers and facilitate transition management services as necessary.
g) Provide opportunities for SBCERS Staff to observe or participate in Investment Manager Search, Selection and Review activities.
h) Report any significant changes to relevant investment management firms' ownership, organizational structure and personnel in a timely manner.
i) Provide a quarterly summary of Investment Manager Search, Selection and Review activities.

3. Performance Monitoring and Reporting

a) Provide a monthly performance report that:
    a) Provides absolute return for the fund, individual managers and policy benchmark.
    b) Shows target vs. actual allocation
    c) Provides weighted returns
b) Provide a Quarterly Report that:
    a) Compares the investment performance of the total fund, asset classes and investment managers to relevant benchmarks and "peer group" samples.
    b) Recommends appropriate performance benchmarks for the total fund, each asset class, portfolio composite and individual investment managers.
    c) Performs attribution analysis on total fund and at the manager level to determine sources of over and under performance.
c) Provide regular risk-based reporting with respect to the fund.
d) Report timely to SBCERS on items referenced above.

4. Securities Lending Monitoring

a) Review Securities Lending program for effectiveness and potential improvements every three years.

b) Provide regular monitoring of SBCERS' securities lending program, including income received, appropriateness of collateral and compliance with SBCERS' securities lending guidelines.

5. Client Service and Education

a) Attend in person a minimum of 8 investment-oriented Board meetings per year, including one annual Board retreat.
b) Prepare and present monthly and quarterly reports on investment performance.
c) Assist actuary in developing capital markets assumptions.
d) Coordinate effectively with SBCERS Staff, the actuary, the custodian bank and SBCERS' specialty investment consultants.
e) Respond to inquiries between meetings in an appropriate and prompt manner; (i.e., be available to respond in a timely manner to calls, emails or other communication from SBCERS Staff and board members.)
f) Report any significant changes in the firm's ownership, organizational structure and personnel in a timely manner.
g) Assist on special projects as needed.
h) Provide all other investment advisory-related services as requested.
i) Provide education to Board and SBCERS Staff on investments issues and participate in ad hoc workshops as requested by the Board from time to time.

6. Review, Search and Selection of Other Investment- Related Vendors

a) Provide advice and recommendations on custodial arrangements, (including custodian review services). Such services shall not include a custodian search unless further agreed upon by the parties.
b) Assist with evaluation, search and selection involving other investments-related consultants and vendors as required.
c) Assist SBCERS Staff as requested to monitor and review the performance of the SBCERS private equity, real estate and private natural resources and infrastructure portfolios.

EXHIBIT B

COMPENSATION

1. SBCERS shall pay CONSULTANT for performance of the Services set forth in Exhibit A the annual fee, which is inclusive of reasonable travel, lodging and meal expenses, set forth below opposite the applicable period.

Period	Annual Fee
Year 1	$314,500
Year 2	$323,500
Year 3	$333,500
Year 4	$343,500
Year 5	$353,500
First 12-Month Extension (if applicable)	$363,500
Second 12-Month Extension (if applicable)	$373,500

2. Annual fee includes the in-person meetings described in Section 5(a) of the Scope of Services (*i.e.*, each year, 8 in-person meetings plus one retreat). At SBCERS' request, CONSULTANT will attend additional in-person meetings at a price of $3,500 per meeting.
3. For other services or projects not included in Exhibit A, SBCERS and CONSULTANT will negotiate the scope of such services and project, and the fees associated therewith.
4. <u>Billing and Payment</u>

   CONSULTANT shall invoice SBCERS on a quarterly basis, in arrears, for 1/4th of the above applicable annual fee.

   SBCERS shall pay CONSULTANT within thirty (30) days, upon receipt of each invoice.

*   *   *   *   *

SCHEDULE 7.8

PENDING CLAIMS OR INVESTIGATIONS

CONSULTANT has no pending claims, litigation or acts or omissions provided to third parties or any investigations ongoing now or in the last five years, regarding Securities and Exchanges Commission, the Internal Revenue Service or the California Franchise Board or any regulatory authorities.

In December 2017, more than three years ago, our firm—along with 31 other organizations and individuals—was named in a complaint filed, not by a client, but by eight individuals described as pension plan participants and taxpayers in the state of Kentucky. The complaint named numerous individuals and organizations including asset managers, actuaries, staff of the retirement board (chief investment officers, asset class officers, executive directors), numerous individual trustees, fiduciary counsel to the board, the pension system itself and even the Government Finance Officers Association.

We provide details of the proceedings below; however, as it relates to RVK, we continue to state with great confidence and without reservation that the claims made against RVK are completely without merit. It is important to note that in RVK's 35-year history, we have never been named in a complaint or involved in litigation initiated by a client.

From the date of being filed in December 2017, the complaint moved slowly through a series of procedural stages. In a unanimous decision issued on July 9, 2020, the Kentucky Supreme Court sent the complaint back to the trial court with orders that it be dismissed on the grounds that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. That order became final on July 30, 2020.

The eight private plaintiffs then attempted to revive their lawsuit in the trial court, and the newly-elected Attorney General sought to intervene to represent the state. The Attorney General also filed a duplicate standalone lawsuit, but did not require responses from any defendants. The Attorney General has not alleged any new claims against RVK in the Intervening Complaint or the duplicate suit. On December 28, 2020, after nearly four months of deliberation, the trial court ruled that the private plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed, but the Attorney General should be permitted to intervene. The trial court also denied the private plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. The decision effectively permitted the newly-elected Attorney General to investigate and prosecute the case on behalf of the Commonwealth and its agencies rather than the private plaintiffs.

However, on December 31, 2020, A new set of "Tier 3" private plaintiffs represented by private counsel have sought to join the original case by filing a putative third amended complaint. On February 1, 2021, after the court advised that an amended complaint would not be permitted, the

Tier 3 plaintiffs filed both a motion for leave to file an intervening complaint and an identical stand-alone suit. The “Tier 3” movants are members of the KRS pension plans. However, these members are hybrid cash participants—who have repeated essentially the same claims as the original plaintiffs in an amended complaint, adding a series of allegations regarding events from and after 2014, and joining Michael Rudzik (Prisma) and David Eager (briefly a KRS Trustee and now the KRS Executive Director) as party defendants.

The Attorney General advised the court in January 2021 – after the putative third amended complaint was filed by the “Tier 3” members - that it intended to file an amended intervening complaint before proceeding further. The Attorney General requested a series of lengthy extensions for the filing of its amended intervening complaint beginning on February 8, 2021 when KRS admitted to the court that it had contracted with the New York law firm, Calcaterra Pollack LLP, in November 2020 to provide “legal investigative services related to investment activities conducted by the Kentucky Retirement Systems to determine if there are any improper or illegal activities on the part of the parties involved.” The court deferred action on the “Tier 3” member motion for leave to file an intervening complaint pending the filing of the Attorney General’s amended intervening complaint.

KRS provided the Calcaterra Report to the Attorney General on May 13, 2021 and the Attorney General filed an amended intervening complaint on May 24, 2021. This amended pleading was almost identical to the original intervening complaint, dropped claims against only two of the 30+ defendants and made no reference to the Calcaterra Report or its findings and recommendations. KRS (now known as KPPA), for its part, voted on May 26, 2021 to “not intervene as a plaintiff in the Attorney General’s amended complaint in the Mayberry action” and that it “does not file any litigation against any party in the Mayberry claims at this time.” The defendants will be required to respond to the Attorney General’s amended intervening complaint within 45 days of the date the court accepts filing of the complaint.

Meanwhile, the Attorney General and the defendants, including RVK, have vigorously opposed the motion of the “Tier 3” members to intervene and that motion is scheduled to be heard June 7, 2021.

*   *   *   *   *